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ABSTRACT
This doctoral dissertation aims to offer new insights into the environmental compliance
behavior of small firms (SFs). Specifically, the dissertation examines the impacts of two
categories of factors. The first category concerns internal motivations that drive SFs'
decisions to comply or not comply with a formal environmental regulation. The other
comprises external factors that affect formation of SFs' perspectives on rule compliance.
Rule compliance behavior results from complicated webs of both economic and social
factors. Nevertheless, existing regulatory enforcement strategies have focused heavily on
rational/economic factors without considering the significant effects of interactions
between the two and consequently failed to produce the behavior they seek. Starting from
an examination of the crucial characteristics of SFs that distinguish them from large
firms, the dissertation sheds light on how social factors affect SFs' views on economic
factors such as the price of penalty and compliance costs/benefits. In so doing, it
contributes to knowledge of how formal regulatory enforcement can alter SFs'
environmental compliance behavior.
The regulatory programs in Massachusetts and southern California targeting the dry
cleaning industry are excellent cases through which to evaluate the central issues of SFs'
compliance. The two programs are comparable in that regulatory requirements are
equally strict; formal sanctions are equally severe; and regulated groups are similar in
cultural background and other sectoral aspects. A notable difference is that there was a
sudden rise in compliance rates in Massachusetts as compared to southern California. The
comparative case study draws on ethnographic analysis based on participant observation,
in-depth interview data and surveys.
Unlike scholarly works in the traditions of deterrence theory and the theory of norms
which depicted compliance behavior as a function of either a strict cost-benefit
calculation or of a sense of moral obligation to obey the law, respectively, my dissertation
portrays compliance as a configuration of regulatory relationships between regulated
entities and regulators, with trade associations playing a steering role. In so doing, the
dissertation suggests how regulatory policies can alter SFs' choices of actions to best
encourage compliance. With a redefinition of the role of government, the dissertation
proposes strategies for institutional arrangements that create and sustain reflexive trust,
and thus expand SFs' willingness, opportunity and capacity to comply.
The dissertation is a pioneering study examining dynamic interactions between economic
and social factors in the context of regulatory enforcement. It will contribute to both rule
compliance and regulation theory by advancing several principles not clearly delineated
in existing theories. Considering the large cumulative impacts of SFs on the environment
and human health, effective regulatory enforcement is crucial. A better understanding of
SFs' motivations for compliance will assist agencies to meet this challenge.
Dissertation Supervisors: Martin Rein (MIT) & David Laws (MIT)
Readers: Archon Fung (Harvard), Dara O'Rourke (UC Berkeley) & Michael Piore (MIT)
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
THE SUBJECT OF STUDY: RULE COMPLIANCE AND
REGULATORY REFORM
Puzzle in a Story of the Dry Cleaning Industry
With growing concerns about the cumulative impacts of small pollution sources,
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) assessed in 1988 which small
business sectors were considered high-risk. The dry cleaning industry was second only to
auto body repair shops (Hillenbrand 1988). Furthermore, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), in the 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendment, classified 189
chemicals as hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) and attempted to set a national emission
standard (NESHAP) for each classified chemical. In 1991, Perc, a potential human
carcinogen, was the first NESHAP promulgated by EPA under section 112 of the 1990
Amendment (EPA 1993). The dry cleaning industry is the single largest user of Perc.
Provided with this regulatory rationale, federal and state environmental agencies
have attempted to increase the compliance rate of the dry cleaning industry-the majority
being small shops-with regard to Perc's NESHAP. Agencies' strategies have focused on
increasing the severity of formal sanctions. Despite these regulatory efforts, there have
been no significant increases in compliance rates in most states. The exception to the
nationwide trend was Massachusetts. The Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Protection (MADEP) launched the Environmental Results Program (ERP) in 1997, which
significantly increased compliance in the dry cleaning industry. Before the ERP, the
industry's estimated compliance rate remained below 10%. One year after the ERP, the
compliance rate skyrocketed to 76% and showed an increasing trend, reaching 86% in
2001. As a result, the industry reduced its Perc use by 80% during the same time period
(Personal communication with the MADEP).
Meanwhile, in the late 1990s, South Coast Air Quality Management District
(SCAQMD) in California, which has the most stringent environmental regulatory policies
in the U.S., began investing greater resources in compliance efforts. SCAQMD's
compliance efforts were a response to the low compliance rate of the dry cleaning
industry between 1990 and 1996. They included both increased formal sanctions and a
compliance assistance program (Cleaners Assistance Project) via community groups and
a university-based research center. Unlike the Massachusetts case, however, the southern
California case did not produce satisfactory outcomes. An audit in 1999 of 340 dry
cleaning facilities in the district demonstrated a 5 percent rate of compliance. While a
majority of the violations involved recordkeeping, Perc leaks, one of the most serious
violations, were detected in 35 percent of the facilities. The results of the 1999 audit were
even worse than those of a 1997 audit, when 208 dry cleaning facilities demonstrated a
10 percent rate of compliance. Perc leaks were detected in 22 percent of the facilities in
1997 (SCAQMD 2002).
The southern California case was an unhappy reminder that even with greater
threats and assistance, there was still uncertainty on whether regulatory requirements
would be met (Gottlieb 2001). Why did drycleaners in Massachusetts and in southern
California produce different outcomes under similar regulatory conditions? How can we
account for the difference in compliance in the two cases?
Environmental Regulations and Compliance of Small Firms
The situation in which one agent commands others to do something turns up as a
significant theme in social relations (Milgram 1965). It is expressed in our everyday life
where government "regulation" occurs in many rooms. I must clarify at this moment that
this dissertation is not concerned with the question of whether or not formal regulations
undermine individual freedom, which has brought about an intellectual stalemate
between those who argue for strong regulation of business and those who advocate total
deregulation. The dichotomized regulation/deregulation debate seems quite unproductive
because, as Polanyi (1944) argues, regulation both extends and restricts freedom; only the
balance of the freedoms lost and won is important.
Rather, the research project is grounded on a fair assumption that at least in some
social arenas, government regulations are required to control socially harmful behavior
and to advance collective social ends. My focus is strictly on this kind of protective
regulation. Smoking-ban policy is a good example that falls into the above category. I
remember that fifteen years ago, people were allowed to smoke while traveling by
airplane a id studying in classrooms. Today, smoking in public spaces is strictly regulated
in the U.S by public and private policies in the name of the public interest. It appears
universall , agreed-upon regulation supported by the general public.
Ai other example is found in the environmental arena which I propose to study in
this disser ation. Growing public concerns about environmental degradation and its
impacts oi human health have forced government to attempt to reduce pollutants
generated >y industrial activities. As far as the public health is concerned, few people
deny the r :ed for protective regulations albeit there is a disagreement on specific ways.
In he environmental arena, a number of regulations have been created and
enforced L nce the 1970s for the purposes of preserving the natural environment and
protecting human health. One of agencies' greatest responsibilities has been ensuring
compliant : with statutes and regulations (Crow 2003) because the level of compliance
could be N ewed as a proxy of effective regulation and a fair test of the state authority
(Tylor 19! 0). However, compliance has never been complete. The compliance issue has
become agencies' greatest challenge. Regulatory agencies report that small firms are even
more troublesome than large ones with respect to compliance (Hawkins 1984). A recent
report by the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB 2002) reveals that across a range of
legislative areas, small businesses have a negative view of government regulation with
key concerns including the complexity, volume, rate of changes, and inspections. (Patton
& Worthington 2003).
Indeed, traditional wisdom says that small firms are more pollution-intensive than
large firms because their use of inputs is inefficient, pollution control equipment is rarely
installed, and owners/managers are unaware of the health and environmental impacts of
operation (Blackman 2000, Kent 1991, Brown, Hamilton & Medoff 1990). An individual
small firm's impact on the environment may be negligible. When they are summed up,
however, the cumulative impact becomes significant. Yet despite their adverse impacts,
regulatory agencies have paid scant attention to small firms for various reasons.
From a technical perspective, small firms are difficult to monitor because they are
numerous and geographically dispersed. Given staffing and resource limitations,
government agencies attempt to deploy constrained resources in an effective manner, and
thus target more visible, large-scale firms while overlooking small ones.
Economically, small firms are characterized by small operating margins and
working capital difficulties, and thus lack capacities to absorb rising costs (Mead &
Liedholm, 1998). They, therefore, tend not to install non-productive assets such as
pollution abatement equipment (Crow 1998). While large firms can disperse compliance
cost burdens by slightly increasing product prices, this tactic is unavailable to most small
firms as their level of production is too low to diffuse increased costs among consumers.
In this context, small firms are left with two choices. One is to fully comply with
requirements and assume significant increase in costs; the other is partial or complete
non-compliance, hoping to escape unnoticed by regulatory agencies. Conventional
theories predict that most small firms fall into non-compliance because compared to large
firms, they are more likely to experience significant cost burdens in meeting regulatory
requirements (Sommers & Cole 1988). Because rising costs threaten firms' profits and
their survival, agencies tend to be sympathetic and give them exemptions from severe
enforcement of regulations.
A third reason, if not universal, lies in a tacit, political deal between small firms
and elected officials who are in charge of agencies. Tendler calls it the "devil's deal": "If
you vote for me, I will not force you to comply with regulations; and I will keep the
police and inspectors from harassing you". This political deal advocates reforms that
grant small firms special relief from burdens associated with environmental and labor
regulations (Tendler, 2002).
Given the situation, is there any way to promote small firms' compliance with
formal regulations? This is the issue I pose in the dissertation in the most general terms.
Before discussing this issue, however, I must remind readers of the story of the dry
cleaning industry that prompted me to grapple with the environmental compliance
behavior of small firms. Certainly, we can infer from low environmental compliance rates
that small drycleaners face difficulties meeting regulatory requirements. But this does, of
course, not mean that all drycleaners do not comply, as shown in the Massachusetts case.
Why did the Massachusetts drycleaners outperform their equivalents in other states?
What caused such a wide difference in rule compliance?
The puzzle raised in the story needs to be approached in a broader context to
address the general problems of regulating small firms: "Why do some smallfirms in an
industry comply with regulation while others do not?" In the more concrete, researchable
form, the question is rephrased as follows: "When an authority commands smallfirms to
meet regulatory requirements, under what conditions or combination of conditions will
they carry out the command, and under what conditions or combination of conditions will
they refuse?"' This is a primary research question which aims to identify underlying
reasons for small firms' moving toward or away from a desired regulatory outcome.
There have recently been a growing number of studies exploring the issue of
environmental regulation in the context of its impact on small firms. Although they have
provided instructive insights into small firms' environmental behavior, few have
investigated reasons underlying their actual behavior. As Petts et al. (1999) stated, quoted
in Patton and Worthington (2003), many studies have predominantly examined 'what'
actions have been undertaken and 'which' attitudes are important. However, simply
knowing the what and the which is not enough if our goal is to yield better outcomes
through higher compliance. What is necessary to know is 'why' the actual action has
occurred and 'in what ways' the attitudes driving the actions have been formed and
developed. Making a policy recommendation without acknowledging the true reasons
behind actions is much the same as writing a medical prescription without a diagnosis.
The dissertation's central research question aims to fill the gap left in this under-explored
arena of small firm regulation.
Theories of Rule Compliance in Brief
The reasons for rule compliance have been discussed in two distinctive theories:
deterrence theory and the theory of norms. Although the two theories were initially
developed to explain individual behavior, they have exerted greater influences in
analyzing firm behavior regardless of its size.
Their basic notions and relative strengths/weaknesses are discussed in greater
detail in Chapter 2. Very briefly, deterrence theory posits that rule compliance is based
exclusively upon a strict cost-benefit analysis. This theory assumes that actors make
choices in a way that maximizes their expected utility by comparing the monetary costs
of compliance with the multiplication of deterrence factors such as probability of
I am indebted to Milgram (1965) for the form of this question.
detection, probability of penalty imposition when detected, and severity of punishment.
Assuming that the monetary costs for meeting regulatory requirements are invariable, the
three deterrence factors are the major determinants identified by this theory that should
explain compliance (or noncompliance).
In contrast, the theory of norms claims that rule compliance is based more on the
internalized values of regulated entities than on rational calculation. Credible
commitment to compliance is determined by two related sets of considerations: a sense of
civic duty to obey laws and a more specific evaluation of the appropriateness of a given
regulation. The former appeals to moral obligation or conscience by putting shame on
violators as a self-imposed deterrent while the latter is comprised of the reasonableness of
the rule resulting from the manner in which the rule is enacted, the fairness of the
authorities in enforcing the rule, and the extent to which other people comply (Tyler
1990).
As we will see throughout the dissertation, however, applications of both theories
to the dry cleaning cases introduced in the first section of this chapter do not yield
satisfactory explanations of the observed phenomena. Recognizing the limits of the
existing theories, I turn to an institutional explanation which has received scant, if any,
attention in relation to this topic. The idea is that it is something about the patterns of
interactions among actors that will account for the differential compliance trends. I
propose that regulatory relationships (adversarial vs. cooperative) function as a
primordial factor that determines firms' compliant behavior by affecting their subjective
perspectives on the legitimacy and compliance costs/benefits, and formation of norms-
like behavioral guidance. The idea was inspired by the framing theory (Schon & Rein
1994). I argue that the framing of a given regulation is even more important than
currently appreciated. It seems that institutional arrangements frame action situations and
the way a situation is framed has significant effects on choice behavior (Bowles 1998).
The main framework I will use to develop an institutional account is to examine in the
regulatory system of these cases the relationship among small firms and the relationship
between the groups of small firms and formal regulators.
Once we confirm that the institutional approach, which I call the 'relational'
approach, provides a convincing account, we will proceed to deal with in an informative
manner the aforementioned issue of "how regulation can alter small firms' behavior to
promote compliance." In a narrow sense, this intends to show technical ways of removing
regulatory barriers to rule compliance. In a broader and more fundamental sense, the
discussion seeks to engage current debates about regulatory reform. The discussion in
this dissertation will be restricted to just two subtopics: reasons for small firms'
compliance behavior and implications for regulatory reform (in relation to institutional
development).
Small Firms' Rule Compliance and the Need for Regulatory Reform
Generally speaking, regulatory reform aims to make regulation more effective. But what
does "reform" aim at in a rigorous sense? In other words, in which direction should it go
to be more effective?
During the 1960s, regulatory agencies were viewed as weak, understaffed, and
unduly inclined towards cooperative rather than coercive manners of enforcement.
Regulations were said to have been captured by the regulated entities. Consequently,
regulatory reform in the 1970s meant to make regulation "tougher" (Bardach & Kagan
1982). The basic reform strategy for effective regulation, therefore, was to: 1) tighten
legal standards; 2) make enforcement intensified; 3) increase inspections in frequency;
and 4) increase sanctions in severity. In the arena of pollution control, this strategy has
taken on the features of what is now derisively called command-and-control (CAC)
regulation, which requires industry to install specific technologies onto the end of the
pipes in order to meet permitted pollution level. Firms were obligated to get permits in
advance for a wide range of new operations, and in addition, were required to undertake
extensive record keeping and reporting of compliance efforts and of the environmental
and health impacts of their operations (Levin 1982).
In the late 1970s and 1980s, regulatory reform took on a totally different meaning.
From the perspective of reformers, most being economists, CAC regulation was too
costly. Until the early and mid 1970s, the costs of compliance were not a serious concern
for reformers. It was usually thought that firms could pay for required abatement
measures out of profits or pass them onto consumers. But experience revealed that the
regulatory pendulum had swung too far and had reached the point of diminishing returns
(Bardach & Kaga 1982). For example, the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality (1979)
estimated that water pollution control regulation would impose $18-$19 billion in annual
compliance costs, while the benefit would be only $12.3 billion. As such, regulatory
reform in this period aimed at "cost effectiveness" implying moderating the excessive
regulation. To address this concern, reformers proposed market incentives as
management tools that could offer increased flexibility to regulatory agencies and
industry. Pollution permit trading and pollution taxes are the most familiar examples of
this efficiency-oriented reform.
Have these two versions of reform strategies lived up to their promises? Can they
be "effective" in regulating small firms? I think not.
The regulatory techniques of CAC regulation, the first version of reform, can be
implemented in a straightforward manner: set a level of safety to protect human health;
mandate the specific devices and processes to guarantee attainment of the safety level;
deploy field inspectors and attorneys with sufficient sanctions and remedial power; and
insulate the regulators from political pressures (Bardach & Kagan 1982). The problem of
these techniques is that it is quite difficult to determine the levels of standards,
enforcement, and sanctions. CAC regulation assumes a modest omniscience of regulatory
agencies (Karkkainen et al. 2000). However, it is limited in its inability to gather
information on complex and continuously changing industrial practices (Dorf and Sabel
1998). Contrary to the assumption that regulatory agencies can know the answer to
pollution problems, they rarely have sufficient knowledge or information to deal with
rapidly changing technical or managerial problems.
The problem is even greater when dealing with small firms. Under complex and
changing conditions, "problems outside a regulated zone frequently become as significant
as those within it" (Sabel et al. 2000). These problems cause too little regulation as well
as overregulation because regulators must isolate discrete problems, drawing sharp
demarcations between what is regulated and what is not (Karkkainen et al. 2000). In
addition, technical problems are inherent in the CAC regime. Technology standards
require all firms to install certain types of pollution abatement equipment. Agencies have
to check whether the equipment is installed. In reality, however, agencies simply do not
have enough resources to monitor these firms. They do not even know how many small
firms should be covered in their jurisdictions. Monitoring compliance is generally more
difficult for process standards than for technology standards for the same reason
(Blackman 2000).
Market-based regulation, a second reform, is by no means free from critiques
despite its greater flexibility and relaxed assumption of regulatory omniscience. Setting
aside a number of serious drawbacks such as inequitable distributions of pollution, it
confronts similar fundamental problem of CAC, which is the problem of information
acquisition. Markets are not natural: they are man-made institutions (Polanyi 1944).
Creating markets requires vast amounts of detailed information. Before setting emission
caps and allocating tradable pollution permits, for example, regulators "must know
individual and aggregate emission levels, how much harm results from various levels of
emissions, and what reductions are feasible" (Karkkainen et al. 2000). While it is more
likely that markets for pollution permit trading among large-scale firms exist, there are no
such things for small firms.
Pollution tax is also ineffective when applied to small firms. First of all, it is
difficult to determine the appropriate level of tax. Second, when tax is imposed on
harmful inputs rather than emissions directly, as is the case with tax on Perc in the dry
cleaning industry, it does not create incentives for pollution control per se. Third, for
taxes to be effective, there must be enough input substitutes at reasonable prices, and
firms must have reliable information on input substitutes (Blackman 2000). This is less
likely for small firms than for large firms. Without meeting these pre-requisites, the tax
will simply increase production costs without changing actual behavior or will lead them
to switch to dirtier inputs (Biller & Quientero 1995).
New Direction of Regulatory Reform
Effective regulatory programs require continual processes for acquiring updated
information. But neither command-and-control nor market-based approaches are well
suited to adaptation to new information and institutional learning (Karkkainen 2001,
Karkkaine et al. 2000). Learning processes are needed to help actors achieve goals by
correcting errors, solving problems in new ways, and developing knowledge in dealing
with internal processes and external stimuli (O'Rourke & Lee 2004).
Fiorino (200 1) and Glasbergen (1996) propose three forms of learning as critical
to improved environmental policy: technical learning, conceptual learning, and social
learning. Technical learning involves the search for new policy instruments (such as the
advent of pollution trading). Conceptual learning focuses on redefining policy goals,
problem definitions, and strategies (such as the switch to pollution prevention from
pollution control). Finally, social learning involves new interactions and relations
between actors that help create an environment supportive of identifying solutions to
policy problems.
Regulatory reform must be directed toward encouraging a process of social
learning. In this way, relationships between regulators and the regulated can be
transformed, implementation can occur not through control but through joint exploration
and information sharing, and uncertainty can be acknowledged and accepted as the reality
of problem solving (Fiorino 2001).
This new approach starts from questioning the taken-for-granted assumption of
purely rational actors and the resulting individualistic approach to the regulatory process.
Regardless of whether it was through a CAC or market-inspired mechanism,
previous regulatory reform began with the premise that firms and individuals are purely
self-interested. As such, predominant regulatory institutions are designed to stimulate
actions that maximize individual actors' self-interest. By doing so, they promise to
produce socially superior outcomes. However, the view of individuals as self-interest
maximizers and something primary is not natural. This view is simply the product of the
19th century philosophical heritage. The pursuit of self-interest may inevitably be bad for
society as a whole. When institutions and policies are designed as if self-interest is the
sole motivating factor, they not only justify this behavior, but also encourage and
reproduce it (Schneider & Ingram 1997, Stevens 1993). Indeed, a number of empirical
and experimental studies have revealed that a sole emphasis on self-interest to motivate
socially desired behavior may actually result in the opposite consequence (Cardenas et al.
2000, Ostman 1998, Kunreuther & Eastering 1990, Titmus 1971). All too often, people
do not abide by the principles that scientists expect them to follow.
It is worth noting here that questioning a self-interest assumption does not mean a
denial of rationality. Obviously, human agent is both rational and arational
simultaneously. Therefore, asking which assumption we should take is a wrong question.
More productive is to explore under what conditions people are more versus less likely to
be rational. Unfortunately, precedent regulatory reforms have been biased toward
instrumental rationality while ignoring the other side. To help regulatory reform move
forward, therefore, we need to pay particular attention to public spiritedness, solidarity
and communal approaches. The soul of protective regulation should not be self-interest
maximization. It must be to induce and promote social responsibility whereby actors
realize the harmful effects resulting from their diverse activities. The latter part of the
dissertation will show how the regulatory institution that inspires this moral component
through social learning helped the Massachusetts drycleaners (as opposed to those of
southern California) make a credible commitment to rule compliance.
Case Selection
To explore plausible answers to research questions, this dissertation examines the stories
of dry cleaning communities in southern California and Massachusetts. These two cases
provide a particularly interesting comparison that helps uncover the determinants of
regulatory compliance. Let us first look into the shared features, and those that vary,
between the cases.
The only observable meaningful difference between southern California and
Massachusetts is their sharply contrasting compliance trends. Throughout the late 1990s,
the southern California dry cleaning industry exhibited a decreasing trend in compliance,
culminating in the low rate previously mentioned. Over the same period, the
Massachusetts industry demonstrated a significant increase, consistently resulting in
exceptionally high compliance rates.
Nevertheless, there are no significant variations in formal regulatory
characteristics that would potentially explain the opposing trends. Although drycleaners
in the two regions are subject to different regulations, de facto requirements are nearly
identical, as both sets of regulations are based heavily upon EPA guidance.
The probability of detection is also more or less identical across the regions.
Although southern California drycleaners outnumber their Massachusetts counterparts,
the former region deploys a proportionally higher number of field inspectors. In addition,
the severity of formal sanctions does not vary significantly between the two locales.
Fourth, research subjects' formal educational levels are almost identical in the two
regions. In existing studies of environmental compliance and technological innovation,
formal education is treated as a proxy for human capital (Blackman & Bannister 1998)
and secondary socialization (Lin 1991), which increase awareness of the private health
benefits associated with compliance. Thus, it has been believed that there is a positive
correlation between compliance and formal education. In southern California,
approximately 78% of Korean drycleaners are college graduates or higher, while the
comparable figure in Massachusetts is 76%. The entire balance of both peer groups has
completed high school.
Fifth, the overwhelming majority of target constituents - Korean immigrants that
account for 60-70% of the dry cleaning industry in the two regions (and in other major
U.S. urban areas) - share the same cultural background. This feature holds particularly
important implications for the study of rule compliance.
Comparing such similar groups makes it possible to hold the cultural variable
constant. Because it is reasonable to assume that these groups were influenced by the
same culture and experienced similar socialization processes, they are expected to share
similar social norms. This means that different compliance behaviors cannot here be
attributed to cultural differences. Conversely, it implies that differential behaviors must
result from other variables.
In addition, Korean immigrants' socio-economic and ethnic characteristics
provide a vantage point through which to examine the dynamics of compliance behavior.
As mentioned earlier, the dissertation's primary assumption about human nature is that
actors are simultaneously rational and arational. There is good reason to believe that
Korean immigrants conform to this assumption. To help understand this, it must be noted
that among Koreans who wished to emigrate to the U.S., only a small group of people
who met required selection categories successfully navigated the legal barriers set up in
both countries. Although the categories are sometimes indistinct, the analytic distinction
is important.
For much of the postwar period, U.S. immigration law showed clear preference
for professionals with a considerable amount of money, and particularly favored relatives
of U.S. citizens and permanent residents. This preference was even more pronounced for
Asian immigrants. Unskilled workers were admitted only when preferred candidates had
not exhausted the quota (Light & Bonacich 1988). Therefore, unlike pre-World War II
Chinese and Japanese immigrants, Korean immigrants since the 1960s were highly-
educated, urban, middle or upper-middle class professionals. The poverty-stricken were
simply not permitted entrance into the U.S. (Kim 1981).
According to Light and Bonacich's (1988) study, the predominant purpose of the
Koreans' emigration was economic gain, followed by educational opportunities for their
children. And the percentage of self-employed Koreans exceeded that of all other
immigrating ethnic groups. The higher percentage of Korean entrepreneurs may be
attributable to class resources such as "bourgeois values, attitudes, knowledge, and skills
transmitted intergenerationally in the course of primary socialization" (Light & Bonacich
1988, p. 19). Therefore, through informal and formal training, Korean immigrants seem to
be more inclined than other groups to rational business mind and consequently, self-
interest maximization.
On the other hand, these immigrants were predisposed to obey formal laws.
Korea's immigration law under successive military regimes contained a restrictive clause
that prohibited a certain segment of the population from leaving the country. This
category was made up of political dissidents who might injure the national reputation
abroad (Light & Bonacich 1988). Those who filtered through this legal restriction are
therefore considered to be highly conformable to existing legal doctrines.
Finally, many Koreans are strongly influenced by the Confucian doctrine equating
the authority of the State with the authority of parents and teachers. Reinforced by
official propaganda under military governments until the mid 1980s, this ethnic heritage
contributes to Korean immigrants' deep-rooted propensity for obeying formal laws. This
point will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5. In short, given their inherently
conflicting inclinations, we can test under what conditions actors will follow rational or
normative behavior with respect to rule compliance.
Admittedly, a single study of drycleaners may not be sufficient to generalizable
conclusion across the small firm sector. Nevertheless, the dissertation will be much more
than a monograph on the dry cleaning industry. In addition to Korean immigrants' socio-
economic and cultural traits, the dry cleaning industry entails several common features of
U.S. industries comprising small firms. To employ Durkheim's vocabulary, this industry
serves as "one well-made experiment": a detailed analysis of a single industry that
reflects typical features of small firms. One example is their wide geographic sprawl. Dry
cleaning facilities are ubiquitous in major urban areas and function as non-point source
polluters. Another typical feature is a flat organizational structure, where a firm is totally
controlled by owners/top managers. Third, the industry is overrepresented by a particular
ethnic group, Korean immigrants. The literature on migrant workers in the U.S. shows
that certain immigrant groups concentrate in identifiable industries that consist of small
firms, as distinguished from large-scale firms (Piore 1990, Light & Bonacich 1988,
Portes & Mozo 1985). The Korean dry cleaning industry is a good example of such an
ethnic enclave. An exploration of the dry cleaning industry will reduce the existing gap
between theories of small firm regulation and the paucity of empirical research.
Changing patterns of relations among the state, industry, and society have
received much attention lately. This attention has highlighted interest in the social
character of regulatory regimes that I propose to study and raised questions of how these
characteristics affect institutional performance. Current debates about these relationships
suffer from the lack of a detailed empirical base. With the two cases in the dry cleaning
industry that naturally lend themselves to comparison, the dissertation will address this
deficit directly.
Foreshadower of Main Arguments
The dynamics of rule compliance behavior entails some implications for more effective
regulation. We will explore them in the following chapters, but it will be useful here to
foreshadow the key elements of my central arguments.
First, I partially reject deterrent explanations and point out the limits of normative
accounts in the small firm context. Instead, I argue that compliance behavior results from
complicated webs of both economic and social factors. Existing theories overlook
significant effects of interactions between the two, and consequently fail to yield the
effective enforcement strategies they seek.
Second, the foundation for developing an alternative approach lies in a careful
examination of the dynamic interactions of economic and social variables-how these
play out both in the relationship among small firms and in the relationship between
groups of small firms and regulators. The ideas are two: 1) Though concerns about
compliance cost are important for rule compliance, they are even more socially
constructed than the standard economic accounts suggest. Social construction of
economic factors is epitomized in the discovery of the nurtured benefits of compliance
that are invisible in expected utility function of the deterrence framework; and 2) Though
actors follow recommended behavioral guidance, it is by no means blind conformity to
social norms. Rather, non/compliance is a strategic response to two related sets of social
relations, that is, reactions to formal regulatory enforcement and a selected means to
strengthen social status and identity.
Third, it is cooperative regulatory relationships developed between active trade
associations and responsive regulatory agencies that account ultimately for small firms'
compliance behavior. I propose that the patterns of regulatory relations determine small
firms' compliance by affecting their rule awareness, public spiritedness, perceptions on
legitimacy and compliance costs/benefits, identities, and norms formation.
Methodology and Research Process
Admittedly, we still know very little about small firms' internal motivations for
compliance and about effective strategies that help small firms formulate positive
attitudes toward rule compliance. Recognizing that the previous studies do not provide
satisfactory answers to the inquiries, my general research strategy starts from overcoming
the limits of the research methods adopted by the previous studies.
Regardless of whether studies on this topic were grounded on deterrence theory or
the theory of norns, most of them adopted statistical analysis (including regression,
factor analysis, and structural equation modeling) as a primary method. Because many
independent variables regarding compliance behavior were non-quantifiable and
incommensurable, some conclusions seemed to be an artifact of the model one set up and
not the reality one was trying to explain. This does not mean that I summarily reject
quantitative methods. All too often, however, the identical phenomenon is defined and
interpreted in radically different ways in which statistical analysis turns to be
inappropriate (or insufficient) to explain the hidden reasons. Ryle's popular example of
contracting the eyelids has been cited to highlight this complicated aspect of
interpretations. Neither a formal model nor a simple (or thin) transcription of what
interviewees say is sufficient to identify linkages between actions chosen and underlying
motivations that drive choices.
To move beyond a surface-level analysis, I aim at the "thick description"
approach as a primary method to uncover true motivations underlying rule compliance
behavior. Thick description amounts to a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures. It
is sorting out the structures of signification and determining their social ground and
import (Geertz 1973). By peeling off multiple covers, I aim to draw core meanings from
small facts and to assert the roles of economic and normative factors in the construction
of rule compliance by engaging them with specifics. Thick description would allow me to
explore the relation between actions and context, and from this to develop an
ethnographic way of explaining compliance behavior.
To do this, the specific research methods comprise participant observation, in-
depth interview (primary methods) and questionnaire-based survey (a secondary back-up
method). Combination of these three methods is indispensable to catch the reality of
observed phenomena. Although beliefs, values and behavior are assumed to be closely
linked, they are sometimes inconsistent. As such, while in-depth interviews are conducted
to elicit actors' beliefs and values, participant observation aims to systematically observe
the actual behavior. These ethnographic methods will contribute to clarifying and
interpreting puzzling findings in the specific socio-historical context by discerning the
meaning of such facts to the people affected by them. On the other hand, statistics
compiled through the survey will contribute to greater confidence in the generalizability
of results (Jick 1979).
In so doing, the dissertation tells a narrative of the two dry cleaning communities.
The narrative is a story-out-of-stories. It is two dimensional, not hierarchical but integral.
The narrower, interior stories comprise research subjects' voices. Actors describe the
certain phenomena in crafted stories with beginning, endings, plots, and stages (Kaplan
1986). While their stories deal with the same events, they begin and end at different
moments (Mandelbaum 1991) and are framed in different ways that locate different
actors in different worlds (Schon & Rein 1994). As a translator, I aim to transport these
diverse stories to readers that are "thick" enough to allow them to judge what happened,
how the storytellers defined the events that happened, how they reacted to the events, and
how they described a desired world. In this way, a thick description will function as
litmus paper with which readers test if my interpretation of their stories made sense.
The broader story comprises my own interpretation of interior stories, that is,
analysis in the ordinary academic language. In my interpretation, storytellers' voices are
paralleled with official data and survey results to decide whether and to what extent they
are consistent. When telling the narrative, I do not mean to argue that one of these stories
is more correct or accurate than others. What I do aim to show is whether and how groups
of actors sustain diverse personal stories without undermining the integrity of the
collective story and how the outcomes become varied as actors interpret or characterize
their past and present, and project them into their upcoming future in different ways
(Piore et al. 1994).
The sequence of the research was as follows: 1) to identify and examine in
isolation economic and social factors that seemed to affect the drycleaners'
environmental compliance behavior.; 2) to specify interrelationship among those factors;
and 3) to characterize the whole system in a coherent story. In so doing, the dissertation
shows that compliance is a surface expression of how the regulated entities characterize
formal regulations and define their relationship with regulators. To test the idea and to
ultimately answer the research question, the research proceeded in three phases.
Phase 1
Phase One was a preparation stage. First, I reviewed the regulatory codes of southern
California and Massachusetts to confirm that there was no notable difference iin
regulatory requirements. Then, I collected data on overall compliance rates for time
periods preceding and following regulatory changes in the two regions. The post-
regulatory change data in Massachusetts shows a significant increase in compliance,
while in southern California, the same period shows a negative trend.
After obtaining the official data, I prepared interview protocols, created an eight-
page survey questionnaire, and pre-tested its clarity. Interview questions were in two
types: structured and open-ended. The former intended to provide interviewees with a
clear sense of the research while the latter encourage them to tell the detailed stories
necessary for in-depth, ethnographic analysis.
Questionnaires were based on the studies of Grasmick and Bursik (1990),
Braithwaite and Makkai (1991) and Winter and May (2001), but modified to reflect
typical features of the dry cleaning industry. The survey measured both dependent and
independent variables. Drycleaners' compliance was the only dependent variable.
Independent variables comprised those identified in previous studies and those revealed
in my pilot research. They included economic variables (including the perceived
probability of detection and punishment, the perceived severity of formal sanctions, and
the perceived cost/benefit of compliance); normative variables (including a sense of
moral duty; the perceived legitimacy of regulatory enforcement; and awareness of the
health and environmental impacts of operation etc.); the nature of regulatory relations;
and activities of trade associations. In addition, sex, age, education, and other traits are
included as control variables.
Phase 2
Phase Two was a data collection and analysis stage to identify drycleaners' internal
motives for compliance. I conducted interviews with 25 drycleaners in southern
California and 38 in Massachusetts, along with 4 key informants and the regulatory
agency in each region. Interviewees included good environmental performers, violators
(as identified by state agencies' official reports) and retired drycleaners. Retirees were
included because the questions of rule compliance were a very sensitive issue, it seemed
that they would be less reluctant to reveal true reasons for "noncompliance." I examined
whether responses from the three groups were convergent or divergent. Moreover, to
confirm the consistency of responses, several drycleaners were contacted more than 5
times. I continued to be in contact with the key informants for approximately one year
and a half for the purpose of acquiring additional information on the one hand, and
overcoming the limits of the interview method on the other.
The primary pitfall of the interview method lies in the possible unreliability of
responses. This does not necessarily refer to intentional deception. But from my previous
anthropological research, I know that many interviewees may respond with what they
believe to be the "right" answer. To provide interviewees with settings that foster freer
responses, many interviews were conducted in informal, social locations over a long
period of time.
Participant observation and interview data laid the basis for an ethnographic
interpretation of compliance. While useful, survey data alone are insufficient to identify a
nature of relationship between actions taken and the underlying motivations that drive
those actions. The difficulty is exemplified when competing theories explain a
bandwagon effect of compliance in which compliance begets compliance with potentially
explosive consequence. Normative theorists view the bandwagon effect as the result of a
"norm of fairness" that tells us, "Do A if and only if other people do A." (Ullmann-
Margalit 1977) But deterrence theorists consider the same phenomenon as the result of
rational calculation: "When there are few violators, the risk of detection is higher and the
penalty more severe. Therefore, people are more willing to comply when they recognize
that others comply." (Elster 1989) We cannot tell the true reasons of actions until niches
of contextual significance are identified (Geertz 1967). In-depth interview aimed to
extract core meanings with the assistance of contextual analysis and to assert the roles of
multiple variables in the construction of rule compliance.
As for the survey data, 107 and 103 surveys were collected in southern California
and Massachusetts, respectively. To secure a high response rate and to minimize the
misunderstanding of questionnaires, they were delivered and collected by the researcher's
and the key informants' on-site visits. Collected survey data were compared with the
ethnographic data. The two groups of the data were quite consistent with each other, and
thus supported that the stories collected from interviews were not idiosyncratic, anecdotal
stories but rather shared by many community members.
Phase 3
Phase Three was for cross-case analysis. Based on the findings in Phase Two, I examined
whether the drycleaners in the two regions had similar motivations for rule compliance.
In this phase, ethnographic analysis was conducted for the case comparison. In the
Massachusetts case as opposed to the southern California case, for example, I showed in
detail how drycleaners were at the table during regulatory negotiations and how this
process altered drycleaners' perspective on rules and consequently perceptions of costs
and incentives for compliance.
The economic and social characters of the two regulated communities in southern
California and Massachusetts promise to provide a rich, consistent basis for comparing
how regulatory practices engage organizations and individuals as complex social actors.
The analysis will shed light on how these relationships can help us account for variations
in outcomes in rule compliance. A careful comparison of the regulatory programs in the
two regions should also yield specific insights that can inform us of how regulations can
be better designed by acknowledging the regulated entities' internal motivations.
Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation is organized into the following structure. Chapter Two clarifies the
significance of the research in its relation to existing scholarship. This Chapter discusses
basic notions of existing theories of rule compliance in a small firm context and evaluates
their relative strengths and weaknesses. It then proceeds to refute the two leading
positions (deterrence theory and the theory of norms) and suggests the relational theory
as an alternative approach. Using social constructivism as an analytical framework, the
relational theory develops a conceptual means to embrace both rationality and norms
without subsuming one to the other. It aims to illuminate in concrete socio-historical
contexts that compliance is a configuration of regulatory relationships.
The following three Chapters explicate how the relational approach obtains the
greater validity over the existing theories by demonstrating the importance the contextual
embeddedness of economic factors in the web of social settings. Chapter Three lists and
compares formal regulatory conditions in Southern California and Massachusetts.
Specifically, it describes and compares the two regions' rule making processes,
regulatory requirements, enforcement principles on the regulators' part, and compliance
results. This Chapter is intended to show divergent compliance trends in the two regions,
despite almost identical formal regulatory conditions.
Provided with empirical evidence, Chapter Four explores internal motivational
factors for the regulated actors' rule compliance from an alternative perspective. By
examining the impacts of three economic factors identified by deterrence theory on the
one group and two normative factors derived from the theory of norms on the other, this
Chapter aims for the good fit between observed phenomena and the interpretations of
them. Specifically, this Chapter identifies surface reasons and deep reasons for
compliance (and noncompliance) behavior. Surface reasons on the part of the regulated
are more or less economic in nature. Those reasons are ascribable to the perceived cost
and benefit of compliance apart from the perceived probability of detection and the
severity of formal sanctions. The most important finding in this regard is that the
economic facts themselves are indeterminate, and thus can be malleable according to
interpretations of the ongoing practices and identities of the self and other actors. As
such, this Chapter demonstrates that real reasons for compliance are essentially social.
Chapter Five is focused on how each case successfully or falsely incorporates
drycleaners' underlying motivations into the design and implementation of a formal
regulation. Starting with a brief historical contour of the two dry cleaning communities,
this Chapter describes how individual drycleaners in each community are connected to
one another and how different forms of linkages provide the dry cleaning communities
with different channels of communication and representation to regulatory agencies. My
overriding concern in this Chapter is focused on illustrating how these different relations
between drycleaners and regulatory agencies lead to redefinition of identities, the
understanding of given regulations, and thus strategic compliance choices in different
ways.
Finally, Chapter Six reaffirms the central theme of the dissertation research and
its findings, and draws on policy implications for building on the dynamics of rule
compliance, aiming to offer clues to regulatory reform. Correspondingly, this Chapter
mainly discusses what government can do to restructure social relations and channels of
information flows in cooperation with trade associations. It then concludes with cautions
against over-enthusiasm for the relational approach.
CHAPTER 2
TWO LEADING THEORIES OF RULE COMPLIANCE
AND AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
To understand variations of rule compliance among small firms, it is necessary to
consider the theoretical underpinnings of the behavior. From a theoretical standpoint,
there have been two competing visions of how human actions are to be interpreted. The
first vision views actions as driven by rational calculation through which actors weigh
costs and benefits of events to maximize self-interest. A second one views them as driven
by norms or external social forces shaping internalized morality in which actors follow
duties and obligations by matching actions to situations in ways that other actors in a
society accept.
The distinction has had significant influences on formulation and development of
two contending modern theories of rule compliance, that is, deterrence theory and the
theory of norms. Not surprisingly, the two theories prescribe different regulatory
enforcement strategies to promote rule compliance: One argues for centralized
regulations by formal regulators armed with sufficient sanctioning powers; the other
emphasizes strengthening the regulated entities' moral bases through education and
persuasion. Both theories seem to have severely limited power in explaining small firms'
behavior. Precisely for this reason, I seek alternative explanations.
Before I begin my argument, it will be useful to look briefly at the previous
development of existing theories in order to explicate why I have felt it necessary to
deviate from them. Therefore, this chapter first explores basic notions and underlying
assumptions of these two leading compliance theories, and examines their strengths and
weaknesses in relation to enforcement strategies accorded to each. It aims to elucidate
their limited explanatory power in explaining the observed discrepancy in rule
compliance between the two dry cleaning cases. In response to acknowledging their
shortcomings, I suggest a new way of explaining compliance behavior in a small firm
context. This chapter concludes by explaining five key conceptual pillars that buttress the
dissertation's whole story.
Deterrence Theory
Influenced by the first vision of human actions, neoclassical economists analyze rule
compliance behavior in terms of costs and benefits. They argue that only when the formal
punishment outweighs compliance costs, people comply with given laws. Under the
extreme view along this line, "the decision to become a criminal is in principle no
different from the decision to become a brick layer.... The individual considers the net
costs and benefits of each alternative and makes his decision on this basis", and thus "a
change in behavior can be explained by changes in prices." (Rubin 1980, p.13). Let us
examine the theory's core arguments and assumptions in a context of theoretical
development.
Basic Notions
The seed of the modern deterrence theory was germinated in 1 8 th and 19 th century
utilitarianism. Utilitarians viewed anti-social actions as stemming from the expectation
that it would promote the actor's pleasure. Therefore, awareness that such action will
ultimately bring pain to the actor will refrain from the impulse to commit any anti-social
action, if the pain is certain and sufficiently severe:
Pain (cost) and pleasure (benefit) are the great springs of human
action. When a man perceives or supposes pain to be the
consequence of an act, he is acted on in such a manner as tends
with a certain force to withdraw him as it were from the
commission of that act. If the apparent magnitude (of the pain) be
greater than the magnitude of pleasure expected, he will be
absolutely prevented from performing it (Bentham in The Rational
ofPunishment. p.396, Parentheses added)
It is worth noting here that the purpose of punishment is not to avenge but to make the
violator's fate a warning sign to others:
The principal end of punishment is to prevent like offences. The
offence already committed concerns only a single individual;
similar offences may affect all. In many cases it is impossible to
redress the evil that is done; but it is always possible to take away
the will to repeat it; for however great may be the advantage of the
offence, the evil of the punishment may be made to outweigh it
(Bentham in Theory ofLegislation. p.272, Italic added)
This utilitarian ethics of punishment is important when discussing the actual deterrent
effect. We will return to this point later.
Utilitarians would not deny that there are other factors that affect anti-social
actions. Unemployment and changes in age composition of population are such
examples. Nevertheless, they conclude that the punishment variable has the unique
characteristic of being easy to change with government regulation (Tullock 1974).
Therefore, they argue, "if it does have an effect, we should take advantage of that fact"
(p.105).
This utilitarian logic was echoed by the 2 0 th century neoclassical economists
when they turned their attention to the problem of maintaining social order. The first
theoretical deduction was performed by Gary Becker. In his path-breaking article, Crime
and Punishment, Becker (1968) used economic analysis to develop optimal policies to
deter illegal behavior (but paid little attention to actual policies). The essence of Becker's
theory is that rule compliance is a function of the probability that violation will be
2detected, the probability of punishment when detected, and the severity of punishment.
In his orthodox deterrence theory which focuses attention on formal sanctions, actors are
assumed to formulate perceptions on the certainty of sanctions and severity of such
sanctions. The resulting perceived threat of formal sanctions is a cost factor in the
expected utility of rule violation3. This perceived threat is important because if actors are
rational, the certainty and the severity of formal sanctions will have a strong deterrent
effect (Becker 1968). Becker's theory was supported and further developed by rational
choice theorists such as Stigler (1970), Ehrlich (1972) and Tullock (1974), and became
dominant in economic and legal analyses of rule compliance.
In the early stages of empirical testing of deterrence theory, researchers applied it
to individual criminal behavior. Their conceptual replications of Becker's work came to
2 His idea can be summarized in the following model: Compliance = a + P (PD * PP * S) + E
(where x is the constant, P is the coefficient, PD is the probability of detection, Pp is the probability of
punishment, Sp is the severity of punishment, and E is the disturbance. Taken together, PD * P* SP is
hereafter called "deterrence threats").
3 In the social psychology literature on rational decision making, it is controversial whether the effects of
probability and severity of sanctions should be treated as additive or multiplicative (For further discussion,
see Carroll 1982). Becker assumed, however, that rational actors multiply the probability of sanctions and
the severity of such sanctions to arrive at a projected cost (Grasmick & Bursik 1990).
the conclusion that deterrence threats would promote compliance with criminal laws
(Sjoquist 1973, Philips et al. 1972, Rottenberg 1979, Andreano & Siegfried 1980).
However, these conclusions were far from unanimous. Some studies on tax evasion
(Schwartz & Orleans 1967, Lewis 1982, Kinsey 1984, Klepper & Nagin 1989) and
juvenile delinquency (Burkett & Jensen 1975, Kraut 1976) have shown that perceived
"informal" punishment (e.g., peer pressure and family disapproval) had much stronger
effects on compliance than formal punishment by authorities. Indeed, many empirical
psychological studies have provided the evidence that deterrence threats failed to deter a
large proportion of individual criminals because their actions are not based on rational
calculation, but on impulses that they can neither understand nor control (Moberly 1968).
Facing challenges, scholars in Becker's tradition attempted to find arenas into
which his theory would better fit and to modify the original version by adding potentially
influential factors such as the direct cost of compliance (Piliavin et al. 1986). The thrust
of their attempt was to theorize deterrence of organizational rather than individual actors.
Braithwaite and Geis (1982) assert that deterrence effect is stronger with corporate
behavior than with individual behavior because corporate violations are calculated risks
taken by rational actors, rather than spontaneous or emotional risks by irrational actors.
As such, "they [corporate violations] should be more amenable to control by policies
based on utilitarian assumptions of the deterrence doctrine" (p.302).
However, both previous and new studies of organizational compliance have
shown only partial support for deterrence theory. Some argue that deterrence threats
would only work for firms whose managers lack a moral commitment to voluntary
compliance (Kagan & Scholz 1984, Smith 1990). Others argue that firms whose
managers are highly emotional would not be affected by deterrence threats (Zimring &
Hawkins 1973). Galbraith (1969) claimed that deterrence threats would only be strong
with firms whose managers are profit-maximizers.
These findings did not surprise scholars in non-neoclassical tradition. At the heart
of deterrence theory for firms is the assumption that top managers are rational
maximizers. Some influential studies (i.e., Simon 1959, Etzioni 1988) have shown that
the neoclassical assumption underlying deterrence theory is misleadingly simple. Indeed,
in a wide variety of contexts, managers might not be rational. They might act in
accordance with competing values, or be unaware of non-compliance at lower
management levels (Braithwaite & Makkai 1991).
Realizing this problem of firm deterrence, many researchers attempted to identify
an ideal context in which the assumption of rational maximizer should be maximally
appropriate. Such a context would be a small firm with a flat structure where top
managers exert total control over the organization (Braithwaite & Makkai 1991). This
latest form of deterrence theory in a small firm context predicts the logarithmic functional
relation between compliance rates and the formal threats4. In sum, the effect of changes
in rule enforcement can be predicted by consideration of the effects of changes in the
probabilities of detection and punishment, and the severity of punishment on incentives
to enter illegal activities (Ehlrich 1972).
Evaluation of the Theorv
The deterrence theory provides a clear-cut analytical framework within which legal and
illegal activities are understood. It is a basic theorem of the economic approach that an
increase in the cost of an activity results in a shift from that activity toward relatively
cheaper activities. This theorem provides the analytical justification for expecting the
deterrent effect to have generalizability. Gordon Tullock (1974) elucidates this logic with
a simple, but powerful economic reasoning: "Demand curves slope downward. If you
increase the cost of something, less will be consumed. Thus, if you increase the cost of
committing a crime, there will be fewer crimes" (pp.104-105). Tullock, of course, knows
that the elasticity of the demand curve might be low. Nevertheless, he insists, "....but
there should be at least some effect." (p. 105, Italic original).
It might be true that formal sanctions have some effect on violators. It remains
unclear, however, whether formal sanctions are an obvious way to prevent potential
illegal activities by sending an unmistakable warning signal to others who have not yet
violated formal rules. In reality, what we are concerned about is not only the direction of
response but also the "magnitude" of such response (Ehrlich 1972). Recall that the
utilitarian purpose of imposing sanctions is not to revenge illegal activity already
4 Proposing a logarithmic function rather than linear function makes sense because small firms are usually
characterized by small operating margins and working capital difficulties. For example, $100,000 of fine is
no different from $200,000 of fine. For small firms, both simply mean bankruptcy.
committed but to deter the same or similar future activities. For formal sanctions to have
the sufficient deterrent effect, several strong assumptions must be sustained:
i) The actor is a purely rational self-interest maximizer.
ii) Preferences are exogenously given and they are separated from objective
opportunities (costs and benefits).
iii) Legal and illegal activities are mutually exclusive in a given period.
iv) The actor knows the cost of compliance and probabilities of detection/
penalty imposition.
Each one of these assumptions is in fact controversial. Since they have been criticized
widely in various contexts, this subsection discusses only as much of critiques as needed
to create a backdrop for an alternative approach in connection with our cases.
First, the assumption of rational maximizer has been treated as axiomatic by the
20th century mainstream social science, that is, the pursuit of self-interest maximization is
an uncontroversial proclivity of human agents. This assumption is inseparable from a
utilitarian approach to an understanding of society. Utilitarians asserted that "society is a
fictitious body, the sum of the several members who compose it" (Bentham, quoted in
Culler 1986. p.85). For utilitarians, there is nothing real in society except the individual.
The individual is the only tangible reality that the observer can attain. Indeed, the
assumption that the individual acts in accordance with self-interest, composing a society,
is the very foundation of utilitarianism.
I am challenging this taken-for-granted assumption (and my challenge is by no
means new). Self-interest maximization is inappropriate to be a dominant factor
underlying a choice and ultimately actions. It is simply one of many features that drive
human actions. This entrenched assumption has been overemphasized as a sole motivator
by utilitarians. Although the assumption seems valid as prescriptive guidance to ideal
rational actions, it is problematic for explaining and predicting actual behavior.
Presumably, the assumption is more appropriate for small firms than for individuals.
Nevertheless, when related to rule compliance in my cases, as we will see later, the
theory based on rational self-interest maximizer overlooks the fact that much of the
variance in compliance remains unexplained because moral and other social factors are
ignored. It is true that this assumption provides analytical parsimony. Real world
scenarios require, however, a more encompassing assumption to deal with the complexity
of the reality as it is (Etzioni 1988). This point will be elaborated in greater detail in the
following chapters by illuminating contextual embeddedness of self-interest under the
light of the relational approach.
The second assumption is also problematic. Following a neoclassical doctrine,
deterrence theorists assume that preferences are stable, externally given as the results of
an unexplained and theoretically irrelevant process of individual development, known
with adequate precision to make decisions unambiguous, and revealed in behavior
(March 1978, Sabel 1992). By adopting this assumption, they avoid all questions of value
formation. In this model, there is no need to study where preferences come from and how
they are formulated and changed. As a result, deterrence theorists claim that changes in
illegal behavior can be explained by changes in prices (penalties) only, because
preferences are held constant.
However, individual preferences as well as group preferences (which are more
subject to the problem of conflicting objectives representing diverse values of diverse
participants) are all too often fuzzy and inconsistent (Pfeffer 1977, Olson 1965).
Preferences change over time. While they are used to choose among actions as prescribed
in orthodox rational choice theory, it is equally true that actions already taken and
experiences with their consequences affect preferences (March 1978). Furthermore,
preferences seem endogenous rather than exogenous because they are shaped by the
certain social constraints (Elster 1983, Bowles 1998). If the above alternative views on
preference are correct, then explanatory powers of deterrence theory are severely limited.
The third assumption plays a pivotal role in the economic theory of behavior
under uncertainty. This general economic theory builds on a hypothesis that one would
choose between two activities by comparing the expected utility associated with each, if
and only if the two activities are mutually exclusive in a given period (Ehrlich 1972). A
deterrence model of choice between legal and illegal activities is formulated within this
framework. However, the decision to enter illegal activities is not entirely an either/or
choice.5 One may in practice combine legal and illegal actions in ways that maximize
5 I am indebted to Prof. Archon Fung for this point.
expected utility and/or switch from one another in a given period without reference to
rational calculation (Ehrlich 1972). In cases of small firms, many, if not all,
owners/managers do not even know which activities are illegal due in large part to
regulatory complexity.
The final assumption, the one the most congenial to deterrence theory, is barely
held true in reality. Within this theoretical framework, an actor is capable of calculating
the probability of detection, the probability of penalty imposition and the severity of
penalty. Then, s/he compares their multiplication with the monetary cost of compliance.
While calculating the monetary cost of compliance is not infeasible, it is extremely
difficult for small firms to estimate values of the three deterrence factors. Even regulators
have difficulty unequivocally presenting their estimation because deterrence factors are
extremely contingent on political, social, and budget constraints.
Proceeding on the above four assumptions which are subject to question,
deterrence theory's regulatory enforcement strategies have been oriented toward the
calculated outcomes expected by regulated entities. Therefore, the principal conceptual
innovation for regulatory policies was the articulation of expected utility by increasing
the probabilities of detection and punishment, and the penalties for violations
(Braithwaite & Makkai, 1991; Shavell, 1991).
Is there any concrete evidence that formal threats alter firms' behavior and that
different firm sizes result in different responses to threats? Although I could not find
empirical evidence that can answer the second part of the question, some studies argued
for deterrence effects on firm behavior as threats increase. Lewis-Beck and Alford (1980)
reported that the 1941 and 1969 coal mine safety legislations and their vigorous
enforcement by the Bureau of Mines (BOM) resulted in statistically significant decrease
in fatalities at workplace. Their time-series analysis of the coal mining fatality rate
between 1932 and 1976 indicates that a coal miner in the 1930s was about twice and four
times as likely to be killed on the job as a coal miner in 1948 and in 1976, respectively.
Block at al. (1981)'s study also revealed that the U.S. Department of Justice's use of
formal sanctions achieved general deterrence of potential price fixing in the bread
industry. Specifically, they showed that "if a cartel's probability of detection increase
with its markup, then the cartel's optimal price is .... an intermediate price that depends on
the levels of antitrust enforcement efforts and penalties" (p.444).
Though plausible, the two studies' findings must be viewed with caution for the
following reasons. In Lewis-Beck and Alford's study, what was used as a proxy for
enforcement efforts was BOM's overall health and safety budget, which included not
only inspections and sanctions but also research and rescues. Moreover, as the authors
mentioned, the regulatory requirements were clear and posed "a single, narrow,
measurable objective....not multiple, broad, or difficult to measure, as the goals of
legislation sometimes are" (p. 1980). Together with increased rescues, this aspect could
contribute to reductions in mortal accidents by helping mine owners/managers become
aware of the safety issue. Thus, we cannot decisively confirm the exclusive correlation
between deterrence and compliance unless the independent effects of formal threats are
explicated. Block et al.'s study is more convincing than Lewis-Beck and Alford's with
respect to deterrence effects. However, their analysis showed that criminal sanctions
(e.g., imprisonment or monetary penalties) did not guarantee a credible threat to
colluding firms. Rather, the deterrence effect arose from the increased class-action suits,
the increased likelihood of compensation to bread consumers and distributors. Because
class actions are civil sanctions, we can hardly deny the effects of antitrust enforcement.
Nevertheless, the reputation effect needs to be considered as a supplementary (informal)
deterrence factor.
Arguably, Braithwaite and Makkai's (1991) study of small Australian nursing
homes is the most congenial to deterrence doctrine. Their test of expected utility model
based on surveys and interviews with 410 chief executives found partial support for
deterrence effect of the probability of detection, but failed to prove the effects of the
probability and severity of formal sanctions. The authors ended up suggesting that in
certain contexts, deterrence threats can still be important.
Despite partial evidence validating deterrence theory, it is still unclear whether
formal threats alone are sufficient to alter firm behavior. Nevertheless, current regulatory
enforcement strategies seem to rely excessively on traditional deterrence strategy. For
example, to ensure small firms' compliance with regulatory requirements, the 1990 CAA
Amendment greatly strengthened and expanded its civil and criminal penalties. For civil
penalties, the EPA can now impose fines up to $25,000 per day for violations. In
addition, the EPA can initiate a court proceeding without the involvement of the
Department of Justice, which was previously required. For criminal sanctions, the 1990
Amendment converts the knowing violation of almost every requirement into a felony.
Sanctions include fines of up to $25,000 for individuals and imprisonment for up to 5
years for a first conviction, with each day considered as a separate violation. Sanctions
can double for subsequent convictions (Weiss & Gallagher 1993). However, no empirical
study has confirmed significant effects on small firms' compliance resulting from these
increased deterrence threats.
More critically, deterrence theory does not help to explain the observed
discrepancy in compliance between the two dry cleaning communities introduced in the
previous chapter. Probabilities (or certainty) of detection and punishment, and severity of
punishment are the major factors identified by the theory that should explain different
regulatory outcomes in the two regions. However, though compliance trends are in stark
contrast, there is no noticeable difference between the two state programs in those
factors.
The Theory of Norms
A vision of actors following internalized moral judgments of what is socially right or
wrong dates back to ancient Greek philosophy and keeps manifesting itself in current
discussions of the importance of rules in guiding human life (March & Olsen 2004).
Although this vision of human action have not been considered explicitly by its own
protagonists as relevant to the field of compliance study, it is obvious that a modern
theory competing with deterrence theory builds on it. It naturally provides accounts on
compliance behavior which are quite different from deterrence explanations. Unlike
deterrence theory stemming from mathematical deduction, this competing theory results
from empirical induction grounded upon many scattered studies in a variety of academic
disciplines, and thus lacks a uniformly agreed-upon name. As such, for the convenience
of discussion, I call this competing theory the "theory of norms"6 . I draw this name, I
think correctly, from a common denominator of the scattered findings.
6 I am indebted to Prof. David Laws for the suggestion of this term.
Basic Notions
The theory of norms rejects the mechanical psychology of a utility maximizing cost-
benefit analysis. Instead, it argues that human action is triggered by internalized
prescriptions of appropriate or exemplary behavior, including cognitive and normative
components (March & Olsen 2004). March and Olsen (2004, 1989) call this perspective
on human action the "logic of appropriateness" to contrast their point to the utilitarian
logic of consequentiality. Actors behave according to distinctive social norms7 that
prescribe which action is appropriate. The criteria actors use to act appropriately are
based on tacit, mutual understandings of "what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and
good" (2004. p.3) rather than on the expected utility. So to speak, actors follow rules
when rules are viewed as natural, rightful, and legitimate:
Actors seek to fulfill the obligations encapsulated in an identity, a
membership in a political community or group, and the ethos and
practices of its institutions. They do what they see as appropriate
for themselves in a specific type of situation (March & Olsen 2004.
p.2)
Echoes of the logic of appropriateness resonate either explicitly or implicitly in the
diverse compliance literature. It suggests that motivations for compliance result from
regulated entities' combined sense of moral obligation and implicit agreement with the
importance of a given regulatory policy, namely, legitimacy (Winter & May 2001).
A group of studies focusing on moral duty was first conducted in an arena of
individual income tax because this arena provides the clear contrast between self-interest
and normative obligations (McGraw & Scholz 1991). The studies in the tax arena
revealed that the emphasis on moral reasoning about norms and principles related to a
perceived legal obligation resulted in a significant increase in compliance.
In On Legal Sanctions, a classic counterpart of Becker's Crime and Punishment,
Schwartz and Orleans (1967) found that moral obligations to obey the law had a greater
7 March and Olsen's original term is "rules". By rules, they mean the routines, procedures, conventions,
and roles, etc. around which action is constructed. In the mean time, I use the term rules to refer to formal
regulations or laws. To avoid confusion and maintain consistency, I replaced March and Olsen's "rules"
with "norms".
impact on tax compliance than did formal deterrence threats. Because their study is
generally viewed as a landmark, the section describes this work in a little bit more detail.
Their experimental study was conducted a month before the tax filing in 1961.
The study involved three treatment groups: control group, normative group, and
deterrence group. A control group was asked to answer the basic questions. A normative
group was asked additional normative questions designed to invoke normative motives
for taxpaying ranging from self-imposed guilty at violation to a patriotic desire to support
government in its valued activities. A deterrence group was asked deterrence questions
emphasizing the formal sanctions associated with violation. Provided with IRS data,
Schwartz and Orleans examined both aggregate pre- and post-survey tax return data for
each group and the effects of the different question formats on actual tax paying
behavior. The study revealed that the normative group demonstrated a significant
increase in reported income in comparison to the control group and a significant increase
in taxes actually paid in comparison to both the control and deterrence groups.
Correspondingly, Schwartz and Orleans reached a conclusion that the normative
questions resulted in an increase in tax compliance by stimulating actors' normative
motives.
Schwartz and Orleans' work has been conceptually replicated by many socio-
legal scholars. Although every study did not succeed in replicating the greater impact of
normative appeals on compliant behavior found in the Schwartz and Orleans' work, the
degree of divergence was moderate. McGraw and Scholz (1991) found that appeals to
civic virtue had as a great impact as formal deterrence threats. Grasmick et al. (1991)
reported that the fear of shame stemming from a sense of moral obligation inhibited
noncompliance. Perceptions on trust (Scholz & Lubell 1998, Murphy 2004) and duty
heuristic (Scholz & Pinney 1995) were reported to contribute to higher tax compliance by
providing a valuable strategy that gains "the advantages of social cooperation which
cannot be obtained through more explicit calculating strategies" (Scholz & Pinney 1995,
p.509). In addition, many researchers confirmed the validity of the Schwartz and Orleans'
findings (Lewis 1982, Kinsey 1984, Klepper & Nagin 1989, Cialdini 1989, Grasmick &
Bursik 1990).
An emphasis on legitimacy, a second component of the theory of norms, is found
in Max Weber's Economy and Society. Weber associated legitimacy with stability and
viewed social actions as guided by the belief in the existent of a legitimate order. As
such, obedience or compliance results from the belief in legality which is formally correct
and have been made in the accustomed manner (Weber 1968). He called this belief legal-
rational legitimacy. However, Weber's position leaves no room for uncovering the
regulated entities' different reactions to legality which is imposed by accepted legal
institutions (Hyde 1983).
Another important study on legitimacy is Tom Tyler's Why People Obey the
Law? (1990). To examine which factors have an independent effect on compliance
behavior and to compare the relative strengths of different influences, Tyler used a
sociological approach as a framework to understand the attitudinal antecedents of
compliance behavior. He conducted extensive telephone interviews with 1,575
respondents who had previous contacts with legal authorities such as the police and the
courts. His primary finding was that the legitimacy of policy was directly related to
compliance. Procedural justice perceived by people had significant influence on their
reactions to authorities and people think of justice in non-instrumental terms. He
emphasized that people have capacity to judge whether or not a particular procedure of
regulatory policy is fair. The way people are treated by authorities is viewed as an
indication of procedural justice and of the likelihood that people will receive help when
they have problems in the future. His view on compliance is summarized as a "perceived
obligation to obey the law" that constitutes legitimacy.
To summarize socio-legal works on compliance, credible commitment to rule
compliance is based more on the internalized values of regulated entities than on
expected utility. They are determined by two related sets of considerations: a sense of
civic duty to obey laws and a more specific evaluation of the appropriateness of a given
regulation. The former appeals to moral obligation or conscience by putting shame on
violators as a self-imposed deterrent while the latter is comprised of the reasonableness of
the rule resulting from the manner in which the rule is enacted, the fairness of the
authorities in enforcing the rule, and the extent to which other people comply (Tyler
1990).
The above discussion is based upon individuals' perception. What is the relevancy
of this discussion to the behavior of small and large firms? Unlike deterrence theorists,
the proponents of the theory of norms do not make it explicit whether this theory is more
applicable to a small firm context. Nevertheless, I infer from the notion of "social proof'
that small firms are more likely than large firms to be influenced by norms in general and
the perceived legitimacy in particular.
Social proof provides clues about what is the best course of action although there
are no formal sanctions (Axelrod 1986). It is an important mechanism in the support of
social norms. As Cialdini (1984, p. 117, Quoted in Axelrod 1986) claims:
We view a behavior as more correct in a given situation to the
degree that we see others performing it. Whether the question is
what to do with an empty popcorn box in a movie theater, how fast
to drive on a certain stretch of highway, or how to eat chicken at a
dinner party, the actions of those around us will be important in
defining the answer.
In general, large firms have the capacity to act alone. They employ experts such as
lawyers, environmental specialists, and lobbyists to interpret a particular situation and
decide future actions. Small firms lack the capacity to behave the same way as large firms
do. Therefore, their interpretation of and reactions to a given regulation may depend on
those of other actors facing the same situation. Especially when they are new to a given
situation, others' perceptions of the situation offer valuable information about what action
is proper for them, although they do not know the reasons (Asch 1956).
Indeed, recent studies of small firm behavior confirm the above conjecture. Much
of the research focuses on compliance with environmental regulations ranging from
medium-sized firms (Burby & Paterson 1993) to small agricultural industries (Winter &
May 2001, Lubell 2003) and to small firms (Patton & Worthington 2003, Blackman
2000, Cardenas et al. 2000). Although the conclusions vary somewhat from one study to
another, the core ideas converge at the same point: Compliance behavior is determined by
the actor's sense of duties formulated through the process of socialization and its
resulting internalization of norms.
Evaluation of the Theorv
As an antithesis of deterrence theory, the theory of norms makes an important
contribution that there are alternatives to the focus on economic outcomes. Indeed,
human actions are motivated by a variety of factors including both economic and
normative components. The theory of norms expanded the scope of our knowledge of
rule compliance behavior by dragging the role of norms out of its marginal status and
putting it at the core of debate. Yet, despite its significant contribution to an
understanding of compliance behavior, this theory is permeable to critiques. Let us
examine in detail the theory's porousness from theoretical and empirical viewpoints.
In contrast to deterrence theory, the theory of norms builds on a notion of homo
sociologicus (Elster 1989). According to this concept, individuals are not separate
atomized actors, acting solely on independent rational calculation. Rather, they are social
beings influenced heavily by other actors and guided by the prescribed behavior. They act
in certain ways just because "to do so is customary, or an obligation, or the natural... .or
right and proper, or just and fair" (Phelps-Brown 1977, p. 17). What is wrong with the
theory of norms arguing for the aforementioned norms-guided behavior?
One of the major critiques is derived from the theory's vagueness in dealing with
the origin of norms. People often display coordinated behavior that helps to comply with
a certain social standard. When this behavior occurs without central authorities, we
attribute it to the existence of norms. To make this appeal to norms powerful, we need a
comprehensive theory of norms explaining altogether how norms emerge, how they are
sustained, and how a particular norm replaces another (Axelrod 1986).
Outside the field of compliance study, this issue has been explicitly discussed.
Arguably, the most influential and widely cited literature on the issue is Robert Axelrod's
work whose original aspiration was to contribute to preventing nuclear arm race. In The
Evolution of Cooperation (1984), Axelrod investigates how cooperative norms arise in a
world of selfishness. The essence of his explanation is that cooperation emerges out of
tit-for-tat-based reciprocity, rather than efficient allocation of resources. In his iterated
prisoners' dilemma game, actors adapt their behavior against other actors who
continually change as they learn. Under this type of co-evolution, although defecting
strategies can spread out initially, their fitness declines as the defectors become numerous
and their potential victims decrease in number. In turn, conditional cooperators displace
the defectors.
In his later work, Axelrod clarifies two conditions under which certain behaviors
turn into social norms: dominance (Ullman-Margalit 1997) and reputation.8 Although his
computer simulations have been criticized for taking too low-brow an approach to an
essentially technical game-theoretic problem and thus leading to exaggerated claims
(Binmore 1998, Quoted in Hoffman 2000), a theoretical generalization has been
supported by many social scientists and evolutionary biologists (Hoffman 2000).
However, his intellectual assets rarely appear in the modern literature of the
theory of norms. The socio-legal scholars in this tradition are strangely silent on where
such norms come from. At best, they end up discussing what mechanisms sustain norms
that are already established. Just as preferences are exogenous for deterrence theorists, so
norms are externally given for normative theorists, at least in the field the dissertation
investigate. It has been said that the salience of the theory of norms lies in its escape from
the Benthamite individualist approach. It does so by bringing society back in. Ironically,
individual actors' internalization of exogenous norms pulls such redemption back to
asocial individualism. This is so because while putting a heavy emphasis on internalized
behavioral patterns sticking to universal norms externally given and fixed, the theory
overlooks changing, on-going relations9 in particular social contexts which affect the
formation and modification of norms. No theorists articulate this point better than
Granovetter (1985) in his dealing with the problem of social embeddedness of economic
action:
.... despite the apparent contrasts between under- and
oversocialized views, we should note an irony of great theoretical
importance: both have in common a conception of action and
decision carried out by atomized actors. In the undersocialized
account, atomization results from narrow utilitarian pursuit of self-
interest; in the oversocialized one, from the fact that behavioral
patterns have been internalized and ongoing social relations thus
have only peripheral effects on behavior. That the internalized.
behavior are social in origin does not differentiate this argument
decisively from a utilitarian one, in which the source of utility
function is left open, leaving room for behavior guided entirely by
8 For a fuller account, see Axelrod (1986).
9 I am indebted to my dissertation committee members for suggestions to consider this point.
consensually determined norms and values - as in the
oversocialized view. (Granovetter 1985, p.485).
To support the assumption of fixed, exogenous norms, one may argue that norms have
inertial forces (Gambetta 1987) due particularly to deeply held values such as moral
obligation (Rokeach 1973) and to habitual routines (Carroll 1989) that are forged through
socialization over a long period of time. According to this argument, norms are inherently
stable and changes in norms are resisted. As we will see later, however, the
Massachusetts case demonstrates that a new norm-like attitude abruptly emerged in the
mid 1990s without conflicts with the previous one. The Massachusetts drycleaners
association played a decisive role in formulating and dispersing it, but there is no room
for the role of trade association within the assumption of exogenous norms.
In addition, a notion of "internalization" raises a critical empirical issue. In order
for this theory to replace deterrence accounts, we must be convinced that internalization
of norms strictly prevents the actor from violating norms. In other words, actors never do
things that they believe are wrong (Grasmick & Bursik 1990). To what degree is it true?
Does a sense of moral obligation always shape behavior? Isn't it the other way around?
Consider the following instance: A group of South Korean lawmakers of the ruling party
recently announced, "We firmly believe that the war against Iraq is morally wrong.
Nevertheless, we decided to send our troops to Iraq for our nation's interest and for
strengthening an alliance with the U.S." And they, as politicians, never forgot to say,
"We believe that our action will ultimately help Iraqi people recover their economy and
democracy."
One may argue that the second statement is a true belief underlying the ruling
party's action. However, anyone who knows about East Asia's political and military
topography will recognize that it is only a lip-service. If the second statement is a true
belief, it serves as evidence that action can create a moral sense at another level to justify
itself. Neither interpretation is compatible with the basic notion of the theory of norms.
Although the example is not about rule compliance, it provides an important lesson: The
theory of norms ignores the reality where a sense of moral obligation is not always
synonymous to actual behavior.
Related to the above point, there is another empirical issue that must be
addressed. Internalization of universal norms implies that good-doers always do well
regardless. As such, we are compelled to infer that good environmental performers never
cheat on tax payment, never violate traffic rules, etc. However, my fieldwork revealed
that while most drycleaners were willing to answer environmental compliance questions,
they were extremely reluctant to revealing annual incomes, implying that their tax reports
might not be as honest as environmental reports. Obviously, the actor acts according to
different normative principles in different action domains. Why then particular norms
instead of others in certain situations? Presumably, the theory can account for why people
comply, but it cannot explain why people do not comply unless the above question is
answered. In this sense, unlike deterrence theory, the theory of norms is at best a theory
of right action, not a theory of action.
Another problem arises when this theory is applied in a firm context. While
deterrence theory explains compliance as if there were no society or social norms, the
theory of norms treat it as if there were no economy. Consider that no matter how small
they are, small firm owners are businesspeople. Is it reasonable to say that businesspeople
are not concerned about the economic factors at all? The theory of norms argues that the
procedures, ideology, and substantive decisions of regulatory institutions measurably
shape popular beliefs in the legitimacy of government regulation and the sense of
obligation. For firms regardless of the size, however, there is little reason to think that
particular norms of conduct gain any particular acceptance upon being pronounced by
regulatory institutions without economic considerations'.
Lastly, let us engage the theory of norms in our specific cases to examine whether
it can explain the observed difference in rule compliance. According to the core argument
of this theory, different regulatory outcomes in the two regions must have resulted from
different norms constraining each group's behavior. How then did the two groups of
drycleaners come to have different norms? One possibility is found in Bowles and Gintis'
(1975) study of the consequences of education, showing that differences in the education
result in different cognitive process. Such a position implies that different education
levels contribute to the different norms formation, and thus make differences in
10 I draw this critique from Hyde (1983).
compliance trends. This occurrence is unlikely because the educational levels of the two
groups are almost identical. Approximately 78% and 76% of them in southern California
and in Massachusetts, respectively, are college graduates. The remaining portions
comprise high school graduates.
An alternative possibility is that informal socialization and acculturation rather
than formal education brought about different norms. This explanation also seems
unlikely because a majority of both groups, being Korean immigrants, share the same
ethnicity and cultural background. In addition, there is little reason to think that Korean
drycleaners' origins of socio-economic class before immigration are significantly
different because all of the research subjects identified themselves as middle or upper-
middle class in origin.
Regulatory enforcement strategy accorded to this theory has been cooperative
enforcement relying on mutual understandings between formal regulators and the
regulated. This strategy is subject to at least three practical limitations unless backed by
substantial benefits to the regulated or appropriate sanctions (Ostrom 1990). First,
regulators who become solely concerned with cooperative relationships can lose sight of
regulatory goals outlined by Sabatier (1975) in his discussion of clientele capture.
Second, regulators may attempt to manipulate conditions of perceived fairness rather than
to actually solve problems or provide needed benefits (Tyler et al. 1986) by using
symbols of justice (Edelman 1964). Third, cooperative techniques may work only with
firms that care about moral obligation, admit the importance of given regulations, and
subscribe to social responsibility. Where these traits are absent, the use of deterrence
threats may be deemed necessary (Burby & Paterson 1993).
A Third Way of Explaining Compliance: The Relational Approach
Deterrence theory has ignored any impact of social structure and social relations on
compliance behavior. It seems to be at fault not in its reasoning but in the oversimplified
assumptions of human nature. In the meantime, the theory of norms has addressed the
problems of deterrence accounts and provided alternative views, but its theoretical
pendulum has swung too far and has reached an "oversocialized" conception of human
action (Wrong 1961). According to this view, actors are "overwhelmingly sensitive to the
opinions of others and hence obedient to the dictates of .... systems of norms and values,
internalized through socialization, so that obedience is not perceived as a burden"
(Granovetter 1985, p.483). If obedience is not perceived as a burden at all, then why do
people disobey?
The tension between rational calculation and norms-based approach has
traditionally been pitched as a struggle to decide which of the two is always correct
(Tyler et al. 1986). As noted in Chapter 1, this tension is unproductive and posed by the
wrong question. Obviously, each view is either correct or wrong depending on situations.
What is necessary is a thorough understanding of the extent to which compliance
behavior reflects or is independent of the potentially determinative factors proposed by
each theory.
Recognizing the false tension, some scholars have made the efforts to overcome
the conflict between the two extreme views and to develop a single framework into which
different motivations for action are compatible. However, none of them seems
satisfactory. Outside the compliance literature, most efforts have been made to rationalize
normative values (Harsanyi 1968, Kurz 1978, Axelord 1980). For example, Harsanyi
claimed that what is explained by social norms can be explained through the theory of
games taking as its primitives only the self-interests of the individual players (Ullmann-
Margalit 1977).
Although some norms are used to dress up self-interest in more acceptable garb
(Elster 1989), I reject a general rationalization of norms. The reason is that within this
framework, every human action, whatever it is, inescapably falls into the rational. For
example, this framework would explain an act to save a drowning child's life at the
expense of yours as an act to increase your subjective pleasure to be altruistic. If every
human action is predestined to be rational, why do we study it? From the outset, the
rationality claim is designed not to be falsified, so that it is impossible to distinguish other
aspects of human action from the rational. Rationalization of norms suffers from the lack
of a differentiating power.
Within the compliance literature, models of moral reasoning (Rest 1984) and
rational compliance choice (Margolis 1982) have been developed to compromise between
self-interest and normative values. A model of moral reasoning claims that when the legal
system is viewed as unfair and when consequences of compliance are considered as a
burden, moral obligation is less likely to affect action. A formal model of rational
compliance finds a determining factor in individual differences in the proclivity to weigh
moral obligations or self-interest more heavily. While the two models show that there is a
trade-off between moral obligations and economic outcomes, neither model delves into
the patterns of interactions that could possibly change the trade-offs.
To overcome the limits of existing theories, I develop a new approach, which is
called the "relational approach"." It is premised on social constructivism, a way of
explaining human action in interpretive approaches. Social constructivism as an
analytical framework helps the relational approach grasp a conceptual means to embrace
both rationality and norms without subsuming one to the other. The actor in the social
constructivist world is still rational in a sense that s/he has goals and makes choices
accordingly (Lee 2003). Unlike the rationalist actor, the constructivist actor's making of
choices does not rely on disembedded economic factors. Rather, the actor's reasoning
about what to want in the first place and what to choose to meet the wants depends on a
variety of social factors surrounding her/him (Berger & Luckmann 1967). Put differently,
the actor "learns" how to order preferences and make choices from a socially established
stock of knowledge in her/his interactions with other actors.1 2 The actor assimilates
socially coded ways of acting.
Using the constructivist notion of socially mediated learning as a springboard, the
relational approach proceeds one step further. In the relationist world, the actor's learning
is not a passive development shaped solely by socially prescribed ways of acting. The
actors are capable of contributing to changing the existing stock of knowledge by
reinterpreting and creating meanings in a particular situation where they are located. In
this vein, social situations or social relations are examined in concrete socio-historical
contexts rather than in stereotypified abstraction (Grenovetter 1985). For the relationist,
the analysis is based upon practical engagement with the real world, rather than pre-
established models. In this way, the relationist actor escapes a trap of oversocialization.
" am indebted to Prof Martin Rein and Prof. David Laws for helping to develop the idea and for
proposing this term.
12 The phrase "socially established stock of knowledge" is a derivative of Berger & Luckmann's social
stock of knowledge.
As we will see in the empirical chapters, this view helps to capture the
circumstances under which socialized actors oppose socially agreed-upon patterns of
behavior (like compliance in the dissertation) by illuminating the patterns of
interrelationship between individuality and sociability.
The relationist actor's reasoning starts from the characterization of a situation in
its relation to the external world. Once the situation is characterized in a certain way over
others, the actor draws from this situational characterization for rightful action choices.
Social relations play a key role in characterizing the situation. They do so by helping the
actor self-reflect where s/he is in the world (that is, defining identity), and thus providing
a basis to interpret social events and to find (or create) meanings associated with each
event. As such, the relationist making of choices inherently grows out of social relations,
providing the actor with a meaningful understanding of unfolding events and of other
actors' "motives, interests, probable actions, attitudes, and roles in any given contexts"
(Lee 2003). In this sense, the relationist actor is not instrumentally but reflexively
rational. Concrete examples of the relationist reasoning will be presented in Chapter 4
and 5.
Undoubtedly, the relational approach builds on the assets of the multiple existing
theories, but it is never identical to any: Like both deterrence theory and the theory of
norms, the new approach starts from a clear conceptual demarcation between self-interest
(or rationality) and normative values. Unlike either, it does not ignore one in favor of the
other for analytical parsimony; Like deterrence theory, the relational approach admits a
pivotal role of economic factors. However, it argues that these economic factors are even
more socially constructed than deterrence theory suggests; Like the theory of norms, the
new approach emphasizes the importance of legitimacy. However, it is not a Weberian
legal legitimacy but an "operational legitimacy" (Cooper 1992), which is about how
regulators' contingent use of discretionary power, technical knowledge, and political
influence can be made responsive to the judgments of the regulated entity; As in the
rationalization of norms, the new approach attempts to resolve the conflict between self-
interest and normative values. However, it does not subsume normative concerns as a
special case of rationality, but rather admits the uniqueness of norms; Like models of
moral reasoning and rational compliance choice, the new approach aims to show that
there are significant interactions between self-interest and normative concerns. Beyond
the proof of a mere existence of the interactions, it focuses the attention on how self-
interest and normative concerns support or counteract each other, how the interactions
alter the structure of the trade-offs between the two, and what changes in regulation can
induce changes in the patterns of the interactions.
It must be emphasized that my approach to understanding the interaction between
self-interest and normative values is different significantly from a traditional analytical
approach that attempts to explain what is going on in terms of cause and effect. The
relational approach is based upon hermeneutics, viewing human behavior as an ongoing
process that occurs in a historical horizon (Piore 1995). As social beings, humans
inevitably formulate relations with others. These relations existent in any situation
provide bases for explaining the rules, performance and roles that characterize
governance systems (Lejano 2006 forthcoming). The relational approach focuses on the
very actions in this web of the working and reworking of social relations over time. By
doing so, the relational approach concomitantly shows how the conceptual line of
traditional analytic demarcation between self-interest and normative values becomes
blurry in reality and how meanings emerge out of their interactions.
Even developed this way, one may say that the above points are insufficient to
demonstrate the relational approach's salience and that it simply is a slight twist of the
theory of norms, not an alternative. I admit that at first glance, the new approach
resembles the theory of norms. However, it has a special distinctiveness that makes it
advantageous in a small firm context over the existing theories. It is the differentiation
between moral obligations at individual level and group norms. Although they are related
phenomena, they all too often conflict with each other in particular contexts. Let us
consider the following hypothetical scenario: In a baseball game, a batter of the Red Sox
is hit by a pitch of an opponent team's pitcher. Given the situation, the Red Sox pitchers
are left with two choices. One is to follow moral obligation to fair-play or sportsmanship.
It is a norm, internalized and individualized. The other is to commit to a norm of
retaliation by hitting intentionally the opponent team's batter in the next inning. It is a
group norm that members of the group are expected to follow to maintain their solidarity
and identity. The Red Sox pitchers' choice for action between the two is affected heavily
by a concrete context. If the opponent team were the Yankees, the likelihood that the Red
Sox pitchers commit to a norm of retaliation would increase. Such instance may be the
case for small firms. While an individual small firm owner may have its own sense of
moral obligation, it can conflict not only with self- interest but also with group norms
induced by trade associations. Small firms' choice for action is also affected heavily by
their relations to the opponent, namely, formal regulators.
By distinguishing moral obligations operating at the individual level from norms
operating at the group level, the relational approach leaves a legitimate room for the role
of groups, that is, trade associations. As we will see later, trade associations provide a
vantage point through which to recognize general problems of both deterrence theory and
the theory of norms. Examining the role played by trade associations helps us understand
how particular norms emerge and become shared. Furthermore, the distinction helps us
recognize the important contribution of socio-historical contexts in which regulatory
relations are manifested in a form of compliance.
Indeed, the theory of norms' ultimate reduction to asocial individualism resulted
from the confusion of an individualized sense of moral obligations with socialized group
norms. Its analyzed set of actors was abstracted independent of particular social context,
and thus the theory failed to eliminate the atomization and only to transfer it to another
level of analysis (Granovetter 1985). In other words, instead of having atomized
individual, the theory of norms has atomized groups of people, and thus tends toward the
very pitfall it is intended to avoid.
The relational approach overcomes this limit and shows that compliance behavior
is contextually embedded in on-going systems of social relations among the regulated
entities, and between regulators and the regulated as a group. As implied in the term "on-
going", these social relations must be understood in a particular historical context, a
relation of time processes. It must be so because the social relations are not a fossilized
phenomenon at one point in time, but rather either evolve or devolve incessantly over
time. The term "relational approach" is derived directly from this set of social relations.
In sum, the new approach's focus is on an understanding of the twofold regulatory
relationship in its socio-historical contexts. It aims to illuminate that compliance is a
surface expression of regulatory relationships. The following three chapters will explicate
how the relational approach obtains the greater validity over the existing theories by
showing the contextual embeddedness of choices and the resulting actions in the web of
social settings.
Conceptual Palette
Before moving on to the empirical chapters, this section explains meanings of key
concepts around which the story told in this dissertation is revolved. They are implicitly
mentioned throughout the dissertation, but it will be useful here to clarify what I mean by
those vocabularies, so that there would be no confusion later on. I hope that this section
serves like a depiction of dramatis personae in a literary work.
First, "compliance" is a sole dependent variable in my analysis. It is the most
important concept among other things since different definitions of compliance result in
different analytic outcomes in spite of the identical data. Compliance is a somewhat
ambiguous term. Depending on the degree of meeting regulatory requirements, it can be
categorized into two groups, that is, partial compliance and full compliance. Within the
first category, pollution sources are considered to be in compliance when they meet
several requirements, if not all. Full compliance is a much more rigorous concept. As
implied in an adjective "full", pollution sources, within this category, are forced to meet
all requirements to be in compliance. Otherwise, they are regarded as violators.
Depending on the timing of meeting the requirements, compliance may mean
either initial compliance or continuous compliance. Initial compliance refers to installing
the pollution abatement equipment that enables regulatory requirements to be met. For
example, drycleaners are prohibited from operating transfer machines and forced to
install dry-to-dry machines with vapor recovery systems. Once drycleaners purchase
required machines, they are thought to be in initial compliance. Continuous compliance
attempts to force pollution sources to keep emission and/or discharge within regulatory
limits over time. Obviously, what determines environmental quality is continuous
compliance (Harrington 1988). Henceforth, compliance in this dissertation refers strictly
to "continuous", "full" compliance.
Second, "deterrence" refers exclusively to formal deterrence accompanied by
legal sanctions. Depending on sanctioners, this term can be interpreted as either formal
deterrence or informal deterrence. The former is the inhibition of illegal behavior by fear
of legal punishment imposed by government authorities. On the contrary, the latter does
not result from legal punishment, but rather from self-imposed shame/feelings of guilty
and contempt on the part of violators and/or disapproval of significant others. Informal
deterrence falls into the domain of norms as explained below.
Third, by "norms" I mean "social" norms and this notion is intended to serve as
an antithesis of (formal) deterrence. That is, norms are another conceivable independent
variable that can possibly replace a deterrence account of compliance behavior.
Sociologists and rational choice theorists have classified norms at various levels
according to the scope of influence and whether or not they are outcome-oriented. 13 By
restructuring existing classifications (since their original forms step out of the line of our
discussion), I re-categorize norms into three groups: personal norms, membership norms
and social norms.
Personal norms are self-imposed rules that individuals establish to control their
own behavior. In many cases, they are an attempt to overcome weakness of will, such as
'Do not smoke at home.' Personal norms are not outcome-oriented and sustained by
anxiety to achieve psychological comforts. They are not sustained by the approval or
disapproval of others because this kind of norm is not shared with others (Elster 1996).
'Never shave the day before exams' is a good example of non-outcome-oriented personal
norms.
Membership (or group) norms are shared by relatively small number of people in
a larger society. They are constructed to strengthen solidarity among group members and
sustained by informal sanctions such as estrangement or ostracism. Examples of
membership norms are different table manners between different socio-economic classes
and particular codes of behavior witnessed in sports clubs. They can either conflict or be
compatible with personal norms and social norms.
Social norms are prescribed guides for conduct which are generally accepted by
all members of a society. Elster (1989b) defines them as injunctions to behavior that are
non-consequential, apply to others as well as to oneself, and are sustained by internalized
emotions (e.g., a feeling of guilty) as well as by the sanctions of others. It must be noted
13 For richer accounts, see Elster (1989a, 1989b) and Ullmann-Margalit (1977).
here that sanctions do matter not because they raise the cost of certain behavior but
because they are "vehicles for the expression of feelings of anger, disgust, and contempt"
(Elster 1996, p. 1390). On this account, the nature of sanctions in the domain of norms is
different from those in deterrence.
Social norms are considered important precisely because "they are believed to be
necessary to the maintenance of social life or some highly prized feature of it" (Ullmann-
Margalit 1977). This notion is what advocates of the theory of norms have in mind when
accounting for compliance behavior. Unless indicated otherwise, the term norms in the
dissertation is confined to social norms.
A fourth key concept I would like to explain is "relation". Although this term was
introduced in the previous section, its notion needs to be spelled out to avoid confusion
with relativism. At first glance, the relational approach and relativism look similar in that
they equally claim that knowledge is held to be relevant to particular theoretical
standpoints. In both approaches, the choice between standpoints is viewed as a matter of
values rather than external truth independent of cognitive judgments (Scott 1998).
However, there is a fundamental difference between the two. Where relativism holds that
all theoretical standpoints and intellectual positions are equally illusory (Feyerabend
1975, Scott 1988), the relational approach, following Karl Mannheim (1929), argues that
they are partially true though limited.
To comprehend their difference, consider the following example. You ask Jane
and Tom to characterize John's personality. Jane says, 'John is so sweet and considerate.'
But Tom responds, 'He is a selfish brute.' For relativists, Jane's and Tom's knowledge of
John is illusion, and thus would keep their knowledge away from evaluation: 'anything
goes' (Feyerabend 1975). Even in the case that Jane and Tom have a new experience of
John, relativists only rearrange the new experience so that it conforms to what they
already know, leaving their cognitive status quo intact. In a relativist framework, "each
thinker is a prisoner inside his definable cognitive scheme" (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982,
p.192). It lacks a theory of how a cognitive scheme ever gets its initial boundaries
(Douglas & Wildavsky 1982).
On the contrary, relationists view that Jane's and Tom's knowledge of John has a
relational truth. In other words, different knowledge of John is constructed by Jane's and
Tom's relation to John; John is nice to Jane, but harsh to Tom. These relations are always
subject to changes, and so their definitions are to be reformulated, rejecting the relativist
assumption of cognitive prison. Knowledge is a product of social relations. What matters
in understanding the nature of knowledge is the continuing conversation with new
definitions and solutions arising from changing relations to hold meanings being tried
(Douglas & Wildavsky 1982). Therefore, relationists are prompted to explore the origins
and the development of different values underlying different relations and explain their
consequences. This implies that from the relationist perspective, values are not
amorphous, abstract entities but social facts that can be understood by actor's social
relations.
On this account, I would like to make it explicit that the relational approach does
not totally deny either deterrence theory or the theory of norms because both accounts
convey a relational truth. Thus, what the relational approach pursues is to synthesize
these two conflicting theories, not finding a middle-ground. To do so, the relational
approach seeks to explain under what circumstances and how actors are more inclined to
be rational versus normative. Chapter 4 and 5 illustrate the above points with real world
examples.
Once we admit the relational approach's theoretical advantage, the significance of
"frames" becomes obvious. Framing is defined as "a particular way of representing
knowledge, and as the reliance on (and development of) interpretive schemas that bound
and order a chaotic situation, facilitate interpretation and provide a guidefor doing and
acting." (Laws & Rein 2003, p. 17 3 . Italics added). To emulate Max Weber's expression,
frame is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity in the relativist world, and thus
provides the basis for making the world meaningful. This definition is important to the
ensuing discussion because social actions and social relations involve the mutual
interpretation and imputation of meanings. Given that social relations are recognized not
only objectively but also subjectively, frames are an indispensable concept to capture the
reality because they provide actors with bases for perceiving how the self and others are
related.
In a policy arena, controversies arise from frame conflicts, which are essentially
value conflicts (Rein & Gamson 1999). I emphasize the term value because the objects
comprising our knowledge are necessarily value-laden (Scott 1998). When we perceive
something as significant, we do so because that something "reveals relationships which
are important to us due to their connection with our values" (Weber 1904, p.76).
Then, how can we reconcile their conflicts? This question entails not only
methodological but also epistemological issues in that it aims eventually to reach a more
comprehensive truth. I reject the mechanical solution viewing that finding a mid-point on
a continuum of conflicting frames is more objective and neutral. Frames cannot be ranked
or traded-off. Instead of adjudicating different standpoints, this dissertation assesses their
partial truth and reconciles them in a broad picture that must be tested through its
contextual relevance (May 1997, quoted in Scott 1998). This idea comes from the
recognition that reality can be viewed various ways and it is by piecing together different
depictions of the reality to gain a better understanding of what the reality is like
(Mannheim 1929). In so doing, the dissertation shows that when actors define a certain
situation through different frames, their definitions result in different paths of the
development of the situation, and thus different policy outcomes.
CHAPTER 3
RULE COMPLIANCE IN THE DRY CLEANING INDUSTRY
The previous chapter was devoted in large part to explaining why it is necessary to
escape the grasp of the dominant theories of small firms' rule compliance and to replace
them with an alternative approach. Yet despite some analogous examples, the alternative
might seem too abstract without offering some exemplary cases. In order to provide
examples that buttress the validity of the relational approach in a small firm context, this
chapter tells a narrative of rule compliance in the dry cleaning industries in southern
California and Massachusetts.
Though they overlap and deal with the same events, the stories told by members
of these local industries begin and end at different points in time and are framed in
different ways. As a translator, I aim to present these diverse (sometimes conflicting)
stories to readers in ways that allow them to draw their own conclusions about what
happened, how the storytellers defined the events that took place, how they reacted to the
events, and how they described a desired world.
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section describes in brief the
general contours and crisis of the dry cleaning industry as it confronted a series of
scientific studies that revealed both chronic and acute health impacts of
Perchloroethylene (Perc), and the resulting regulations by the EPA. The latter part of this
section draws heavily on Robert Gottlieb (2001), the EPA's official documents, and
Chemical Week (the chemical industry's leading magazine) published between the late
1950s and the late 1980s. It pieces together several anecdotal stories chronologically to
draw a far-reaching picture of nationwide regulatory trends targeting Perc and the dry
cleaning industry. This section aims to provide background knowledge about how and
why drycleaners' general attitudes toward the current regulation were formed.
The following two sections give examples of actions taken by state regulatory
agencies and the dry cleaning industries' responses, and compare compliance outcomes.
The first of the two examines the case of southern California, a region known for its
stringent environmental policies and aggressive enforcement. The southern California
case is an unhappy reminder that even with greater formal threats, it is still unclear
whether regulatory requirements would be met. The third section offers a success story of
Massachusetts. It highlights what the state environmental agency and the drycleaners did
to promote compliance.
Trends in the Dry Cleaning Industry
Profile ofDry Cleaning Operations
The origin of dry cleaning dates back to the Roman Empire. The ruins of Pompeii
provide a record of a highly developed trade of professional garment cleaners known as
fullers. Lye and ammonia were used in early dry cleaning, and a type of clay known as
fuller's earth was used to degrease and absorb soils from clothing too delicate for
laundering (International Fabric Care Institute. www.ifi.org).
Modem dry cleaning started in France in 1825 after a worker in a dye and
cleaning factory accidentally spilled camphene, a fuel for oil lamps, on a soiled
tablecloth. When the table cloth dried, the spots were gone (IARC 1995). Petroleum-
based solvents quickly became popular and soon dominated the commercial garment care
industry. Despite its name, dry cleaning is not a completely dry process. Fluids have
always been used in the dry cleaning process. Garment scourers discovered that several
fluids could be used as cleaning solvents, including camphene, turpentine, and kerosene
in early days, and later benzene and gasoline (NIOSH 1997). These fluids are all
dangerously combustible (Wentz 1995). Accordingly, petroleum-based solvents were
prohibited in urban areas and dry cleaning operations tended to be centralized plants
located in industrial zones or on the edge of urban areas (Sinsheimer et al. 2002) until
non-combustible solvents were developed.
Near the turn of the 2 0 th century, synthetic chlorinated hydrocarbons were
developed and mass-produced. During the early 2 0th century, carbon tetrachloride was
popular for dry cleaning. However, because of its toxicity and aggressiveness to metals,
textiles and dyes, it was outlawed and gradually replaced by perchloroethylene (Wentz
1995). Percholoroethylene (Perc) was first introduced to the U.S. in 1934 as an
alternative to petroleum-based solvents. Perc's superior cleaning ability combined with
petroleum shortages caused by the Second World War and local fire codes brought about
a surge in its use. Because Perc is a nonflammable, synthetic solvent, professional
cleaners using Perc were allowed to locate in residential and commercial areas of cities
(Campbell & Low 2002). With this change, small neighborhood drycleaners began to
dominate the industry. This trend continues today1 4 (see Table 1).



























































Source: American Business Information (1994)
According to the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) of
California, the majority of dry cleaning facilities within its jurisdiction are located 25
meters or less from the nearest residence, school, daycare center or business. In more
densely populated cities, such as New York and San Francisco, residences are often cited
14 Unlike the OSHA list of employees, which does not include non-salaried owners, the American Business
Information includes owners on site as employees since many of these firms are family operated. The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently estimated that there were 30,000 commercial dry
cleaning facilities and approximately 244,000 employees. The National Occupational Exposure Survey
estimated that in 1982-83 there were over one-half million employees in more than 40,000 facilities
(NIOSH 1997).
right above dry cleaning facilities (Campbell & Low 2002). In urban areas, dry cleaning
is an extremely dispersed industry made up of small facilities, few of which practice
health and safety training or have environmental personnel (EPA 1995).
Today, approximately 85 - 90 % of U.S. drycleaners use Perc as a cleaning
solvent (NIOSH 1997). Annual Perc air emissions from the dry cleaning industry were
estimated at approximately 46,000 tons (more than 100 million pounds) in the early
1990s (Garetano & Gochfeld 2000). More recent numbers have pegged current use by
the dry cleaning industry at less than 100 million pounds in 2000. However, it has been
estimated that approximately 70% of Perc used by drycleaners is released directly into
the environment, excluding the emissions from offsite disposal (DeRosa 2001).
Nationwide Regulatory Trends
Although some studies in the 1960s revealed that exposure to Perc could cause serious
health problems, such as impaired respiratory and liver functions, its carcinogenic effect
was not yet widely recognized. During the 1950s and 1960s, Perc largely escaped the
regulatory attention its competitors received. Robert Gottlieb (2001) identifies three
possible reasons for this absence of concern: insufficient evidence of Perc's health
effects; the absence of Perc emissions monitoring; and regulatory attention focused
elsewhere. In addition, careful review of Chemical Week published between the late
1950s and 1960s, suggests that it was at least partially due to the Perc manufacturers'
lobbying. As of 1958, drycleaners accounted for 88% of Perc sales market in the U.S.
(Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter, September 11, 1967) spending $85 million on the
chemical annually (Chemical Week, August 30, 1958). By the late 1960s, approximately
50% of coin-operated laundry facilities had added Perc machines. Perc manufacturers
such as Vulcan, PPG, and Dow Chemical expected this trend to continue, forecasting
future market expansion for their products. Accordingly, Perc manufacturers were active
in defending Perc and drycleaners, the single largest user of Perc. The leading chemical
industry magazine preposterously claimed that "the experience of small dry cleaning
15 The EPA's Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) reported that in 1994 only 10 million pounds of Perc were
released into the U.S. air, water and land. This quantity meant that Perc was the sixth ranking pollutant in
the U.S. However, the TRI report underestimated the actual release of Perc because TRI only tabulates
estimates of pollutants released from companies with a certain level of emissions and number of employees
(mostly 10 or more). Most drycleaners do not make the cut (DeRosa 2001).
shops situated in business districts and using perchloroethylene demonstrated the safety
of this solvent" (Chemical Week, quoted in Gottlieb 2001).
Despite the chemical industry's claims, a series of episodes in the mid 1960s drew
attention to hazards associated with Perc use. One dry cleaning employee in Stockton,
California died of Perc fumes and some drycleaners were found unconscious in their
facilities. Facing these tragic incidents, regulators attempted to establish warnings to
avoid excessive exposure to Perc. However, even these modest efforts met strong
opposition from drycleaners (Gottlieb 2001). Dow Chemical supported drycleaners by
arguing that there was "no medical demonstration of damage to the liver or any other
organ from exposure to perchloroethylene." (Chemical Week, February 1966).
In the 1970s, a series of studies conducted by reliable research institutes revealed
Perc's hazardous effects. Studies by the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the National
Toxicology Program (NTP) demonstrated that exposure to Perc causes liver cancer in
mice, and leukemia and kidney cancer in rats (Brown & Kaplan 1987). Other
epidemiological studies have also shown a correlation between exposure to Perc and
increased rates of several types of cancer and other non-cancer health effects' 6 , including
damage to the central nervous system, reproductive system, dizziness, and nausea to
name a few. In response, government regulators such as the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) sought to include Perc in a cancer policy being developed by the
Carter administration at that time. Again, Perc manufacturers blocked the CPSC's efforts
through legal action, seeking to embrace the dry cleaning industry as a dependent
downstream source that would be most threatened by the CPSC policy (Gottlieb 2001).
Mounting evidence of Perc's hazardous effects reported in the 1980s made a new
regulatory round appear imminent. In 1985, the International Agency for Research on
Cancer (IARC), part of the World Health Organization, classified Perc as a probable
human carcinogen. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
observed the effects of Perc on 1,708 dry cleaning employees. The study revealed a
statistically significant correlation between exposure to Perc and higher probability of
16 As for non-cancer risks, acute exposure to Perc has been reported to cause irritation of the skin, eyes,
nose and throat; nausea, fainting, and impaired judgment; central nervous system intoxication, etc. (New
Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services 2002). Chronic exposure causes neurotoxicity,
development toxicity, reproductive disorders and Infertility, respiratory disease, impaired liver and kidney
functioning, impaired visual-information processing, etc. (Schreiber et al. 2002).
cancer. NIOSH recommended that Perc be classified as a potential human carcinogen
(Ruder, A. et al. 2001). Though these findings were opposed by Perc manufacturers and
there were hot debates over the interpretation of those studies, legislators and regulatory
agencies could no longer delay the regulation of Perc use. With a Democratic Congress
raising pressure through new legislation, Perc users were forced to comply with
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). HSWA required that dry cleaners dispose their used solvent and
that the muck and filters from solvent recovery be sent to hazardous waste management
facilities for recycling or incineration (Gottlieb 2001, EPA 1999).
With elevated public concern over Perc's health effects, regulatory battles
intensified in the late 1980s. At that time, the centerpiece of debates was not whether but
how to regulate the dry cleaning industry. In fact, the EPA had attempted to regulate Perc
emissions from the dry cleaning industry as early as 1980 in order to fulfill the
requirement of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendment. The 1977 Amendment required that
each state report to the EPA the status of compliance with National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS). However, previous state regulations pertaining to organic solvents
had always exempted Perc from emission limitations due in part to regulatory agencies'
sympathy for small businesses and in part to Perc's exclusion from the list of "criteria
pollutants." 17 Provided with the NCI's and NTP's studies of Perc's health effects, the
EPA attempted at this time to require all states to submit a State Implementation Plan
(SIP) reflecting Reasonably Achievable Control Technology (RACT) for Perc dry
cleaning systems that had not previously been regulated (Harvey & Spessard 1980).
This initial attempt was blocked by the Halogenated Solvents Industry Alliance
(HSIA). HSIA was formed in 1980 by a group of executives in the chlorinated solvents
industry to meet the growing challenges of government regulation. Regarding regulatory
affairs, its mission was "to monitor international, federal, state, and local legislative and
regulatory activities; to provide information and comment to legislative bodies and
regulatory agencies; and to represent the industry in challenges to regulations where
appropriate" (www.hsia.org/about.htm). To counter the NCI's and NTC's laboratory
"7 "Criteria pollutants" refers to six major air pollutants identified by NAAQS. They include ozone, carbon
monoxide, particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and lead.
animal studies, Dow Chemical, a key member of HSIA, conducted its own animal study
of Perc's carcinogenic effect. The Dow study showed no significant difference between
the control and exposed rats. After reviewing several laboratory studies, the EPA's
Science Advisory Board (SAB) concluded in 1987 that there was no reliable scientific
basis for associating leukemia or kidney tumors observed in rats with exposure to Perc.
The SAB stated that "the mechanism responsible for the marginal increase in kidney
tumors appears to be unique to male rats and probably not operative in humans" (HSIA
1999).
EPA's reluctance to make further regulatory efforts was challenged by an
Oregon-based community group. This group demanded a safety standard for Perc use in
dry cleaning and filed a law suit against the EPA's inaction. Negotiations to settle the suit
led to a 1990 Consent Decree agreement requiring that the EPA propose such a standard
within a year of the agreement (Gottlieb 2001). During this time, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) lowered permissible exposure limits (PEL) for Perc
from 100 ppm down to 25 ppm while classifying Perc as a potential human carcinogen.
Paul Cammer, president of HSIA, stated that "the classification of perchloroethylene as a
potential human carcinogen is without scientific basis" and warned that drycleaners
would be most hard-hit by the new regulation (Chemical Week, February 15, 1989). Due
probably to continuous challenges, this OSHA action was overturned by a federal court
and the PEL for Perc reverted to the previous limit.
In response to both anti-toxic groups' campaigns and the growing body of
scientific evidence, the 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendment finally stipulated that the
EPA had to set a national emission standard for Perc along with 188 other hazardous air
pollutants (HAPs), suspected to cause health and environmental impacts at low
concentrations but not regulated as "criteria pollutants". The 1990 Amendment
considered as primary sources any "group of stationary sources" located within a
contiguous area, which had previously been considered as minor facilities. Under this
stringent definition, the dry cleaning industry as a group became classified as a primary
HAP source. On December the 9 th 1991, under section 112 of the 1990 CAA
Amendment, the EPA proposed the National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air
Pollutants (NESHAP) to limit Perc emissions from both new (constructed on or after
December the 9 th, 1991) and existing (constructed before December the 9 th, 1991) dry
cleaning facilities (EPA 1993). The final rule was promulgated on September the 2 2nd,
1993 (Federal Register Vol.5 8, No.182).
However, the interpretation of what constituted an "acceptable risk" or "adequate
margin of safety", which established the threshold for permissible exposure, was
controversial. Indeed, small drycleaners could not possibly meet an emission standard set
by the EPA that forced them to measure air quality down to parts per billion (DeRosa
2001). Because of this and/or under the pressure from HSIA, the EPA opted for a less
stringent regulatory protocol known as a technology-based standard, one that required
drycleaners to use only EPA-approved "best available control technology (BACT)". In
addition, the Perc NESHAP was subsequently revised to extend the deadlines for
drycleaners to submit initial compliance reports by six months (Federal Register Vol.58,
No.242). Despite relaxed requirements, the dry cleaning industry furiously complained,
"many drycleaners will require changes costing from $35,000 to $50,000, a capital
investment that some small businesses cannot afford."
Regarding the passage of Perc regulations under the 1990 CAA Amendment in
general and the NESHAP in particular, two interesting questions arise. First, why did the
HSIA not challenge the EPA on this front? Second, the 1990 CAA Amendment provided
the dry cleaning industry with available pollution prevention technologies as a method of
compliance, but these alternative technologies were paid scant attention. What are the
reasons for this? Although I was unable to find decisive evidence, one possible reason
can be inferred from HSIA's response to the issue. At this time, blocking regulatory
efforts appeared impossible because a series of chemical accidents in Seveso, Love
Canal, Bhopal and West Virginia which occurred between the mid 1970s and 1980s were
still on the mind of the public. It was likely that any visible proactive opposition to
government action at the outset would bring about backfire. The chemical industry and
HSIA in particular already knew that they were confronting fierce public criticism. Peter
Savage, a chief editor of Chemical Week, warned the industry that:
The idea of chemical companies as irresponsible organizations
with a devil-may-care attitude to the environment grew among the
general public during the 1960s and 1970s and now has a strong
Constituency, backed by entrenched but rather flimsy anecdotal
evidence...... Whether you like it or not, the industry's image is
generally little better than that of the much-maligned nuclear
power business, many studies have shown..... (Chemical Week,
December 14, 1988).
Unlike in the 1960s and 1970s, HSIA recognized that the enactment of new regulations
was unavoidable. Instead of attempting to prevent the creation of new regulations through
lobbying, HSIA pushed attention to Perc emission mitigation add-on equipment,
simultaneously pulling the attention away from alternative technologies that could
accelerate the phase-out of Perc. They emphasized an entrenched belief of American
regulatory agencies: American technological genius should be brought to bear on the
pollution problems. In fact, the HSIA's lobbyist in the push for this technology-based
standard was a former EPA scientist who conducted Perc risk assessment in the 1980s
(Lavelle 1996). Control devices were expected to reduce spills, leaks, and various types
of fugitive emissions. Although such devices would conceivably reduce Perc sales, the
costs of equipments would be passed onto drycleaners, not onto Perc manufacturers
(Gottlieb 2001). Furthermore, it was believed that the control devices might not actually
reduce the quantity of Perc used in dry cleaning facilities unless they were operated
properly.
Since the 1980s, the dry cleaning industry has been affected by several
environmental laws, including the Water Pollution Control Act (commonly known as the
Clean Water Act), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (commonly known as Superfund), the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA),
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), and
the Clean Air Act (CAA). However, it was not Perc manufacturers but drycleaners that
would be forced to bear the burden imposed by these environmental laws. Among them,
the 1990 CAA Amendment created the most significant and the most onerous pressures
on the dry cleaning industry. Indeed, most drycleaners tend to equate Perc regulation with
this air regulation. The new regulation required time-consuming activities and investment
in expensive control and recovery systems to reduce leaks and emissions. This is one of
the main reasons that most drycleaners believe that the current Perc regulation is
unrealistically costly and unfair.
Another is found in drycleaners interpretation of the timing of regulatory agency's
decision. Many drycleaners cynically comment that "when the chemical industry stood
against Perc regulation, government did not make any actions. As soon as they [the
chemical industry] set back and we stood alone, the regulation was enacted. Government
simply ignored our concern. Why? Because we are not like Dow and Vulcan. We are
powerless." These stories will be described in greater detail in Chapter 4 and 5.
The Southern California Case
Since 1980, the dry cleaning industry in the South Coast Air Basin in California has been
regulated by the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD). Its
jurisdiction covers Los Angeles County, Orange County, San Bernardino County and
Riverside County which together account for approximately 50% of California's
population. Rule 1102.1 (Perchloroethylene Dry Cleaning System), which regulated Perc
emission from dry cleaning facilities, was first adopted on June 6th, 1980 and amended
four times in 1981, 1982, 1987 and 1990. Specified provisions of the Rule remained
unchanged through the revisions: minimizing leaks, equipment operation and
maintenance, waste residue handling and storage, and recordkeeping.
Since its inception, Rule 1102.1 seems to have been neither strictly enforced by
regulators nor adhered to by drycleaners during the 1980s, judging from the following
evidence. First, the SCAQMD does not have any compliance-related records of the dry
cleaning industry before 1993. One anonymous staff member of the SCAQMD said,
"Nobody had paid attention to dry cleaning facilities until the 1993 federal NESHAP
promulgated by the 1990 CAA Amendment." Similarly, many long-time drycleaners in
the region commented, "There was no such thing as Perc regulation before the mid
1990s". Some drycleaners said, "There were some environmental laws targeting
drycleaners in the 1980s, but we did not know what to do." In response to the
interviewer's question about Perc disposal, most interviewees said, "I used to dump it in a
toilet. Most people did the same."
Rule 1102.1 was replaced by Rule 1421 (Control of Perchloroethylene Emissions
from Dry Cleaning Systems) on December the 9 th, 1994 because Rule 1102.1 differed
significantly from the federal NESHAP promulgated in September 1993 and the state
Airborne Toxic Control Measure (ATCM) adopted in October 1993 (effective in
December 1994). In other words, Rule 1102.1 was much less stringent than the federal
NESHAP and the state ATCM, so that it could not meet requirements from both
NESHAP and ATCM. Although some maintenance and inspection requirements
remained the same, Rule 1421 (21 pages in length) was much more stringent than Rule
1102.1 (3 pages in length).
Because Rule 1421 is one that is compared with the Massachusetts Environmental
Results Program (ERP) with regard to rule preparations, regulatory requirements,
enforcement efforts and trends in compliance, this section describes Rule 1421 in greater
detail. The following figure is a brief chronology of Rule 1421.
Figure 1. Rule 1421 Chronology
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Preparation of Rule 1421
Since the 1990 CAA Amendment, the EPA has emphasized and encouraged stakeholder
involvement in rule-making processes. During the Rule 1421 preparation period, the
SCAQMD took steps consistent with the EPA's proposal. In an effort to obtain input
from people whose interests were at stake, the SCAQMD consulted with drycleaners'
associations, Perc and equipment manufacturers, and suppliers.
The SCAQMD staff presented an overview of Rule 1421 in industry association
meetings. They met with the Greater Los Angeles Dry Cleaners Association (GLADCA)
on March 15th, 1994; the Harbor/South Bay Dry Cleaners Association (HSBDCA) on
March 16th, 1994; the Korean Drycleaners and Laundry Association (KDLA) on July
14t, 1994; and the Orange County dry cleaners on June 3 0th, 1994 (the Orange county
meeting was sponsored by the Environmental Health Division within the Orange County
Health Care Agency). In addition to the open meetings, the staff met with the leaders of
each association twice. For the first meeting on June 2 3rd, 1994, representatives of
KDLA, the Federation of Korean Dry Cleaners (FKDC), HSBDCA, and the California
Fabricate Institute (CFI) were present. In attendance for the second meeting on July the
20t, 1994 were representatives of FKDC, GLADCA, CFI, and Wayne Freeland and
Associates. According to the SCAQMD staff report (1994), "the association membership
and leadership were generally supportive of a consolidated AQMD rule." Between the
two meetings with association leaders, the SCAQMD invited all individual drycleaners to
hold a workshop on the proposed Rule on June 2 8 th, 2004. The public notice was mailed
directly to drycleaners and was posted in four local newspapers in each county of the
District. The official record indicates that there were only 15 attendees in the workshop,
mostly environmental consultants and other regulatory agencies' personnel. The
SCAQMD viewed the low turnout as a result of "the previous extensive industry outreach
efforts." However, Steve Han of KDLA who attended the June 23 meeting expressed a
different opinion:
From our perspective, the proposed Rule was very harsh. We just
agreed with the general purpose that our business activities must
not harm the environment and human health. Who could object?
But we raised several critical issues such as recordkeeping and
equipment requirements, which appeared unnecessary and too
burdensome. For example, the proposed Rule required us to
maintain and report a vast amount of records. Was it really
necessary? Is the SCAQMD currently using them in productive
ways? (Personal Communication with Steve Han of KDLA)
In the meantime, to prevent potential conflicts among various regulations required by
different agencies, the SCAQMD met with the Sanitation District of Los Angeles on May
4 th the Sanitation District of Orange County on June 7thh, 1994, and the City of Los
Angeles Bureau of Sanitation. These three agencies were about to ban a direct discharge
of Perc containing wastewater. No agency raised objections to the proposed Rule. Their
only concern was that "the equipment and operating requirements for wastewater
elimination should not be too complex and prohibitive for the small drycleaner."
(SCAQMD 1994).
The SCAQMD also met with local equipment manufacturers and suppliers to
confirm that compliant equipment was available and that the equipment specifications
could be attained. Eight local companies were contacted between March and August,
1994: Kelleher Equipment on March 1s' and May 10th, 1994; Air Quality Laboratories on
May 10 th, 1994; Beyerlein's Sales and Service on May 2 6th, 1994; WTW Industries on
June 14 h, 1994; VaPure Company on June 14 th, 2004; Environmental Emissions Systems
on July 5th and 12th, 2004; Arthur Kajiwara Equipment on July 12 th, 2004; and Allrec
International on August 2 4 th, 2004. They commented that the provisions for evaporators
and separators were not suitable for all forms of wastewater elimination, but a Perc
detector was available, though expensive.
After a six-month industry outreach and commentary period, the SCAQMD
modified the proposed Rule 1421 based upon inputs received in many meetings and the
workshop. The SCAQMD concluded that the final version of Rule 1421 would not result
in significant socioeconomic impacts on drycleaners.
Regulatorv Requirements
Broadly speaking, Rule 1421 includes four key elements 8 : 1) equipment requirements
(Rule 1421 section d); 2) good operating practices (Rule 1421 section e &f); 3)
18 Based on SCAQMD staff report (1994) and an environmental code book, I categorized all requirements
into four groups. The categorization reflects the distinctive nature of regulatory requirements.
recordkeeping and reporting provisions (Rule 1421 section g, h & i); and 4) training
requirements (Rule 1421 section e-3).
"Equipment requirements" stipulated that on or after December 9th 1994,
drycleaners were required to install a factory original dry-to-dry, closed loop machine
equipped with integral secondary control. In this type of machine, washing, extraction,
and drying are all performed in one single unit (Rule 1421 (c)-3) minimizing fugitive
Perc emission and consumption. This requirement reflected the standard BACT approach.
"Good operating practice requirements" dealt with self-monitoring and
wastewater disposal. The Rule required weekly testing of control devices prescribed by
the federal NESHAP to detect Perc leak and emission. However, it streamlined this
monitoring requirement by offering a technological incentive for those who installed a
computerized Perc monitor. Drycleaners who installed a Perc monitor were not required
to undergo weekly testing and corresponding recordkeeping activities because a Perc
monitor is more effective than a prescribed maintenance or replacement schedule since it
provides continuous and real time Perc concentration measurements (SCAQMD 1994).
Regarding wastewater treatment, the Rule did not intend to regulate the disposal
of the wastewater containing Perc, which goes beyond the SCAQMD authority.
However, the SCAQMD was concerned with any method of wastewater treatment that
might affect air quality. In the early 1990s, the EPA and the State and Regional Water
Quality Boards (SRWQBD) started investigating groundwater Perc contamination. The
City of Los Angeles Bureau of Sanitation and the Sanitation Districts of Los Angeles
County and Orange County no longer allowed drycleaners to discharge Perc-containing
wastewater into the sewer system. However, the EPA and the California Department of
Toxic Substances Control did not require permits from drycleaners that treated
wastewater onsite. These regulatory actions taken by diverse agencies tended to
encourage drycleaners to treat wastewater onsite.
In an effort to prevent releases of high concentrations of Perc into the air from
wastewater, the Rule proposed performance standards to ensure proper liquid separation
and safe water elimination. The standard for liquid separation was set at a level of 150
ppm, which is Perc's solubility limit in water. A standard for water elimination was
established at the level of 25 ppm, which was the California PEL for Perc. The Rule also
stated that Perc-contaminated wastewater could be disposed by permitted offsite waste
management companies (Rule 1421, SCAQMD 1994).
"Recordkeeping provisions" intended to help drycleaners evaluate their
performance and to facilitate the SCAQMD's systematic oversight of the industry in the
District. The Rule required drycleaners to keep daily, weekly, and annual records for five
years. On a daily basis, drycleaners were required to record the pounds of clothes and the
quantity of Perc used. On a weekly basis, they had to document the results of the self-
inspection of Perc machines and the testing of control devices. On an annual basis, the
quantity of Perc purchased over the previous twelve months was to be recorded. Finally,
drycleaners were required to keep a log of maintenance and repair to machines as well as
operator and employee training. For the first two years, the records had to be retained
onsite. For the remaining three years, records could be stored in another location as long
as they could be delivered to SCAQMD within two days of the request (SCAQMD
1994).
The Rule also required that three types of reports be submitted to the SCAQMD:
an initial report, a compliance report, and an annual report. The initial report aimed to
establish an inventory of the dry cleaning equipment and corresponding control
technologies installed at each facility. For existing facilities (constructed before
December 9 th, 1994), this report was completed by SCAQMD's field inspectors and
submitted to both the EPA and the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to meet the
initial report and initial notification requirements, respectively, of the NESHAP (or the
1990 CAA Amendment) and ATCM. For new facilities (constructed on or after
December 9 th, 2004), it was required as part of the permit application. The compliance
report was intended to provide the status of changes that had occurred, or were planned to
occur in order to comply with the Rule. For example, the Rule required drycleaners with
transfer or vented machines to either convert or replace them. Drycleaners also had to
document their intentions in this report. The annual report is a performance evaluation
providing useful information such as the facility mileage19 , which might also serve as a
proxy of efficient dry cleaning operation. As noted above, drycleaners were required to
'9 The facility mileage is calculated as follows: the total of the pounds of materials cleaned per load divided
by the total of the gallons of Perc used (Rule 1421 section h-3).
calculate annual Perc purchases. This calculation had to be reported to the SCAQMD one
year after the compliance report was submitted and every year thereafter. If the
SCAQMD could obtain information from other sources than an individual facility, the
facility could be relieved of reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
Finally, "training requirements" aimed to increase overall awareness of good
operating practices and other regulatory requirements. The rule specified that each
facility must have at least one trained operator. A trained operator was defined as either
the owner or a responsible employee who completes the CARB-approved initial
environmental training program and a refresher course every three years. In an effort to
ensure that all employees are aware of the regulation, the Rule required the trained
operator to educate other employees (Rule 1421 section e-3).
As noted above, when Rule 1421 was first proposed by SCAQMD, drycleaners
and equipment manufacturers raised some issues regarding recordkeeping and reporting,
Perc monitor options, and the environmental training program (Personal Communication
with SCAQMD staff and Korean Drycleaners-Laundry Association, February 2004).
First, drycleaners objected to the five-year recordkeeping and reporting
requirements. They claimed that the requirements were psychologically burdensome,
costly, and impractical for small firms for the following reasons: The information
required by the Rule is not likely to change from month to month or from year to year;
many facilities could choose to misrepresent the records and reports by generating data
anticipated by the SCAQMD; many facilities could choose to ignore the recordkeeping
and reporting and gamble on not being detected (Personal Communication with KDLA
members); the overwhelming amount of documents are not likely to reviewed or used by
the SCAQMD; there are other ways for the SCAQMD to obtain the required information
(i.e., Perc purchase records can be comprehensively collected from Perc suppliers); and
the annual Perc balance sheet is too difficult to quantify because hazardous waste drums
may be filled with varying amounts of still bottoms, spent carbon and filters that each
contain highly variable percentages of residual Perc (Comments from Katy Wolf at
Institute for Research and Technology Assistance, quoted in the SCAQMD staff report).
In response, the SCAQMD relaxed these requirements for businesses that could show the
data required were holding constant or could be obtained through other means.
Second, the dry cleaning industry complained that a Perc monitor which activates
an automatic door lock whenever the Perc concentrations are high is too expensive
(ranging from $10,000 to 150,000) and is not locally available. This then state-of-the-art
monitor was manufactured by only one company in Italy. During the Rule preparation
stage, this requirement was attacked in several written comments which stated that the
costs of Perc monitors might keep drycleaners from adding the properly outfitted
separator. To respond to this concern, the SCAQMD proposed portable Perc detectors
that had been locally available since the 1980s. The cost of these portable detectors
ranged from $300 to $600.
A third concern arose from the dry cleaning industry's suspicion of the
SCAQMD's ability to conduct the environmental training programs. In fact, the
SCAQMD could not provide the proper program due to limited resources. In response,
the SCAQMD relied on the CARB, trade associations, and individual consultants to
provide sufficient programs to help the industry comply with the Rule.
Overall, the SCAQMD attempted to address the concerns raised by drycleaners,
and the Rule 1421 consolidated several existing regulations affecting the dry cleaning
industry (i.e , the federal NESHAP under the 1990 CAA Amendment and the California
ATCM). One SCAQMD staff commented:
How would you feel if you were required to submit income
information to the Department of Treasury, dependents
information to the Bureau of the Census, information for mortgage
interest deductions to another government agency, etc.?20 You
would go crazy, wouldn't you? We knew that, so we consolidated
the diverse environmental requirements of various agencies and
established a streamlined set of requirements, standards, and forms
of recordkeeping and reporting. They were designed to help
drycleaners comply. Once you meet all requirements of Rule 1421,
you do not have to worry about other federal and state laws
(Personal Communication with the SCAQMD staff).
Enforcement Efforts
The 1990 CAA Amendment, the beginning of stringent Perc regulations, greatly
strengthened its civil and criminal penalties and proposed new enforcement provisions
such as operator liability. For civil penalties, the EPA could impose fines of up to
20 This is a popular example used to highlight regulatory complexities.
$25,000 per day for violations, with a maximum monetary penalty of $200,000. The EPA
could initiate court proceedings without the Department of Justice, whose involvement
had previously been required. For criminal penalties, the 1990 Amendment converted the
cognizant violation of almost every requirement into a felony. Penalties included fines of
up to $25,000 for individuals and imprisonment for up to 5 years for a first conviction,
with each day considered a separate violation. The maximum penalty that could be
imposed was $500,000. Penalties could double for subsequent convictions. In addition,
the 1990 Amendment intended to impose legal liability not only on owners and senior
management personnel but also on employees whenever they knowingly endangered
others (Weiss & Gallagher 1993). The U.S. Congress authorized awards of up to $10,000
to citizens who provided information leading to criminal convictions or civil penalties for
violation.
Alongside the EPA prescription, the SCAQMD's primary enforcement tool to
promote industry compliance was based explicitly on deterrence strategy (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Primary Enforcement Principle
A primary goal of law enforcement is to create
an adequate dteffent to criminal aiiy.
+ To create a sufficient deterrent, enforcement systems
must create an expected penalty that exceeds the
economic gain from violating the environmental law.
* Prob (etection)x Prob (Sanction/Detection) x
Sanction > PDV Cost Savinp
V "PDV Cost Savings" - present discounted value of the
flow of cost savings from vislating environmental law,
+ Prob(sanction/detection) - the conditinalp robability
ofa firm being sanctioned given they have been
detected in violation.
Source: Excerpt from the SCAQMD Presentation Slides
In fact, California's proposed sanctions were equal to or severer than the EPA's: Under
the California Clean Air Act, one of the higher-level laws on which Rule 1421 was
grounded, an emission that caused death or serious bodily injury could result in a 15-year
imprisonment and a fine of up to $1 million; The California Hazardous Waste Control
Act stipulated that violations that contributed to increases in bodily injury or a substantial
probability of death could result in a three-year imprisonment and a fine of up to $25,000
per day of violation; and the California Hazardous Substances Account Act intended to
impose two-year imprisonment and a fine of up to $50,000 per day of violation.
More than 50 inspectors conducted periodical random and targeted inspections to
ensure that approximately 3,800 dry cleaning facilities in the District were meeting
emission limits and permit operating conditions. Field inspectors also responded to
complaints reported by the public. When inspectors detected violations, they wrote either
a Notice-of-Violation (NOV), which involved penalties or a Notice-to-Comply (NOC),
which did not necessarily impose penalties as long as facilities made corrections in a
timely manner.2' When dealing with violations, if a facility had a good history of
compliance and other requirements were met, the violation could be resolved under the
Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP) penalties, which refers to alternative
measures that can create either direct or indirect environmental benefits, instead of
monetary penalties. The SEP penalties typically involve changes in process, material, and
equipment, etc. Note that the SEP penalties are not an exemption from penalties but
another form of civil penalties. They often require costs that exceed typical monetary
penalties to reach compliance. Facilities that self-reported violations could be granted
reduced penalties under Self-Auditing Penalty Policy (however, none of my 25
interviewees and 107 survey respondents self-reported their violations).
Although the SCAQMD has rarely taken enforcement actions equivalent to the
maximum civil and criminal penalties for drycleaners, it has started paying more
attention to the industry since the Rule of 1994 and increased onsite inspection rates and
penalties. For example, more than 60 field inspectors were sent to approximately 3,500
21 A Notice to Comply is an enforcement tool used by AQMD inspectors to document minor violations of
AQMD rules. Minor violations are violations that are administrative or procedural in nature, or which
involve a minimal amount of emissions increases. Minor violations that are corrected in the presence of the
inspector will not result in issuance of a Notice to Comply unless they are repeated minor violations. In
such cases, a Notice of Violation, which is a more serious enforcement action, could result in penalties
(http://www.aqmd.gov/nov/disclaimer.htm).
dry cleaning facilities at least once per year to ensure compliance; the Notice-to-Comply
(NTC) and the Notice-of-Violation (NOV) were issued to many dry cleaning facilities.
Together with increased formal deterrence threats, the SCAQMD provided
drycleaners with both technical and administrative assistance, so that they could comply
with all applicable requirements. The assistance was offered through two routes. To help
initial compliance, field inspectors visited individual facilities to complete the initial
report. Onsite visits aimed to minimize confusion, to reduce the number of tardy,
incomplete submittals and to respond to inquiries immediately. In addition, the
SCAQMD contacted all Perc machine manufacturers and dealers to inform them of the
agency's equipment certification program. Under this program, machine manufacturers
could obtain equipment certification ensuring that their machines were capable of
meeting equipment requirements. By purchasing the SCAQMD-certified machines,
drycleaners could avoid time-consuming engineering review and obtain operation permits
within three working days at a reduced permit processing fee.
The SCAQMD further encouraged compliance by providing alternative
technologies through a university research institute and a Los Angeles-based community
group. The Occidental college-based Pollution Prevention Education and Research
Center (PPERC), one of the leading research institutes on pollution prevention issues in
the garment care industry launched in 1995 the Garment Care Research and Education
program. PPERC initiated the analysis of the viability of a pollution prevention
technology in comparison to the chemical-based process. Their research demonstrated
technical feasibility and economic viability of professional wet cleaning (PPERC 1997).
Sponsored by the SCAQMD, PPERC helped the establishment of the first wet cleaning
demonstration facility in California and educated Perc drycleaners. PPERC expanded
their efforts to technically assist eight drycleaners who had interest in switching from
Perc to wet cleaning (Personal Communication with Peter Sinsheimer at PPERC). Having
seen PPERC's program as a form technical assistance for of small business, Korean
Youth and Community Center (KYCC) became involved in order to reach Korean
immigrant drycleaners.
Trends in Rule Compliance
It was in 1996 that all dry cleaning facilities were required to comply fully with the Rule.
To examine compliance with Rule 1421, the SCAQMD in cooperation with the CARB
randomly selected 208 dry cleaning facilities from the official list of permitted facilities
in the District and inspected them in January 1997. The result of this Perc Drycleaner
Joint Inspection Program (PDJIP) is summarized below (see Table 2).
Table 2. SCAQMD Compliance Audit in 1997
Number of Facilities Inspected 208 facilities
Overall Violation Rate 90%
Percentage of Facilities with Violations based on excess Perc Emission 22%
Percentage of Facilities with Perc Vapor or Liquid Leaks from Dry Cleaning Equipment 17%
Percentage of Facilities in Violation of Recordkeeping Requirements 83%
Percentage of Facilities in Violation of Perc Detector Requirement 20%
Source: The California Air Resources Board (1997).
The PDJIP discovered that all requirements were being violated. The overall violation
rate was 90%. Although the majority of these facilities were found to be in violation of
administrative and recordkeeping requirements, 22% (46) of the facilities inspected were
emitting Perc in excess of legal limits. These emissions commonly emanated from air-
drying of Perc waste, open waste barrels, open lint/muck containers, etc. The inspection
team noted that "the figure of 22% refers only to direct Perc emission evidenced during
the inspections and does not include recordkeeping violations which could possibly be
emissions related" (CARB 1997). For instance, the inspection team detected 156 facilities
(75%) that did not conduct the weekly leak check requirements. If a Perc leak occurred at
one of these facilities, it could have existed for an extended time period before the excess
emissions were detected. The fourth row of Table 2 shows that 17% (35 facilities) had
equipment with excess liquid or vapor Perc leaks. This figure did not include the
additional vapor leaks detected by a halogenated hydrocarbon detector. Approximately
30% of the facilities did not even equip the leak detector.
The weakest area was recordkeeping requirements (83% of violation rate). For the
most part, records were nonexistent. In addition, approximately 20% of the facilities did
not meet the environmental training requirement which required all facilities to have at
least one operator who attended ABR-approved environmental training programs. 28% of
the facilities did not post operation permits and an aditional 7% of the facilities had
invalid permits (CARB 1997).
For the SCAQMD, which had aimed for a 95% of compliance rate, the result was
shocking. When 50 inspectors were sent to 3319 facilities in 1994 (during the Rule 1421
preparation period), approximately 15% of facilities were found to be in violation of Rule
1102.1 (Cleaners News, April 20, 1994). Even allowing for the fact that Rule 1421 is
stricter with regards to operating and recordkeeping requirements, this high rate of
violation was an unpleasant surprise. The SCAQMD ascribed the high noncompliance
rate to insufficiently harsh penalties and too few onsite inspections (Malloy & Sinsheimer
2001). The CARB Joint Inspection Team agreed with the SCAQMD's diagnosis:
There appears to be a decline in the compliance rate among the
facilities when compared to the results reported in the District's
October 1995 study on Perc dry cleaning facilities. The new rule is
admittedly complex. Hence, acceptable compliance rates will be
achieved for this industry only through a combination of more
frequent inspections, public outreach, and appropriate penalties for
sources found in violation (CARB 1997).
Correspondingly, the SCAQMD decided to conduct follow-up inspections with
appropriate penalties for facilities in violation, and a thorough inspection for all facilities
to ensure that the compliance rate would reach a level of 95% or higher.
In 1999, the SCAQMD inspection team conducted inspections of 340 dry
cleaning facilities. The result of the 1999 compliance audit is summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. SCAQMD Compliance Audit in 1999
Number of Facilities Inspected 340 facilities
Overall violation Rate 95%
Percentage of Facilities with Violations based on excess Perc Emission 35%
Percentage of Facilities with Perc Vapor or Liquid Leaks from Dry Cleaning Equipment 9%
Percentage of Facilities in Violation of Recordkeeping Requirements 50%
Percentage of Facilities in Violation of Perc Detector Requirement 33%
Source: SCAQMD (1999).
The 1999 compliance audit discovered that the overall violation rate was 95%, as
opposed to 90% in the 1997 audit. The percentage of facilities in violation of allowable
Perc emission levels (the most serious violation) also increased from 22% to 35%. In
addition, approximately 33% of the facilities inspected were not equipped with the
required Perc detector, as opposed to 20% in 1997. The areas in which we see
improvements are recordkeeping requirements and a direct Perc leak from equipment.
Can the higher compliance with these two areas be explained by increases in deterrence
threats, as the SCAQMD intended? My answer is "unlikely".
Rule 1421, which governed the dry cleaning industry during the PDJIP in
January, 1997 was amended on June the 13 th 1997. 22 The amended Rule required
drycleaners to maintain records for only two years (Amended Rule 1421 section i-1), as
opposed to five- year recordkeeping required by the previous Rule. In addition, the 1997
amendment of Rule 1421 removed several requirements in the areas of wastewater
elimination, employee training, self-monitoring, and applicable control equipment for
replacement of existing and new equipment (SCAQMD 1997).
22 Rule 1421 was amended again on December the 6th, 2002. The essence of the second amendment was a
total ban of Perc use in all dry cleaning facilities in the District. This dissertation does not deal with the
second amendment because both enforcement and compliance data are unavailable. In Chapter 4, however,
some episodes surrounding the approval of the amendment are introduced in brief to explain tensions
between the dry cleaning industry and the SCAQMD.
The decrease in Perc leaks from equipment can be explained by the replacement
of old machines with new ones. Since the amended rule, approximately 685 older transfer
and vented machines have been phased out (SCAQMD 1999).23 This explanation is
supported by the fact that the number of violations of the Perc detector requirement
increased. One drycleaner complained that "When I purchased a new machine in 1998, a
salesman said 'you will not need a portable Perc detector'. So, I did not order a Perc
detector. But I ended up with getting a $500 ticket."
To summarize a compliance trend in its relations to both regulatory requirements
and enforcement between 1997 and 1999:
e Regulatory requirements were relaxed
e Actual formal threats have increased (Perceived threats will be discussed later)
e Nevertheless, the overall compliance rates decreased
Here we should examine how the SCAQMD decided which drycleaners would be
inspected. The sampling method is critical in judging whether or not compliance rates
were underestimated. For instance, if the SCAQMD had primarily inspected facilities for
which they received complaints, it is reasonable to assume that the compliance rate for
those facilities would be lower than the compliance rate for the entire population of
facilities. In the southern California case, the two compliance audits were based on
random inspections. As such, there is no reason to believe that the violation rates were
overestimated.
13 Transfer and vented machines are commonly known as the first and second generation machines,
respectively. Compared to new, non-vented machines, they emit higher levels of Perc.
Figure 3. Overall Compliance Rates of the Southern California Dry Cleaning Industry




Source: CARB (1997) & SCAQMD (1999)
A trend in rule compliance is a proxy of the regulatory effectiveness and provides a
snapshot of how the industry responded to the formal regulation. This trend will be
compared with the Massachusetts experience.
The Massachusetts Case
In 1997, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MADEP) launched
the Environmental Results Program (ERP) targeting small businesses including
drycleaners, photo processors and printers. The ERP is a compliance-assurance system
that uses annual self-certification requirements to shift the compliance assurance burden
onto facilities. It incorporated onsite inspections and industry-specific performance
measurement to ensure that self-certifications were accurate and environmental
performance improved. After reviewing approximately 50 regulatory innovations on
which it had partnered with states, industry, and communities, the EPA concluded in late
2000 that the ERP was one of the best programs in use, suitable for small businesses
(Golledge et al. 2003). Encouraged by the remarkable success in Massachusetts, four
other states (Rhode Island, Delaware, Tennessee, and Florida) recently initiated ERP-type
regulations and Wisconsin is currently planning a pilot program.
This section describes how the MADEP created the final version of the ERP, what
the ERP requires small firms to do, and what the program has accomplished. This section
focuses primarily on the dry cleaning industry among the three ERP sectors for a
coherent comparison with the southern California case, but stories of printers and photo
processors are included where necessary. The following figure summarizes the ERP
development process.
Figure 4. ERP Dry Cleaning Sector Chronology
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Preparation of the Environmental Results Program24
The seed idea for the Environmental Results Program (ERP) originated in a conversation
between Mr. James Gomes of the Environmental League of Massachusetts (ELM) and
Mr. James Coull of the Massachusetts High Technology Council (MHTC). The two were
meeting at the Futures Day of April 1995, an annual event hosted by the MADEP at
which environmental NGOs, industry, and local governments discuss and share ideas






about environmental protection in Massachusetts. They agreed that it would be better to
25have performance standards rather than technology standards. The difficult issue was
how to certify performance standards and shift resources from bureaucratic permitting
processes to enforcement and compliance assurance. The biggest concern of Gomes was
how to form a link between those standards and more inspectors whereas Coull of MHTC
was more interested in ensuring flexibility to allow industry to make its own compliance
decisions. Nevertheless, their views converged at one point: Neither saw much value in
the permitting bureaucracy (April & Greiner 2000).
As of 1995, the MADEP was spending significant regulatory resources issuing air
permits to approximately 4,400 facilities, of which two-thirds were small and medium-
sized firms. Despite extensive permitting processes, the MADEP estimated that at least
two-thirds of small and medium-sized firms in the state were in violation of some
existing requirements (MADEP 1997a). Tara Velazquez, the ERP general manager,
recalled:
In Massachusetts, a number of businesses were not regulated,
particularly very small businesses. These facilities were off our
radar screen because of our limited resources (Personal
Communication with Tara Velazquez).
In fact, most of the 6,000 state superfund sites were formerly permitted facilities,
evidence that permit-by-permit control was no longer working, and instead, only wasting
the regulatory resources. It could not respond quickly enough to meet the needs of
businesses. In addition, time spent securing permits increased unnecessary transaction
costs (MADEP 1997c).
The conversation between Gomes and Coull was overheard by Pat Stanton of
MADEP. He brought up the ideas to Allen Bedwell, a Deputy Commissioner of Strategic
Priorities and Environmental Results (SPER) and MADEP Commissioner David Struhs.
Shortly thereafter (in the summer 1995), Struhs initiated an ERP design team. The ERP
team aimed for increased industry flexibility, permit elimination and reduced
bureaucracy.
2' Both performance standards and technology standards start with the identification of sector-specific
environmental insults, and then set protective limits. Unlike technology standards, however, performance
standards do not prescribe specific technologies but leave it up to individual firms to meet those limits.
Not long after the ERP team was created, the MADEP risked alienating the
environmental community and was having to confront a deepening skepticism within the
agency. The ELM felt betrayed by Governor Weld's "less government" public spin on
the ERP. Other environmental groups feared that the ERP might be the prelude to permit
elimination for large firms. In line with this concern, the Massachusetts Public Interest
Research Group (MassPIRG) worried that the ERP might result in less environmental
protection, and thus insisted that the MADEP not jeopardize the environment and public
health by promoting an unproven regulatory system for large firms (April & Greiner
2000).
Given that the ERP was a top-down effort, there was resistance from line staff.
The majority of them were extremely skeptical of a Republican state government's will
to protect the environment. On the surface, they thought, the ERP looked like an
environmental protection scale-back:
Skepticism of the ERP was not so much external. It came from
traditionalists within DEP. Their thinking was that "you go out,
find violations and punish them." Advocates thought inspectors
needed to "go out, measure performance, monitor it over time, and
understand how a facility is performing. That is a success." Two
different schools of thought were debating internally (Personal
Communication with Tara Velazquez and Paul Reily, ERP dry
cleaning sector manager).
Indeed, many staff within the MADEP worried that the ERP might carry the risk of
letting go of the government's control over polluting sources. The greatest challenge for
the advocates was to convince opponents that the ERP was an innovative way of
regulating small pollution sources, not a hidden agenda to slice up the status quo.
The MADEP selected the dry cleaning and photo processing industries as the first
ERP targets for various reasons. First, under the 1993 federal NESHAP, MADEP
urgently needed to set forth a specific regulatory plan for the dry cleaning industry. On
the other hand, the photo processing industry was permitted only by states, thus avoiding
conflicts between states and the EPA over issues like federal air pollution permit
requirements (April & Greiner 2000). Finally, the MADEP expected high potential gains
from working with cooperative trade associations (Personal Communication with Tara
Velazquez).
The design team invited drycleaners to provide their input for the regulatory
framework and specific requirements. Note that the team could have made a big mistake
at this stage. Mr. Myeong Ho Lowe, a drycleaner in Arlington, tells us an interesting
story:
One day, my sister who worked at the Ways and Means Committee
called me. She asked if I knew about a new regulation targeting
drycleaners. I told her I had never heard of it. As a president of the
Korean Drycleaners Association, I was prompted to call the DEP
to ask what was going on. They explained in brief what they were
doing, with whom and for what purpose. They also said that I was
most welcome to join.
I visited the DEP several days later. The development of
the program was almost complete. They showed the near-final
version of the rule. Shit! I was surprised. I could hardly understand
what the program required of me as a drycleaner.
Mr. Lowe, an architect-turned drycleaner, immigrated to the U.S. at the age of thirteen
and was in his mid-forties at the time of the interview. Dry cleaning is his family
business, started by his father. He is a college graduate and speaks English fluently. In
addition, he has worked with the Toxics Use Reduction Institute (TURI) at the University
of Massachusetts, Lowell, on a project concerning reduction of Perc use and development
of alternative technologies for garment cleaning. In 1996, he was recognized by TURI for
successfully demonstrating his wet cleaning operations to the public (he treats
approximately 65-70% of garments through wet cleaning. The remaining portions are
processed by Perc). He hosted several open houses where other drycleaners and the
public examined his cleaning process and asked questions about his experiences with it.
He knew well the existing federal and state environmental regulations as well as dry
cleaning operations per se. Yet even to his eyes, the original version of the ERP was too
complicated to understand:
I wondered how they came up with those complicated
requirements, given that drycleaners participated. For me, the
requirements were not only complex but also redundant. They
asked the same questions in different forms using different
language. Do you know who advised the DEP staff? They were
managers of Anton's and of Dependable. For them, the proposed
compliance questions were not difficult to understand, I presume.
But I was sure that the majority of small drycleaners could not
understand what they were supposed to do to comply. No doubt.
Anton's Cleaners is a huge chain store with 40 retail locations in 34 cities of
Massachusetts and 2 in New Hampshire. Dependable Cleaners is a three generation
family-run company whose annual income exceeds $20 million. The company has 17
branches in Boston and the South Shore. Both companies had their own environmental
staff who managed companywide environmental and safety issues.
To create dossiers for individual dry cleaning facilities and prepare a
comprehensive compliance log form, the ERP design team pursued detailed information
of varying degrees of complexity in dry cleaning operation. Correspondingly, they
required vast amounts of facility-specific information and asked participating drycleaners
whether they could provide those kinds of information. The response from the managers
of Anton's and Dependable was "yes". The MADEP falsely assumed that other
drycleaners, too, were capable of understanding the proposed requirements and
compliance questions.
To discuss the impending issue, Lowe called upon governing board members of
the Korean Drycleaners Association (KDA) and Mr. Harry Cho of Peabody, former
president of KDA from 1992 to 1994. Prior to his time with KDA, Cho worked as a
mechanical engineer at a missile manufacturing company. In his first year as KDA
president, he hosted a large seminar to inform drycleaners about how Perc increased
ground-level ozone levels and how individual facilities could reduce Perc emissions.
The board members and Cho talked to the MADEP about their negative
evaluation of the proposed compliance questions and suggested starting anew with
preparation of requirements and compliance questions.
I heard from Mr. Lowe about a new program and read a draft. We
were afraid that most small drycleaners could not meet proposed
requirements. So, Myeong-Ho Lowe and I visited the DEP to
deliver the association's concern. The DEP staff said, 'Why is
that? The proposed requirements were the product of long
conversations among drycleaners, the environmental community,
environmental consulting firms, the EPA, and us. In fact, other
drycleaners of the advisory group seem to have no problem with
the requirements.'
I was frustrated....... I knew that Mr. Charles Anton and a
manager of Dependable were in an advisory group...... Lowe and
I were trying to convince them [the staff] how significantly
different from them we were. I told the staff, 'I am not only the
owner but also a 7-to-7 worker. I handle all the chores day and
night. I don't think I have time to read all this material in order to
understand and meet your requirements.... My shop is in Peabody.
To meet with you, I gave up today's business. There is no one who
can operate dry cleaning machine but me. Why do you think I am
doing this?'
They looked serious about my appeal. (Personal
Communication with Harry Cho)
Lowe accompanied by Cho stated:
We did not mean to ask for exemptions from a new regulation or
anything. Nor did we aim to relax regulatory requirements. How
could we? Rather, we genuinely supported the idea of the
environmental protection. We wanted to do the right thing. To do
that, we needed to know how. The proposed requirements were
simply too complicated to understand. To convince them, I said,
'Ask Ms. Heather Tenney at TURI who I am.' (Personal
Communication with Myeong-Ho Lowe)
I asked Cho and Lowe how the MADEP responded:
First of all, they wanted to know if our comments really
represent the general opinion of the Korean dry cleaning
community. We promised that we already talked to other
members about what has been going on and showed them
proposed requirements. We also clarified that we came
there as representatives of KDA, not as individuals.
Then, they asked us what we wanted. Lowe
suggested that the agency restart it from the beginning and
promised to help the staff as much as we could (Personal
communication with Harry Cho)
KDA's suggestion meant the ERP team's months of work would be rendered
meaningless. Certainly, it would be difficult for any public agency to accept this kind of
request given their limited time and monetary resources.
The staff we spoke to said that he was not in a position to decide
whether to accept our suggestion. But he promised he would
consult the commissioner and other staff to come up with a
program agreeable to all of us.......
On the other hand, he emphasized they had invested too
much to completely revoke the plan at that point. Of course, we
knew it. Nevertheless, we kept asking to remind him of the goal of
a new regulation. I asked him, 'Do you guys simply want to enact
a new regulation? Or do you want to make sure that we will
comply? As we already told you, we will be ready to help you if
you understand the reality of small drycleaners.' (Personal
Communication with Myeong-Ho Lowe)
Lowe continued, "Even though we told them our genuine opinion, we really did not
expect that they would accept our suggestion. Surprisingly, however, DEP decided to go
back to the first step and re-open the conversation."
Tara Velazquez at the MADEP remembered this episode:
I was not a general manager of the ERP in those days, but I clearly
remember when the manager told us what the Korean drycleaners
suggested. Some staff suspected hidden agendas on the part of the
Korean drycleaners. Some of us thought they might attempt to
abort or delay the ERP like a group of gas station owners did, but
most of the team members took it seriously. Even if we did not
know the exact number of Korean drycleaners, we came to realize
they accounted for the majority of the state's dry cleaning
industry........
You know there were internal conflicts between the ERP
advocates and their opponents. We needed a promising regulatory
framework to prove the validity of our own philosophy and theory
of the ERP approach, as opposed to the opponents' alternative. It
seemed obvious that without their cooperation, the ERP would not
succeed. In addition, my manager sensed good faith within them.
So, we decided to restart.
At this time, small drycleaners as well as large ones began working together with the
MADEP and EPA staff to reinvent comprehensive sets of regulatory requirements
without undermining the spirit of the ERP and without conflicting with the EPA's
baseline requirements. The first task of this partnership was to explain to the large chain
drycleaners why they had to rewrite the proposal. At the MADEP headquarters on Winter
Street in Boston, Lowe and Cho met with other advisory group members. Fortunately,
Anton's and Dependable were quick to understand the Korean drycleaners' business
environment and agreed to revise the original version of the ERP requirements. The
MADEP clarified that the purpose of the revision was to increase the rule's clarity, not to
relax its requirements.
The next task was to identify the number and locations of dry cleaning facilities in
the state since the main environmental benefits of the ERP would result from stepping-up
oversight of previously un-scrutinized firms. Prior to implementation of the ERP, only
10% of drycleaners were in the state regulatory database. With help from the trade
association, the MADEP raised the percentage of drycleaners under their oversight to
95% (approximately 765 facilities) 26 in 1998 (see figure 5).27 Identification of the
regulated entities not only facilitated industry-wide compliance gains but also leveled the
playing field within the industry, which was a crucial issue for drycleaners complying
with the regulatory requirements (April & Greiner 2000).
Figure 5. Percentage of Drycleaners in the ERP System
Source: MADEP (2000)
Before ERP 1997 1998 & 1999
26 Of 765 facilities, more than 400 facilities are owned by Korean immigrants.
27 April & Greiner's study (2000) shows different statistics on the ERP universe identification as in the
table below.
Industry Identified Number of firms before ERP Identified Number of firms after ERP
Dry cleaning 30 600
Photo Processing 100 500
Printing 250 1100
Total 380 2200
Regardless of the exact figures, MADEP should have the capability to track environmental performance for
80-90% of firms, as opposed to 17% prior to the ERP.
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During this period, drycleaners and the MADEP staff had met almost once every two
weeks. Lowe and Cho periodically delivered proposed regulatory requirements to Korean
drycleaners to test their clarity and to get feedback. One drycleaner in Cambridge who
observed this process says:
DEP and our representative working together? It was a surprise to
us. We are not white but minority, and we are all small
businessmen. If the government ignored us, I would not be
surprised, though a little bit angry. My friends (other drycleaners)
and I asked ourselves, "what did our association do?" It was a
pleasant surprise.......
In the past, I didn't pay the annual membership fee. Since
then, however, I have paid $100 every year because I became
convinced that our association was doing something good for us.
After 15 months of conversation and negotiations, the groups finally reached an
agreement and formed an easy-to-understand set of 22 compliance questions. They also
developed a 56-page workbook explaining in plain English what each regulatory
requirement meant and what drycleaners needed to do to meet each requirement.
To bring as many drycleaners as possible into the system, the group published
workbooks in Korean since native Korean speakers account for more than 50% of the
state's dry cleaning industry. KDA members and a Korean graduate student at UMass
Lowell, majoring in environmental policy, were involved in translation for approximately
three months (Personal Communication with Harry Cho). In addition, the ERP design
team developed 16 Environmental Business Practice Indicators (EBPIs) for the dry
cleaning industry that aimed to provide a snapshot of a facility's environmental
performance and to identify industry-wide problems. 28 The EBPIs included both
traditional compliance measures and some that went beyond simple compliance (see
Appendix A).
During the program development period in 1996, the MADEP initiated the ERP
Demonstration Project to test whether the ERP really could work. They invited 23 small
firms that would ultimately be subjected to the ERP to participate. Of 23 firms, three
were dry cleaning facilities; one was Anton's Cleaners and the other two were small
facilities. Prior to the Demonstration Project startup, MADEP conducted baseline
28 The printing industry and photo processing industry has 26 and 8 EBPIs, respectively.
inspections at participating firms in order to make comparisons between overall
environmental performance before and after the Project was implemented. While laying
this groundwork, the MADEP suspended two firms. One was rejected because of serious
environmental violations discovered in the baseline inspection and the other for failure to
correct pre-project violations in a timely manner. The MADEP explained, "because
participating facilities were granted a limited enforcement forbearance for minor
violations, DEP suspended any firm with serious violations or inadequate return to
compliance to avoid abuse of amnesty" (MADEP 1997a). Three more firms left the
Demonstration Project for other reasons. One firm moved its facility to another state.
Another company's participation was put on hold because of an unresolved MADEP
policy question. The third facility voluntarily ceased participation because it felt the cost
of participating would outweigh the benefits (MADEP 1997a). Excluding these 5 firms,
the remaining firms' compliance rate was 33% (6 out of 18).
After the first self-certifications by the 18 participating firms in January 1997, the
MADEP conducted follow-up inspections to measure changes in environmental
performance. The post-certification compliance rate was increased to 78% (14 out of 18)
(MADEP 1977a). Tara Velazquez reported, "skepticism within DEP decreased with the
ERP performance measurement that the ERP team has been able to report." Encouraged
by the success of a pilot program, the MADEP decided to roll out the program to the
entire Massachusetts dry cleaning and photo processing industry, officially stating that all
drycleaners and photo processors were required to report their
compliance/noncompliance status by September 15th, 1997 and every year thereafter.29
Regulatorv Requirements
The official ERP requirements for the dry cleaning industry can be categorized into four
groups: 1) control requirements for dry cleaning system (310 CMR 7.26 section-12); 2)
operation and maintenance requirements (310 CMR 7.26 section-13); 3) recordkeeping
and reporting requirements (310 CMR 7.26 section-14); and 4) compliance self-
certification requirements (310 CMR 70. 00)30. The first three groups of requirements are
29 The printing industry was officially subject to the ERP in 1998.
3 CMR stands for Code of Massachusetts Regulations.
more or less equivalent to those used in Southern California: 1) equipment requirements
(Rule 1421 section d); 2) good operating practices (Rule 1421 section e &f); and 3)
recordkeeping and reporting provisions (Rule 1421 section g, h & i), respectively. Unlike
Rule 1421, the ERP lacks mandatory environmental training requirements. Instead, it
required drycleaners to self-certify their compliance status, which shifted the burden of
compliance assurance from the regulatory agency onto the drycleaners themselves.
Regarding "control requirements", the ERP prohibited installation of transfer
machines (the oldest type of dry cleaning machine) under Title 40, Part 63 of the Code of
Federal Regulation, Subpart M. For existing machines, the ERP required primary and
secondary control devices such as a refrigerated condenser, carbon absorber, or an
equivalent device. These devices are vapor recovery systems into which a Perc gas-vapor
stream is routed, preventing or minimizing Perc emissions.
The main components of "operation and maintenance requirements" were weekly
leak and emission checks using the MADEP-approved detectors (310 CMR 7.26, section
13-i & j), safe storage of Perc-related materials (310 CMR 7.26, section 13-g & h), and
wastewater disposal (310 CMR 72.00). The MADEP's original method for leak and
emission detection was the same as the EPA's prescription, that is, olfactory appraisal.
Perhaps surprisingly, the drycleaners advisory group objected to this "primitive" method
and suggested, instead, computerized detectors:
Drycleaners helped us develop the requirements and told us how
we could be more stringent. For example, before the program was
rolled out, our requirement was an olfactory test. However,
drycleaners informed us that technology was available which could
detect leaks on a weekly basis. So, their suggestion was
incorporated. (Personal Communication with Tara Velazquez, ERP
general manager).
Harry Cho made a comment consistent with the ERP staff's:
The olfactory tests did not make sense to me. What if I have nose
congestion? Halogenated-hydrocarbon detectors, air sampling
pumps, colorimetric tubes, and portable gas analyzers were already
available. We were willing to persuade our members to purchase
one of these pieces of equipment. In return, we requested a 3-year
recordkeeping period, as opposed to the DEP's original 5-year
requirement (Personal Communication with Harry Cho).
To meet Massachusetts General Law Chapter 21 E (Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous
Material Release Prevention and Response Act), the ERP required drycleaners to drain all
cartridge filters in sealed containers for a minimum of 24 hours (or treat them in an
equivalent manner) before removal from facilities. Also, drycleaners were required to
store all Perc and Perc-containing wastes in solvent tanks or leak-proof containers with
warning labels. The ERP's wastewater disposal requirement, subject to 310 CMR 72.00
(Industrial Wastewater Standard for Drycleaners), is more stringent than that of Rule
1421. In general, drycleaners were prohibited from discharging any kind of wastewater as
well as Perc-containing water into the ground, a septic system, or other onsite systems
(310 CMR 72.04, section 1 & 3-a) such as toilets. Evaporation of wastewater containing
Perc was also strictly prohibited, except for separator water. Furthermore, drycleaners
using tanks to store any kind of industrial wastewater31 were required to have: "a
containment structure with 110% of the total volume of all above-ground tanks" (310
CMR 72.04, section 5-a-1); and "a bell and light alarm in a conspicuous location for
remotely/automatically filled tanks." "The alarm must activate when the level of
wastewater reaches 75% capacity of the tank and alarm signal must be transmitted to a
staffed location" (310 CMR 72.04, section 5-a-2).
"Recordkeeping requirements and reporting" of the ERP is equivalent to or more
stringent than that of Rule 1421. Section 15-a of 310 CMR 7.26 required drycleaners to
notify the MADEP by November, 2nd, 1997 to provide the name and address of the
owner/operator, the address of the facility, and information on the dry cleaning system
and ancillary equipment. This requirement is identical to the initial report requirement
under Rule 1421. Section 15-d required drycleaners to keep receipts of Perc purchases,
record the volume of Perc purchased each month, calculate annual Perc consumption, as
well as keep the dates and results of self-monitoring, the dates of repair and records of
orders for repair parts, the date and temperature sensor monitoring results, a copy of
design specifications and operating manuals of all equipment, and a workbook. In
addition, 310 CMR 72.00 required that sufficient information on industrial wastewater
disposal be retained, including, but not limited to, transporter name and address, the dates
310 CMR 72:00 defines "industrial wastewater" as wastewater resulting from any process of industry,
trade or business, regardless of volume or pollutant content.
of shipment, the amounts shipped, and destination. It also required filing a report with the
MADEP and local Board of Health within 24 hours of any Perc spills. Industrial
wastewater information was required to be retained onsite for at least 3 years, while other
data must be kept onsite at least one year and in another location for at least 3 years, as
opposed to 2 years under the 1997 amendment of Rule 1421.
Finally, "compliance self-certification requirements", which are absent in Rule
1421, are subject to both 310 CMR 70.00 and 310 CMR 7.26. To meet these
requirements, all dry cleaning facilities must submit to the MADEP a certification
statement signed by a responsible person. The compliance certification is comprised of
three sections. The first section (Facility information) identifies the name and address of
the facility and a person whom the MADEP can contact if questions arise about the
certification. It also includes the facility's federal employer identification number (FEI)
from state and federal income tax forms, and a facility identification number that has
been assigned by the MADEP. The second section (Compliance questions) covers air
pollution control, industrial wastewater management, and hazardous waste management
requirements. Compliance questions aim to provide the MADEP with background
information on the facility and about whether the facility has met the standards and
applicable requirements. This second section also indicates where in the Workbook
drycleaners can find information on the regulatory requirements referred to in each
question. The third section (Certification statement) attests under the penalties of perjury
that all information provided in the form is correct. The statement can only be signed by
the owner or responsible personnel listed in the form. The person who signs the statement
is legally responsible for false information submittal.
If a facility is not in compliance with a particular requirement, the firm must
complete the Return-to-Compliance (RTC) plan. In the RTC plan, the owner/operator
must identify the date, type, and reporting date of any violations. The RTC plan forces
non-complying companies to address what they plan to change in order to comply and
when they will do so. Facilities are required to comply with all of the standards and
requirements by the time the certification is completed; the RTC plan is required only in
cases in which the facility cannot correct the problems prior to certification. For example,
if required pollution control equipment malfunctioned and the facility could not make
repairs by the certification date, or if required equipment that the facility planned to
install was not delivered on schedule, the RTC plan would be submitted to the MADEP.
If a spill or release occurred, the facility would attach a Spill or Release Report Summary
to its compliance certification.
Unlike rule 1421, the ERP did not require mandatory environmental training for
owners/operators. Instead, the MADEP held seminars prior to the ERP implementation to
help drycleaners increase their familiarity with the ERP rules, but participation was not
mandatory. Here, it would be helpful to summarize and compare the two rules (Rule 1421
and the ERP) to show that the regulatory requirements are comparable (see Table 4). And
my assessment of compliance costs associated with each category of regulatory
requirements will ground the basis for recognizing the importance of the perceived cost
of compliance in Chapter 4.
Table 4. Comparison of Regulatory Requirements and Assessment of Compliance Costs
Equipment Original dry-to-dry, closed loop
machine



















* This includes the annualized cost of purchasing a refrigerated condenser and the
annual operation and maintenance costs associate with the refrigerated condenser (EPA
Date Unknown).
** The range of equipment age, types of machines and amount of Perc used result in
variations in compliance costs. Neighborhood Cleaners Association International (1998)
assessed that for average drycleaners, hazardous waste disposal would cost $4,567.
Meanwhile the Pollution Prevention Education and Research Center's (PPERC) estimate
was $1,010. My estimation is based on drycleaners' comments.
Perc waste disposal: 70-100 gallons X $6.94/gallon = $485.8-$694
Drum disposal: 6-8drums X $85/drum = $510-$680
Filter disposal: 2-4 filters X $25/filter = $50-$100
*** PPERC estimated that mandatory training course taken every three years incurs $150
annually (Gottlieb et al. 1997).
Although the ERP covers most state and federal air, water, and hazardous waste
regulations, some major local, state, and federal laws are not covered. These include the
Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act, groundwater withdrawal regulations, wetlands
and waterways regulations, and hazardous waste site cleanup requirements (MADEP
2003). The state dry cleaning industry still must comply with these regulations. However,
most drycleaners are not subject to them due to their narrow scope of business activities
and limited use of chemicals. Indeed, the ERP was designed to target firms that have
traditionally been exempted from those requirements.
It is worth noting here that the ERP's environmental requirements and standards
are scattered across diverse codes of regulations. For example, most performance and
technology-based standards for the dry cleaning industry are listed in 310 CMR 7.26
(1 0)-(16). However, industrial wastewater standards are included in 310 CMR 72.00, and
310 CMR 72.00 requires a performance-based facility-wide compliance certification in
accordance with 310 CMR 70.00. The problems of this complicated rule structure have
been, to a significant extent, resolved by a drycleaner's workbook, which is the result of
extensive collaboration among the dry cleaning industry, the MADEP, environmental
groups, the state attorney general, and the EPA. The workbook classifies all standards
and requirements according to dry cleaning processes, with which drycleaners are quite
familiar. The workbook must be retained on site at all times.
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Enforcement Efforts
The MADEP's efforts to assure drycleaners' complied with the ERP were a combination
of traditional deterrent strategies and technical assistance, but they relied more heavily on
the latter. Regarding traditional deterrence, the MADEP was authorized under Section 16
of Massachusetts General Law chapter 21A (M.G.L. c21A § 16: Administrative Penalties
Statute) to issue penalties of up to $25,000 per day for violations of the major
environmental statutes and regulations that they implement. M.G.L. c2 1 A § 16, M.G.L.
cI1 1 l42A (Pollution or contamination of atmosphere, prevention, regulations,
violation, enforcement) authorized the MADEP to fine violators up to $ 25,000, imprison
them for up to one year or both, for each violation. Each day that such a violation
occurred or continued was considered a separate violation.
Like in Southern California, MADEP set out to detect violations through both
random and targeted inspections. Two types of inspections were conducted for a variety
of reasons. The targeted inspections were used as the program's standard assessment of
the industry, as program specific follow-ups at facilities that were the subject of previous
multi-media inspections, to ensure compliance with performance standards, and as
investigations in response to citizen complaints. Random inspections relied on traditional
compliance measures, such as levels of compliance with equipment, recordkeeping,
labeling, and self-monitoring, etc. The MADEP selected a certain number of dry cleaning
facilities from those within the ERP universe and sent field inspectors to sites without
pre-notification.
Due to limited regulatory resources, the MADEP did not intend to inspect every
facility at random. The MADEP had only 8 full-time inspectors to cover approximately
756 facilities. Thus, they focused scarce resources on targeted inspections:
Skeptics within and outside DEP were afraid that the ERP might
result in less oversight, but this was not the case. Our goal was to
increase strategic oversight (Personal Communication with Tara
Velazquez).
For focused inspections, the MADEP targeted those drycleaners that were the subject of
complaints reported by the public, that did neither self-certify nor respond to agency
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mailings and telephone calls and that provided suspicious information on their
compliance status (April & Greiner 2000).
The MADEP took two steps to analyze self-certifications. First, they examined
each compliance certification and RTC plan for completeness. When a form was not
complete, the MADEP requested the facility provide the missing information within a
certain time period. Second, once a certification was deemed complete, the staff checked
internal consistency of responses to compliance questions. If the responses were
inconsistent or technically deficient, MADEP conducted inspections. In addition, failure
to file the reports could result in enforcement actions without a field inspection (Personal
Communication with Paul Reily, ERP dry cleaning sector manager).
In the event that field inspectors detected violations, they issued either Notice-of-
Noncompliance (NON, equivalent to the Notice-to-Comply in California) or took Higher
Level Enforcement (HLE, equivalent to the Notice-of-Violation in California) actions,
depending on the severity of violations. The NON was generally used to require
correction of minor problems, provide notice that an existing practice was unacceptable
and/or take the first formal step before issuing administrative orders and penalties. It did
not involve penalties if violations were insignificant and a facility agreed to come into
compliance promptly. Meanwhile, the HLE, including a range of separate or combined
enforcement actions, imposed civil administrative penalties on detected facilities. Any
violators detected through random and targeted inspections were subject to potential
penalties.
However, inspections accounted for just a portion of the compliance activities that
the MADEP conducted. Compliance assistance (also known as technical assistance) was
an important enforcement tool. It promoted compliance by encouraging self-audits and
self-disclosure of violations and incorporating supplemental environmental projects in
administrative settlements. The Interim Policy on Compliance Incentives for Small
Business (Policy ENF-97.002) reflected the MADEP's decision to extend incentives and
compliance benefits to small businesses. Furthermore, it relieved formal penalties for
violations by small businesses32 . Established in June, 1997, immediately before the ERP
3 ENF-97.002 defines a small business as "a person, corporation, partnership, or other entity employing
fewer than ten persons (measured as full time employee equivalents on an annual basis) to manufacture a
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roll-out, this policy established how the MADEP would exercise its enforcement
discretion at ground-level in terms of deciding upon an appropriate enforcement
responses and according penalties:
Many small businesses experience difficulty in complying with
environmental requirements as a result of limited access to
information concerning requirements and limited financial
resources........ In recognition of the particular difficulties
typically experienced by small business, this interim policy
intended to: 1) promote environmental compliance among small
businesses by providing them with incentives to seek onsite
compliance assistance, or to conduct environmental audits; and 2)
achieve statewide consistency in responding to noncompliance of
small businesses by providing guidance to DEP staff on how to
exercise enforcement discretion in such cases (MADEP 1997d).
This official statement did not mean that small firms could be exempted from regulatory
requirements. Despite the difficulties experienced by small firms, they were required to
comply fully with all environmental regulations administered by the MADEP. The
MADEP did not mitigate or waive penalties simply because the regulated entities were
small. Relief of penalty was only considered under three conditions: 1) There was
evidence that a facility did not have ample access to information concerning compliance;
2) There was evidence that noncompliance was an isolated instance, not part of chronic
violations; and the owner demonstrated good faith to correct errors within a reasonable
period of time and to maintain future compliance with all applicable requirements; and 3)
The facility demonstrated financial constraints that prevented compliance or claimed an
inability to pay a penalty. In this case, the burden was on the facility to prove why such
constraints impeded its ability to comply or perform a remedial measure, and resulted in
inability to pay full penalty (MADEP 1997d).
Whether a facility met one of the three conditions above was completely at
inspectors' discretion. In the event that inspectors decided to mitigate or waive penalties,
they offered the facility technical assistance. However, because the MADEP did not have
sufficient resources to provide onsite assistance to all drycleaners that sought it, the
product or to provide a service" that is neither a large quantity generator of hazardous waste nor branch
offices, divisions, or subsidiaries of a business that in the aggregate employs ten persons or more, nor a
location franchised by a parent corporation, nor a government owned/operated facility.
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organization referred some facilities to other private and public sources of assistance.
Drycleaners were most frequently referred to trade associations.
Trends in Rule Compliance
I was unable to locate official pre-ERP Massachusetts dry cleaning compliance data. The
MADEP's website indicates 33% of Massachusetts facilities complied in 1996, before the
ERP was instituted. However, this figure does not well represent the dry cleaning
industry's compliance record, not only because it includes printers and photo processors
in addition to drycleaners, but also because the sample size was too small; the number of
drycleaners participating in the ERP Demonstration was only three. Meanwhile, one
document discovered in the SCAQMD library shows a 6% compliance rate in
Massachusetts in 1996, but the source is unidentified. According to the MADEP staff and
Mr. Dong In Choi, an incumbent president of KDA, it must be "pretty low, maybe lower
than 10%." In the mid 1990s, the dry cleaning industry's compliance rates were 2% in
New York, 14% for Sacramento, 21% in the San Francisco Bay area, and 10% in 1997
and 5% in 1999 for Southern California, as noted above (Sinsheimer at al. 2002). Based
on these statistics and the testimony of aforementioned witness, I presume that
Massachusetts drycleaners' overall compliance rate must not have been significantly
different from those in other major cities.
The first systematic compliance measure was used in late 1997. The MADEP
measured the accuracy of compliance reports submitted by 765 drycleaners (see Figure 6-
1).
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Source: Unofficial Internal Document Provided by the MADEP
The MADEP conducted a correlation analysis on the data, which they explained in the
following manner: "We took inspectors' results from random inspections and correlated
the findings to the facilities' answers on the certification forms and examined how often
field inspectors and drycleaners agreed."
As shown in the figure, frequency of noncompliance as determined by MADEP
was higher than that reported by drycleaners. Whether or not it was intentional, 23% of
drycleaners misrepresented their compliance status. This figure did not surprise the
MADEP: "We know that there are always things that go on behind our back. That is why














Figure 6-2. Drycleaner Accuracy Analysis:
Self-certifications vs. Inspections






76% M Drycleaner: ComplianceInspector: Noncompliance
Source: Internal Document Provided by the MADEP
Approximately 76% of the universe reported that they were in compliance with all
applicable requirements and inspectors verified it. Only 1% of drycleaners reported
violations of some requirements that were confirmed by inspectors. Interestingly, 4% of
drycleaners admitted violations, only to have inspectors discover they were actually in
compliance. This finding seems illogical, but two possible explanations can be inferred.
First, these drycleaners might have misunderstood the compliance questions. The more
compelling possibility is that they were in violation at the time of self-certification, but
promptly returned to compliance. Inspectors then visited these sites after they had
corrected their noncompliant operations. The problem was the remaining 19% of cases
where drycleaners reported compliance where inspectors did not. This is where the
MADEP's attention was focused and where strategic oversight was deemed necessary.
This strategic oversight seems to have been effective. In 2001, the MADEP
analyzed trends in EBPI performance between 1997 and 2000. The result was impressive
(see Figure 7).
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Aggregate EBP Score
O 1997 Average score: 8.4
N 1998 Average score: 8.4
n 2000 Averaqe score: 9.7
Source: Internal Document ProvAded by the MADEP
Full EBPI credit received a score of 10. However, a lower score should not be equated
with noncompliance because some EBPIs are "beyond-compliance" measures. Trends in
EBPI performance show that many drycleaners improved their environmental
performance between 1997 and 2000. Although there was no change between 1997 and
1998 in terms of the aggregate average score, we see more 10s in 1998. In 1998, 34% of
drycleaners scored a 9 or 10, as opposed to 17% in 1997. In 2000, this figure jumped to
100%, and the average score reached 9.7. Again, this does not mean that the overall
compliance rate in 2000 was 100%. Nevertheless, this data shows that behavior has been
shifting in the right direction.
The MADEP's unique performance measure makes it difficult to directly compare
the Massachusetts compliance rate with Southern California's. Thus, the EBPI-based
measure needs to be translated into a traditional compliance score. The method of
converting to traditional compliance measure is as follows: the number of drycleaners
who self-reported compliance inspectors confirm divided by the number of drycleaners
who self-reported and scrutinized by inspectors (see an explanation of Figure 6-2 for a
fuller account). This method is almost the same as the traditional way of measuring
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compliance rates: the number of drycleaners in compliance inspectors confirm divided by
the number of drycleaners inspected. My translation resulted in 76%, 81.4%, and 86%
compliance rates in 1997, 1998, and 2000, respectively (see Figure 8).







Before ERP 1997 1998 2000
Source: MADEP
In the southern California case, comparing pre-1421 (Rule 1102.1) compliance rates with
post-1421 rates does not provide interesting connotations because Rule 1421 is more
stringent than Rule 1102.1, which could cause an apparent decrease in compliance. By
contrast, the up-shift from A to B (Figure 8) in the Massachusetts case is quite
counterintuitive given that the ERP is more stringent than its predecessor. Compelling
explanations on this leap in compliance have yet to be provided. More importantly, high
compliance in Massachusetts is not a point-in-time phenomenon but a trend that
continued throughout the late 1990s. If this phenomenon is not to be taken for granted, it
must be explained. The following two chapters deal directly with this concern by




EXPLORATION OF CRITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING
RULE COMPLIANCE
Chapter 3 was devoted to describing characteristics of the regulatory regimes in Southern
California and Massachusetts. Their similarities and differences are summarized as
follows:
1) Regulatory requirements are more or less similar between the two regions.
2) Southern California has harsher penalty policies than does Massachusetts, but the
difference seems insignificant.
3) Actual inspection rate is slightly higher in Southern California than in
Massachusetts.
4) The rule-making process was more cooperative in Massachusetts than in Southern
California.
5) Compliance trends in the two regions contrast starkly.
Missing in the above comparison are drycleaners' attitudes toward formal regulations,
though they were implicitly mentioned when discussing the rule-making processes.
Omitting normative factors was deliberate because the previous chapter aimed to focus
mainly on the "formal" characteristics of the regulations. An explicit discussion of
drycleaners' sense of moral obligations (duty to comply) and perceived legitimacy was
reserved for this chapter.
My overriding concern here is focused on the fit between observed phenomena
and the interpretations of them on the part of the storytellers (interviewees). I examine
this fit by identifying groups of potentially influential factors, splitting them up into their
constituent parts, and examining each in turn. For this purpose, my two-case study adopts
as preliminary analytical method J.S. Mill's method of difference comparing "two
instances resembling one another in every other respect, but differing in the presence or
absence of the phenomenon we wish to study" (Mill 1980, 8 th edition, p.280).
Specifically, the analysis takes compliance as a sole dependent variable. To
explain its occurrence/non-occurrence, I first examine the impacts of two groups of
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independent variables. They comprise 'the probabilities of detection and penalty
imposition, the severity of penalty, and compliance costs' on the one group, and 'moral
obligations to obey the laws and the perceived legitimacy' on the other. Each group of
independent variables is derived from deterrence theory and the theory of norms,
respectively. The analytical structure can be summarized as below.
Table 5. Analytical Structure of the Method of Difference
Case Dependent Independent VariablesVariable Economic in Nature Normative in Nature
Southern
CA Compliance Probability Probability Severity Compliance MoralTrComplinen of of Penalty of Costsi Obligation Legitimacy
A Trend Detection Imposition Penalty Costs Obligation
Students of public policy may be familiar with this analytical approach, but my intention
to conduct this type of analysis may sound odd to them. Far from being it the case, as
traditional analytical mind seems to believe, that thorough examinations of each part
reveals the nature of the whole, and thus their causal relations, I use this analytical
method only to discover which independent variables differ between the two cases and to
show that each component does rarely provide meaningful accounts of observed
phenomena apart from the other components of the whole in question. The question of
'why they differ' will be explored through the thick description method. This second
method reflects the belief that the whole is not identical with an arithmetic sum of the
parts. Rather, "the parts and the whole grow out of each other through a continual cycling
back and forth in which meaning gradually emerges and evolves over time." (Piore 1995,
p.130).
This chapter aims to ground the relational approach's empirical validity in a small
firm context by criticizing the two dominant theories and their analytical methods.
However, the criticism is not a complete refutation of these theories. It is rather an
attempt to specify the action domains that they do and do not cover. In this way, we can
make good use of their true contributions to the study of rule compliance and incorporate
them into a more comprehensive explanation. In so doing, new concepts are suggested to
capture the theoretical links between them. Specifically, this chapter first examines the
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divergent compliance choices between the two regions which resulted in contrasting
regulatory outcomes. It then delves into the patterns of the interactions between diverse
economic and social factors in order to trace the root of different action choices.
For this purpose, I have created my own interpretation of what I heard and what I
observed. In my interpretation, the stories I gathered are cross-referenced with official
data and survey results to decide whether and to what extent they are compatible. Never
do I argue that one of these stories is more correct or accurate than others. It is not my
intention to claim that one way of acting is always better than others. What this chapter
does aim to investigate is whether and how groups of actors sustain diverse personal
stories without undermining the integrity of the collective story.
Do Threats Deter?
Examining a compliance rate at one point in time is rarely helpful in elucidating the
effects of deterrence on behavior; more relevant are trends over time. Let us start by re-
examining compliance trends in the two regions (see Figure 9).






In order for deterrence theory to provide sufficient explanations of the above trends, at
least one of the following statements must be true.
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e The perceived severity and certainty of formal sanctions are higher in
Massachusetts than in southern California.
" The perceived probability of detection is higher in Massachusetts than in southern
California.
" The cost of compliance is lower in Massachusetts than in southern California.
Based upon official data, as well as interview and survey responses, this section refutes
the first two statements while partially holding the validity of the third in its relation to
the perceived benefit of compliance, which I call nurtured benefits.
Impacts of the severity and certainty of formal sanctions
Maximum penalty policies prescribed in the rule books are similar in the two regions.
What about the severity of penalties actually imposed on violators? In southern
California, the range of actual civil penalties falls between $500 and $2,000.
Massachusetts imposed relatively more severe fines. In several instances, violators in
Massachusetts were fined more than $20,000. In October 2003, for example, the MADEP
issued a $26,250 ticket to LaFluer Drycleaners in Holyoke for their failure to cleanup a
former dry cleaning facility. One month prior to Lafluer, Lynch's Laundromat and
Carwash in Hanson was forced to pay for the cleanup of a site where past activities (dry
cleaning and truck washing) left contamination. The former owners were forced to pay
$130,000, the current owner $10,000.
Deterrence theorists must be tempted to use these facts as strong evidence
accounting for the observed difference between the contrasting compliance trends:
"These frightening experiences must be cemented in the consciousness of violators and
become transmitted to other drycleaners. Through the transmitting process, individual
experience becomes shared by people in the Massachusetts industry and recognized as
relevant to them. That is how Massachusetts could increase compliance rates, as opposed
to southern California. Heavy penalties work as a strong warning signal."
At first glance, this argument seems to be plausible. However, it seems to me that
this deterrence account results from what Bourdieu called the scholastic bias, a mere
projection of a scholastic mind into the minds of laypeople it observes, to construct
artifacts of theories. How can we prove my rejection to the deterrence account? First,
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increasing trends in compliance in Massachusetts started from 1997 and have continued
until today, while Higher Level Enforcement (HLE) actions were taken in 2003.
Imposition of heavy penalties in Massachusetts is not ex ante but ex post, occurring as an
effort to correct recalcitrant violations.
Second and more importantly, a close look at how drycleaners interpreted the
events leads to a totally different explanation. One day in November 2003, 18 board
members of the Massachusetts KDA discussed ways to promote member participation
and collection of membership fees. The discussion was focused on what kind of
information should be provided for the individual drycleaners. One person who was not a
drycleaner but a publisher of the monthly drycleaners' news letter suggested, "DEP has
recently imposed a $100,000 fine on an Indian drycleaner in Northborough. Why don't
you inform the people of this kind of news?" A drycleaner from Malden responded,
"Well.... To be totally candid with you, I do not think that people are interested in that
information. Who cares? What do you guys think?" Most attendants agreed with him.
When I attended a southern California drycleaners meeting in January 2004, they
were discussing the same issue. I gave them a trick suggestion: "Several drycleaners in
Massachusetts and New York recently received $100,000 to $150,000 fines. Don't you
think your members are interested in a horror story of heavy penalty?" One drycleaner
from Fullerton responded, "No offense, but you don't understand. We are not really
interested in others' misfortune. Of course, we feel sorry for them. But so what? What
can we do with that information? People want more helpful information that directly
benefits them." Another drycleaner added, "Thanks to them, the others in MA and NY
would be safer at least for the next couple of years." People laughed and nodded as a sign
of agreement. They seemed to think of those violators as scapegoats.
Even regulatory staff was skeptical of the effect of formal sanctions on the
drycleaners' compliance. Mr. Edwin Pupka, a senior enforcement manager in the
Division of Engineering and Compliance of the SCAQMD replied to my straightforward
question as follows:
Interviewer: Based on your 20 years of experience, do you believe that penalty threats
will promote compliance rates?
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Mr. Pupka: Probably, but only in the short term. (He continued), Drycleaners'
compliance rates have increased slightly in recent years. We believe that this
change resulted from our cultural approach training provided for field
inspectors.
If we accept the trade associations' interpretation as representing the dry cleaning
community as a whole, it seems clear that the severity of formal sanctions has little, if
any, direct impact on compliant behavior. How about the certainty of formal sanctions?
Does it exert a significant influence? Let us examine the effects of both the actual rate
and perceived certainty of penalty when detected. The following two tables inform us of
the level of enforcement action in each region.
Table 6. Rule 1421 Compliance Summary from 1990 through 2003
1990-1995 No Records No Records








Source: SCAQMD Information Management Public Records Unit
Table 7. Summary of ERP Enforcement Action from 1997 through 2001
Source: MADEP 2002
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Using data from the two tables, we can measure the actual rate of penalty imposition as
seen in the following table.
Table 8. Comparison of the Level of Penalty Imposition
Southern California vs. Massachusetts from 1997 through 2001
Southern California 1951 1111 0.57
Massachusetts 121 8 0.07
The estimated rates of penalty imposition were 57% for southern California and 7% for
Massachusetts. These figures are quite counterintuitive from the perspective of deterrence
theory.
One might argue that we should look not at the actual rate but the perceived
certainty of sanctions when detected. This argument is legitimate. In response, let us
examine the perceived certainty by using survey data. To measure the level of the
perceived certainty, I asked the following questions:
e QSJ: When inspectors detect your violation, what are the chances that agencies
will impose monetary penalties? Please, indicate from 1 (0%) to 7 (100%)
certain.
e QS2: When inspectors detect your violation, what are the chances that agencies
will terminate your business license? Please, indicate from 1 (0%) to 7 (100%)
certain.
Responses from 103 drycleaners in Massachusetts and 107 in southern California are
summarized in Table 9-1 and Table 9-2 below.
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Table 9-1. Perceived Certainty of Monetary Penalty Imposition (Response to QS1)
Southern California 5.43 (n=107) 4.78 (n=37) 5.77 (n=70)
Massachusetts 2.43 (n=103) 2.03 (n=87) 4.56 (n=16)
* See Appendix for ANOVA results
Table 9-2. Perceived Certainty of License Withdrawal (Response to QS2)
Southern California 1.40 (n=107) 1.32 (n=37) 1.44 (n=70)
Massachusetts 1.38 (n=103) 1.28 (n=87) 1.94 (n=16)
* See Appendix for ANOVA results
The survey results are far from causal relationship between the certainty of formal
sanctions and compliance predicted by deterrence theory. Taken at face value, they seem
to suggest that the two are inversely related. However, it would be wrong to assume an
inverse relation between the two because formal sanctions are by no means the only
definable motive affecting rule compliance. For example, the low perceived probability
of detection might negate the effect of high perceived probability of penalty imposition.
We will concern ourselves with this matter later. At the moment, it is important to
emphasize that the empirical data offers room for refuting deterrence theory's entrenched
proposition of penalty threats. The data do not support an a priori reason for assuming
that the severity and certainty of formal sanctions will necessarily promote compliance.
Indeed, most interviewees in both regions denied the significant influence of
formal sanctions on their compliant behavior. One drycleaners' counter-question for the
interviewer is illustrative: "What are your questions about? Do you really believe we are
that simple-minded, opportunistic people?"
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Impacts of the probability of detection
To say that formal punishment has no significant deterrence effect is not to say that
deterrence theory is falsified. Intuitively, the probability of detection must play a more
decisive role in the deterrence framework than does punishment. This is so because
detection is a necessary precedent to punishment. If an actor perceives zero probability of
detection, the meaning pertaining to the severity and certainty of formal punishment
evaporates. Precisely for this reason, we must measure the probability of detection
perceived by drycleaners to fully evaluate the validity of deterrence claim. Before making
an estimate, let us briefly look at the ratio of the number of dry cleaning facilities to the
number of inspectors in each region. From time to time, agencies employ part-time
inspectors, so the exact ratios are difficult to estimate. Thus, the following table includes
only full-time inspectors.
Table 10. The Number of Dry Cleaning Facilities per Inspector
Southern California 3800 5033 76
Massachusetts 756 834 94
We can infer from these statistics that the actual inspection rate might be higher in
southern California than in Massachusetts. Is this reflected in drycleaners' perceptions of
the likelihood of detection? To measure the perceived probability of detection among
drycleaners, I asked the following questions at the beginning (QD1) and the end (QD2) of
interviews and surveys to check consistency of responses.
e QDJ: "Let's suppose that there are instances where you slip into temporary
noncompliance, if not intentional, with one requirement or another. When
noncompliance with one of the requirements occurs for a month or so, what are
3 This estimate of the number of inspectors is derived from the witness of a senior enforcement manager in
Division of Engineering and Compliance of the SCAQMD.
34 This number of inspectors comes from the witness of an ERP dry cleaning sector manager of the
MADEP.
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the chances that agencies willfind out? Please, indicate from 1 (0%) to 7 (100%)
certain?"35
e QD2: "Let's suppose that 100 drycleaners are in violation for a month or so.
How many do you expect will be detected?"
In general, responses to the two questions were consistent. For both questions, southern
California drycleaners perceive a higher probability of detection compared to their
Massachusetts counterparts (See Table 11-1 and 11-2).
Table 11-1. Perceived Probability of Detection: Responses to QD1
* See Appendix for ANOVA results
Table 11-2. Perceived Probability of Detection: Responses to QD2
* See Appendix for ANOVA results
These survey results provide a strong rationale to refute deterrence theory by showing
that the perceived probability of detection does not determine drycleaners' behavior in
question. Interview data compared favorably with the survey data. When QD1 was asked
in interview settings, most interviewees in Massachusetts replied, "I have never thought
about that." Nonetheless, when pushed to indicate some ballpark figures, most answered,
"Well.... 10%, 5%? Maybe lower than 5%.... I really don't know." Of 38 interviewees,
only 2 drycleaners had relatively high expectations of detection (20% and 30%,
35 This question draws on Braithwaite & Makkai (1991).
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respectively). Meanwhile, the southern California interviewees reported 35-45%
probability of detection.
Before closing the discussion regarding the perceived probability of detection, I
need to solve two puzzles that appeared in the survey results. This is necessary to better
support my argument that the perceived probability of detection has little, if any, effect
on compliance behavior in our cases.
First, as in the case of the severity of punishment, good environmental
performers have lower expectations of detection than do violators, both between regions
and within regions. Does this mean that compliance is inversely related to the probability
of detection? What can explain the apparent paradox behind these numbers? Second, the
same interview question asked in different forms resulted in variations in responses. How
can we explain this confusing difference? Deterrence theorists would require answers to
this inquiry.
Psychological theories and in-depth interview data provide plausible answers to
these inquiries. Although I do not intend to explain my empirical observations by way of
psychological reductionism, psychological theories provide important insights that help
to solve these puzzles.
Regarding variations between the regions, a difference in actual inspection rates
might cause different perceived probabilities of detection. The Prospect theory in
psychology offers a reasonable explanation of this phenomenon. The theory posits that
"people systematically accord higher estimates to the frequency of events that they can
recall more readily, than to those that are more difficult to recall" (Etzioni 1988). This
account is supported by higher inspection rate in southern California. Recall the
SCAQMD's primary enforcement strategy introduced in Figure 2. The SCAQMD has
traditionally viewed a primary purpose of law enforcement as creating deterrence and this
regulatory philosophy seems to lead to more frequent field inspections. Increased
inspections in turn led to higher perceived probability of detection.
Variations between rule-abiders and violators can be explained in the same
manner. Violators confessed that experiences of being caught by inspectors increased
their perceptions of detection. Therefore, the data presented in Table 9-1 and 9-2 alone
are insufficient to imply the inverse relationship between compliance and the perceived
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probability of detection unless we know the previous violators' current compliance status
or unless we are sure that perceptions of detection did not change significantly over time.
This is so because violation always precedes detection. Nevertheless, these survey results
help to confinn that actual inspection rates were higher in southern California (minimum
one to three inspections per year) than in Massachusetts. It prompts us to doubt the
effects of the perceived probability of detection associated with deterrence claims.
A second inquiry about a variation between QD 1 and QD2 may be answered by
a psychological theory positing that people tend to think they are safer than others in
risky situations. In retrospect, the subject of QD1 (you) was not identical with QD2's
(100 drycleaners). Although the distinction was not deliberate, respondents seemed to
take QD1 as their own case while QD2 as others'.
Two different interpretations of the responses to QD2 can be made in relation to
compliance trends. One interpretation supports the deterrence theory. To explain the
Southern California compliance trend, deterrence theorists would argue, "See.... People
believed that they would not be caught. That is why the compliance rate has been low. If
you would like to increase the compliance rate, then increase the perceived probability of
detection via morefrequent inspections."
This deterrence claim seems incorrect because it was formulated in a way that
renders testing the theory impossible: when a rule violation occurs in a set of conditions
under which it is not expected to occur, the deterrence threats might be said to be "not
high enough" (Etzioni 1988). But how high is high enough for preventing violations?
Without answering the question, the above deterrence argument is not valid. More
seriously, this argument does not explain the increasing compliance trend in the
Massachusetts industry whose perceived probability of detection is lower than that of
Southern California.
Instead, the results should be interpreted differently. It is quite difficult to increase
the perceived probability of detection unless actual inspection rates dramatically increase.
This interpretation implies that the attempts made by agencies to increase the number of
inspections they carry out in order to raise compliance may be less effective than
deterrence theory prescribes.
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Our final task in this subsection is to examine whether drycleaners' present
perceptions of detection differ significantly from their past perceptions. This examination
is an effort to ensure methodological validity by overcoming the limit of a dominant
research tendency that treats past behavior as the dependent variable with present
perception as the independent variable (Grasmick & Bursik 1990).36
I was not able to quantify the changes in perceptions of detection due precisely to
a methodological problem not only on my part but also on the part of the drycleaners
themselves. Most interviewees refused to respond to the question, "By what percentage
have your perceptions of risk have changed?" simply because they could not estimate the
rates. One drycleaner countered, "If you were me, could you do that?" Having rarely
considered the probability of detection in everyday life, how could it affect their
behavior? Nevertheless, all interviewees in question converged on the same point: Their
perceived probability of detection increased for the first few years of the new regulation
and remained more or less stable later on. In the Massachusetts case, increases in
awareness of threats resulted mainly from KDA's outreach to its members in an effort to
promote member participation in association activities. The reason for KDA's activities
will concern us in the following chapter. For the moment, it is enough to say that the data
associated with perceptions of detection show that the probability of detection does not
reflect the behavior of actors in practice.
In sum, all empirical data regarding the probability of detection fail to explain the
observed difference in compliance trends between the two cases. While the findings can
account for an increasing compliance trend in Massachusetts, the same explanation is not
valid in the Southern California case. If neither formal sanctions nor the probability of
detection is a factor that plays a significant role in drycleaners' expected utility function,
then what is it? The only economic factor left to scrutinize is the cost of compliance.
36 Another method of overcoming this limit is estimating the direct effects of present perceptions of
detection on present inclinations to comply or violate in the future (Grasmick & Bursik 1990). However,
this method is questionable in that it only measures "intentions" as the dependent variable. That behavioral
intentions are not necessarily synonymous to actual behavior is one of my main critiques of the theory of
norms.
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Impacts of the cost of compliance
Before examining the data, it must be emphasized that we should not confuse the cost of
compliance with cost factors (commonly known as deterrence factors) in the expected
utility function. As noted in Chapter 2, deterrence orthodoxy treats as cost factors in its
expected utility function the perceived probability of detection (PD), the probability of
formal punishment when detected (Pp) and the perceived severity of formal punishment
(Sp). In making compliance choices, rational actors are assumed to compare "PD * PP *
Sp" with the costs they would have to pay to fully comply. By the cost of compliance, I
only mean the latter. This distinction is necessary for an accurate discussion of the
benefits of compliance in the next subsection.
Deterrence theory assumes that unlike cost factors, the cost of compliance is fixed
and difficult to overcome. However, my research shows that its magnitude can be either
reduced or amplified by actors' perceptions.
In 1993, the EPA estimated that the average dry cleaning facility would spend
approximately $6,300 (fixed cost) installing pollution control equipment and $1,100
(variable cost) per year operating and maintaining equipment. In addition, waste disposal
was estimated at $1,500-2,000 per year. Costs of recordkeeping, reporting and operator
training were not included in the EPA's analysis.
To measure the annual cost of compliance, I posed the following question:
e Omitting the cost of new equipment, how much money do you spend per year to
fully comply with all applicable requirements?
I focused particularly on respondents' immediate answers as a means to gauge the
perceived costs. The average self-reported annual cost of compliance for Massachusetts
drycleaners was $804, while in southern California, the comparable figure was $4,291.
Such a large difference is surprising because although the two regions are subject to
different regulations, they share similar requirements. Thus, annual costs of compliance
should be expected to be nearly identical (See Table 4 on p. 100). The range of reported
costs is also noteworthy, as demonstrated in the frequency distribution (See Table 12).
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Approximately 46% of Massachusetts drycleaners indicated that they spend exactly $200
per year complying with the ERP. This could hardly be considered a coincidence; indeed,
this is the annual ERP fee that drycleaners must pay the MADEP. It must be noted that at
the program's onset in 1997, the KDA heavily promoted compliance with the new
regulation. At four seminars designed to familiarize drycleaners with the new
requirements, KDA board members consistently informed their colleagues that
compliance would not be expensive and that the ERP's yearly fee was only $200, while
not mentioning other costs. In all likelihood, the percentage of respondents who actually
believe that the $200 completely covers the cost of compliance is less than 46%. This
became evident at a drycleaners' religious meeting held in a church in Newton. Eight
drycleaners were present. After the meeting, I asked them to fill out survey
questionnaires. While answering, one person asked, "How much do we spend?" "$200,"
another replied immediately. This exchange could have influenced some-possibly all-
in the group. Indeed, one drycleaner crossed out his original answer, "$1,000" and
instead inserted "$200." No one questioned the $200 figure.
As shown in Table 10, approximately 76% of Massachusetts respondents
indicated an annual cost of compliance ranging from $200 to $1,000. This range remains
far below southern California's. How can we account for this discrepancy? An important
explanatory factor is that significant costs attributed to compliance by southern California
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drycleaners are categorized as normal operational costs in the Massachusetts group. For
example, many Massachusetts interviewees did not consider the cost of waste disposal as
a compliance cost. I asked them, "You must pay $6-7 per gallon for (Perc) waste removal
and $25-30 for filter disposal. Why did you not include these costs?" In response, some
added the costs to their estimation, but others insisted, "I have to pay for waste disposal
regardless of the ERP, so it does not make any difference in my compliance costs." In a
similar vein, approximately two-thirds of the Massachusetts interviewees did not consider
that recordkeeping incurred costs, in contrast to their southern California counterparts.
Many southern California respondents meticulously noted compliance-related
costs. Furthermore, they tended to amplify the cost by including psychological costs.
Some interviewees even included fees required not by the SCAQMD but by fire
departments and sanitation districts. These drycleaners emphatically stressed to me that
Rule 1421 is simply too costly to follow:
Interviewer: Could you outline your estimated compliance costs according to each
requirement?
- A drycleaner from Pomona starts matching costs with Rule 1421 requirements -
Interviewer: Hold on. Where does this number come from? Isn't this a Fire Department
fee? I'm asking about Rule 1421.
Drycleaner: I know, but what's the difference?
- At my request, he deleted $720 and his compliance cost decreased from $5,000 to
$4,280. When he finished matching costs with requirements, approximately $1,500 in
costs were left unmatched -
Interviewer: What is this money ($1,500) for?
Drycleaner: Well... let's say....stress. (after reconsidering) I don't think this is correct. It
must be more expensive (He insisted that the annual compliance cost be
higher than $10,000. I recorded $4,500.)
In fact, this scenario, in varying degrees, took place several times during the southern
California interviews. Without exception, these drycleaners confessed that they were in
violation of one requirement or another. More interesting is that regardless of amount,
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89.7% of the southern California respondents complain that compliance costs are too
high. In dramatic contrast, 92.2% of Massachusetts respondents view compliance costs as
low or reasonable.
Table 13. Perceptions of the Cost of Compliance
Is the Cost of Compliance Too High?
Southern Califomia
(n=107)
The following interviews are instructive:
- Interview with a drycleaner from Reading, Massachusetts -
Drycleaner: I'm spending approximately $1, 000 per year to comply with the ERP.
Interviewer: Do you think that's too much?
Drycleaner: Not at all. $1,000 per year is nothing, considering the benefits we have
from the ERP
(Discussion of the benefits ensues.)
Interviewer: Can I ask you about your annual gross income before tax?
Drycleaner: I used to make $120,000 - $150,000, but I am making much less these
days because the economy is bad.
- Interview with a drycleaner from Cerritos, California -
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Drycleaner: I am spending approximately $600 per year.
Interviewer: Do you think that it is too much?
Drycleaner: Yes, I do.
Interviewer: Can I ask you about your annual gross income before tax?
(Drycleaner was reluctant to answer the question, but agreed after some persuasion.)
Drycleaner: Approximately $350,000.
Interview: Well... .do you really think that you're spending too much money
complying with Rule 1421?
Drycleaner: I know why you are asking me this question. Of course, $600 per year is
nothing compared to my income. But I am spending money that I otherwise
would not spend. Money does not come easy. You may not know it because
you are a student, but someday you will understand what I mean. What is
Rule 1421 about? It is all about collecting fines. It is a regulation for
regulation's sake that has nothing to do with protection ofpublic health.
What benefits can the people have from Rule 1421? Nothing.
It is clear that the perceived cost of compliance has a significant impact on making
compliance choices. However, a critical question remains. To decide that the cost of
compliance is either high or low, it must be compared with something. What provides
this point of comparison?
According to deterrence theory, deterrence factors serve this role (PD * PP * SP).
The actor complies if and only if the potential cost imposed by deterrence factors exceeds
the monetary costs of compliance, otherwise s/he does not comply. However, deterrence
factors are unlikely to be comparable across groups, as in the previous subsections, which
showed that they did not play a significant role in the drycleaners' choice-making. An
alternative comparable factor is income. Because few drycleaners were willing to reveal
this figure, I estimated it by the number of hangers consumed per year. Although
imprecise, this method shows that even the lowest estimated income renders insignificant
the costs of compliance. Moreover, the above interviews imply that perceived costs
relative to income do not play a decisive role.
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Whether drycleaners view the cost of compliance as high or low depends on the
perceived benefits of compliance, which I call nurtured benefits. It was not until the ERP
seminar in September 2004 that I recognized the importance of the nurtured benefits,
despite repeated references to it from drycleaners. To avoid confusion from later on, there
is a need for clarifying conceptual distinction between nature of these nurtured benefits
and nature of benefits assumed in deterrence theory's utility function (see Figure 10).
Figure 10. Conceptual Distinction between the Benefits of Noncompliance
and the Nurtured Benefits of Compliance
Deterrence Factors (DF)
* Probability of detection
* Probability of penalty imposition
* Severity of Penalty CC - DF = Benefits of Noncompliance
(Expected Utility in Deterrence Framework)
Costs of Compliance (CC)
Nurtured Benefits (NB)
NB - CC = Benefits of Compliance
In deterrence theory, actors are assumed to subtract the multiplication of deterrence
factors from monetary costs of compliance (e.g., cost of pollution abatement equipment)
to assess the expected utility. Note that the expected utility estimated in this way is not
the benefits of compliance but the benefits of noncompliance. Meanwhile, the nurtured
benefits discovered by the dissertation research are the benefits that accrue with
compliance, which is invisible in deterrence framework. When deliberately nurtured,
perceived benefits exert more influence on compliance behavior than does any other
economic factor. The following section demonstrates this point.
Benefit of noncompliance vs. nurtured benefit of compliance
Veridical perception requires that the perceived relative height of two adjacent mountain
peaks must not change with changes of viewpoint; similarly, purely rational actors must
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not reverse their preference and choice-making with changes of situational
characterization, because they stick ideally to a set of axioms such as transitivity of
preference (Tversky & Kahneman 1981). Note that the economic axioms are not
statements of logical necessity but assumptions about the actor's choice-making. Whether
and to what degree the actor's reasoning about making choices depends on such
assumptions is an empirical question whose answer is found in the actor's actual behavior
pattern. The following story illuminates what typically occurs in drycleaners' minds
when they confront a choice situation:
In the summer of 2004, the MADEP requested online filing for the first
time in the ERP's history. Although traditional hardcopy submittals were
still allowed, the MADEP strongly preferred online filing to reduce
regulatory costs on their part.
Massachusetts KDA intuitively recognized that most drycleaners
would likely be unfamiliar with the new submission format. In an effort to
help drycleaners e-file their annual self-certifications, KDA held an ERP
seminar at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Woburn on September 1st. The
board members even had a rehearsal the day before to make sure that the
session would run smoothly. Moreover, they leased 10 laptops to be
prepared for the largest possible attendance, and asked both the MADEP
staff and some students (including me) to attend the seminar for technical
assistance. The seminar was open to both members and non-members.
Disappointingly, only 35 drycleaners attended the seminar. This was less
than half the number attending ERP seminars of the previous few years.
After the seminar, board members got together to have dinner in a
Korean restaurant in Medford. While waiting for the food to arrive, Mr.
Sung-Bae Kim from Beverly raised a question: "It is really strange. I have
received many phone calls from our members asking about the seminar.
But few of them came tonight. Why didn't they come?" His question
sparked the others' curiosity because they had also received many phone
calls since mid August, yet comparatively few members showed up. A
discussion on possible explanations for the low attendance followed.
Someone said, "The time was not right. It was too early for
people." The seminar started at 6:00 PM, but most drycleaners close shop
between 7:00 and 7:30 PM (Previous seminars usually started at 8:00 PM.)
Obviously, KDA was familiar with typical closing times. While
scheduling, however, KDA was afraid that the seminar could be delayed if
unexpected technical problems occurred during the online demonstration.
For this reason, KDA decided to begin earlier. Most board members
agreed that the timing was a likely barrier. Indeed, many of the 35
attendees arrived between 8:00 and 9:00 PM.
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Another board member proposed an additional reason: "Isn't it
because they did not want to spend $50?" (KDA had required a $50
seminar fee to cover hotel and laptop costs.) Some agreed, but president
Choi, the chairman of the advisory board, and Lowe had a different
opinion, essentially, "Does $50 really matter?" (When KDA first started
the ERP seminar in 1997, they required a $100 annual membership fee,
yet approximately 200 drycleaners attended, and few people complained
about the fee.)
While the discussion continued, a group of drycleaners came to the
restaurant. (This restaurant functions as a social club for Korean
drycleaners from parts of Suffolk, Middlesex and Essex counties.) The
board members and drycleaners seemed to know each other very well.
One of the board members asked a drycleaner who had just arrived:
"You promised that you would come to the seminar. Why didn't
you show up?"
"What are you talking about? When did I promise? I just asked if
there were any changes in the ERP requirements and you said
no'.
"But do you have any idea how to use the Internet?"
"My son does. Anyway, how was the seminar? No need to answer.
I can already tell."
Another board member asked, "It wasn't because of the $50, was
it?" The question was partly a joke and partly serious. A reply followed:
"How dare you say that?" A pretend boxing match ensued to demonstrate
jovial relations.
After dinner, some board members continued talking, and Choi,
Kim and I went outside to smoke. Three other drycleaners were already
smoking outside. We stood together. Choi offered, "We prepared a lot for
this seminar but only a handful of people showed up. What would Paul
(Paul Reilly from the MADEP) think? It was so disappointing." One of the
three responded, "I'm really sorry.. .seriously. But you know what our job
is like. I worked alone today because my wife is sick. I was too exhausted.
And you said there would be nothing new except for online filing. What
could I gain from the seminar? I already know what to do. You guys
taught me."
When Choi, Kim and I returned to the table, the board members
were still discussing how to promote participation in KDA events. Choi
repeated what we had just heard. Lowe snapped his fingers because he had
been making the same point: "See, we made a big mistake. To encourage
member participation, we should not ponder how to penalize non-
participants. They won't care. What we must do is convince them that
there are real advantages in joining us." (Discussion of strategies to create
more beneficial KDA events and increase attendance went on for another
hour.)
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One month later, I met with Lowe. I reminded him of what he had said during the dinner.
He added:
We're business people. When business people face
something new, what first comes to our mind is "So, how can
this benefit me?" A question of "how will this disadvantage
me" is at best a secondary concern. Let me give you an
example. When machine manufacturers introduce a new
machine, I first think, "How is this machine better than the
one I have?" not, "How could this new machine be worse
than the one I have?" I have no doubt that others think in the
same way... .We used this psychology when emphasizing the
necessity of the ERP. Didn't I tell you this before?
I went through my field notes and matched them with recorded interviews. Surprisingly,
similar comments were found in interviews not only with Lowe but also with several
southern California drycleaners. But interviews in southern California were mostly about
complaints. For instance, "What benefits can people have from Rule 1421? Nothing."
During my fieldwork, I discovered a most interesting phenomenon. Drycleaners
within the same region told stories that were similar to a curious degree. The two
communities have completely different perspectives on the potential benefits of the
regulatory requirements 37 and one perspective predominates in each region. Specifically,
37 The following question was asked to measure the degree of the perceived benefit of compliance: "To
what extent is the following statement true?: IfI comply with the current state regulation, the benefits
exceed the costs. Please, indicate from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)" The responses are
summarized in the table below.
Std. Error
VAR00001 N Mean Std. Deviation Mean
VAR00002 MA 103 5.6990 .91646 .09030
CA 107 1.6075 .97861 .09461
Levene's Test
for Equality of
Variances t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Interval of theSig. Difference(2- Mean Std. Error
F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper
VAR00002 Equal
variances .468 .495 31.245 208 .000 4.09155 .13095 3.83340 4.34971
assumed
Equal
variances 31.285 207.845 .000 4.09155 .13078 3.83372 4.34939not
assumed
131
that which seems to annoy the southern California drycleaners is accepted in
Massachusetts. With the recordkeeping requirement, for example, a southern California
drycleaner asserted, "It has nothing to do with the environment or human health. Why
must we keep records for years?" In contrast, a Massachusetts drycleaner stated, "It's just
like a housekeeping book. Recordkeeping helps us manage our business more
efficiently." Another example is found in responses to a weekly leak check requirement.
The typical southern California response was: "If Perc is leaking, it's not our fault. It's
the manufacturers' fault. Why should we be responsible for that?" A Massachusetts
member expresses his community's view: "The weekly leak check helps us detect Perc
machine problems prior to a total breakdown. When problems are detected in advance,
we can repair them ourselves. It saves big money."
How can we account for the divergence in the stories that drycleaners tell about
their practice? If we accept Lowe's remark about psychology, the puzzle of each region
having a dominant perspective is to some degree resolved. Indeed, it is not difficult to
infer that KDA and KDLA composed instructive stories for distinct purposes.
Nevertheless, two critical problems remain unsolved. First, why did the two trade
associations come up with diametrically opposed stories? Second, why did the majority
of each dry cleaning community believe its respective narrative? Tracing the answer to
the first question is the heart of the dissertation and is discussed at length in Chapter 5.
For the moment, it is sufficient to say that different narratives resulted from differing
conceptions of self-identity and situational characterizations in a dynamic social web.
The second question is by no means simple to answer. It requires an
understanding of the process by which manufactured narratives are accepted by
individuals as objective reality. In response to this inquiry, deterrence theory may argue
that, as is often the case with organizations, the two trade associations must have both
internal rules to prevent behavioral deviations and sanctions for nonconformity.
Empirically, this argument is absolutely wrong about our cases. The trade associations
can dismiss members for misbehavior deemed harmful to the group. However, there are
no clear definitions of harmful acts in their charters, so judging a particular act as
damaging is highly controversial.
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Moreover, even when an executive board agrees on the detrimental nature of
particular actions, sanctioning is rare due to fear of negative backlash from members who
consider it overly harsh. This was demonstrated twice in southern California in 1996,
when two former KDLA presidents publicly disagreed with an association position. In
this case, KDLA officials ejected the men from the group. This caused dissent in the
membership sufficient to force the leadership to revoke the sanctions.
Less orthodox deterrence theorists may argue that the transformation from
manufactured narrative to accepted truth is facilitated by homogeneous preferences
between trade associations and individual drycleaners, all pursuing self-interest. If true,
there is no need to promote and legitimatize the standardized narrative.38 But why would
a rational actor believe in a collective story and behave in conformity to it, given that s/he
already has well-defined criteria for acting? Unable to answer this question, neither strict
deterrence theory nor a more flexible variety is capable of explaining transformational
process that took place in southern California and Massachusetts.
Presumably, the orthodox version of the theory of norms could provide a viable
account of the transformation process, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, a pure
normative account leads ultimately to an oversocialized conclusion that cannot
adequately respond to the issues of legitimation and individual autonomy.
Legitimation is a process of reification. In other words, it is a process of making
ideas acceptable not to the manufacturers of narratives (because the legitimacy of a story
is self-evident to its manufacturers) but to others in a community. To persuade others, the
legitimatizing process must provide not only values at a normative level but also
substantial knowledge at a cognitive level (Berger & Luckmann 1965). While normative
values tell the actor "why you should do this, not another," knowledge answers "why and
how this is what it is".
Knowledge precedes values in legitimatizing ideas (Berger & Luckmann 1965).
This is true because doing right by following prescribed normative values requires
knowledge of how to distinguish right from wrong. An explanation based on the theory
of norms lacks knowledge as an essential legitimatizing instrument. Without this
38 This hypothetical deterrence account draws on Sabel's (1992) critique of the liberal account on the
politics of trust.
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component, it would be difficult for manufactured stories to convince the target
population. Although propaganda may convince a population for a certain period, it will
not function indefinitely. Overlooking knowledge results from incorrectly assuming that
individuals are wholly in the power of universal norms. However, actors are not
necessarily passive recipients of externally given norms. They often act on their own,
driven by self-interest or emotion.
An alternative explanation overcomes the limits of deterrence and normative
accounts. For a standardized story to embed itself into an individual's reality, it must
include persuasive meanings that become listed in the person's mind. At minimum, the
story must be in harmony with hearsay evidence turned virtual memory. The
Massachusetts case illustrates how this alternative account provides a fuller explanation
than its rivals.
As noted in the interview with Lowe, KDA was aware of drycleaners'
psychology. To simply warn them to "comply or you will be in trouble" was obviously
insufficient, though necessary. In the effort to bring the maximum number of drycleaners
into compliance with the ERP, KDA used drycleaners' inclination for tangible benefits to
its advantage. The effort at first required a list of compliance benefits to be advertised. At
this stage, what most concerned KDA was that the listed benefits that accrue with
compliance be verifiable in drycleaners' everyday business activities. If not, drycleaners
might believe that KDA's advertisement was lip service or deception. KDA feared that
this could undermine the association's credibility.
As a mechanical engineer-turned drycleaner, Harry Cho in Peabody had expertise
in repairing a variety of machines. He would help neighboring drycleaners with their
repairs. Lowe and Choi were also familiar with working mechanisms of Perc machines.
From their personal experiences, KDA recognized the potential benefit of a weekly leak
check requirement and started advertising it. Afterwards, several drycleaners contacted
KDA. Cho and other key members of KDA immediately responded to their calls for
assistance. Some drycleaners previously fixed their machines by themselves without
KDA's assistance. For them, KDA's advertisement seemed absolutely reasonable: "It is
true that if any sign of a problem is noticed in advance, you can prevent major
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malfunctions. A weekly leak check was obviously a good idea", a drycleaner in Foxboro
commented.
Whenever KDA board members visited dry cleaning facilities that requested
assistance, they discussed the reasons drycleaners should comply. Their verbal
advertisement on sites went well beyond the repair of machines. It was more like the
"fixation of beliefs" (Peirce 1877). KDA emphasized the importance of recordkeeping
because they worried that many drycleaners would ignore it while the MADEP would
view violation of this requirement as a 'broken window'. Drycleaners in violation of the
recordkeeping requirement could be under intense regulatory oversight although they met
other requirements. It could lead those drycleaners to complain that the ERP was
excessively stringent. The analogous example used by KDA to promote compliance with
this requirement was a housekeeping book.
Moreover, KDA's emphasis on the health benefits of reduced Perc use is
noteworthy. KDA knew that few drycleaners believed the reports of Perc's carcinogenic
effect. In fact, the KDA board members did not believe it, either. Nevertheless, they
advertised, "Perc is a chemical. Chemicals do not do a body good." This statement was
accompanied by Choi's street-level experiment. At the ERP's onset, Choi was curious of
whether and how dangerous Perc was. He caught a house mouse and put it into Perc.
Choi discovered, "Perc leads to instant death for the mouse." He added more: "Do you
ever see cockroaches in your shop? I'll bet you don't. Why do you think that is?" His
experiment quickly circulated as a funny story in the Korean dry cleaning community.
Undoubtedly, the process of sharing information necessitates networks of social relation
as a prerequisite that facilitates the circulation of the story. This point will be discussed
further in Chapter 5.
Drycleaners who directly benefited from KDA's assistance held the experience in
their memory. These experiences are not restricted to the beneficiaries' memory. Just as
the data saved in a floppy disk can be available to any personal computer owners, so their
memory becomes available in a form of business episode transferred to other drycleaners.
Now, they know what benefits there are, what to do to get them and, at least, whom to
contact when they have troubles. It becomes recognized that complying with the ERP as
a law is not only normatively right. It is also recognized that compliance may bring about
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some benefits. In other words, KDA's standardized story becomes capable of being
reduced to empirical factual knowledge in drycleaners' cognition. Correspondingly, the
Massachusetts dry cleaning community starts accepting KDA's advertisement as the
persuasive truth. When KDA was successful in convincing drycleaners with its
standardized narrative, knowledge of the potential benefits involved in the situation had
steering consequences for drycleaners' conduct.
It is worth noting here that those potential benefits, by definition, always existed.
Several interviewees in southern California recognized the same kind of benefits.
However, this recognition was buried beneath the KDLA's dominant story emphasizing
the unfairness of Rule 1421. In KDLA's story, there is nothing beneficial in Rule 1421:
"What benefits can the people have from Rule 1421? Nothing." The perceived benefit of
compliance is fixed at zero. On the contrary, KDA excavated and nurtured perceived
benefits. In so doing, invisible, superficial ideas turned into subjectively available
objects.
The acknowledgement of the nurtured benefits has special connotations in
reference to compliant behavior. In deterrence theory, the type of impression that comes
to mind first does not make any difference in the outcomes of a cost-benefit calculation,
and thus it has no bearing on choice making. In effect, depending on how people view a
situation in which a behavioral transition is required, they commit to different behaviors.
In other words, whether something is viewed as an uncompensated loss or as an
investment incurred to achieve some benefit makes a difference in the actor's assessment
of behavioral choices (Tversky & Kahneman 1981).
Contextual embeddedness of the cost and benefit of compliance
Thus far we have discussed several economic factors in terms of their impacts on
drycleaners' compliant behavior. Although our discussion has not dealt with all of the
possible variations and combinations of these factors, it was sufficient to reveal that each
economic factor's real impacts cannot be understood solely by rational reasoning in
isolation from particular social contexts. All economic factors under scrutiny are socially
embedded.
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Broadly speaking, the term "embeddedness" refers to the fortuitous nature of
economic action with respect to social structure, political institutions, culture, and
cognition (Zukin & Dimaggio 1990). Since Karl Polanyi (1944) who used the term to
expose the capitalist self-regulating market as not natural but artificial by explicating the
nature of economic action in pre-industrial societies, the concept of embeddedness has
stimulated research in a variety of academic disciplines, including labor economics (Piore
1975), economic sociology (Granovetter 1985), immigrant entrepreneurship (Portes &
Sensenbrenner 1993), organizational theory (Uzzi, 1997), and location decisions (Romo
& Schwartz 1995), to name a few. However, existing compliance literature does not seem
to incorporate this concept into discussions in productive ways.
My empirical data demonstrate that the costs and benefits of compliance play a
crucial role in making choices in a way unexplained by deterrence theory and the theory
of norms. From the viewpoint of a deterrence theorist, economic factors are not social
constructions but automatic responses to certain conditions. However, this view cannot
deal with the wide variations of the perceived costs and benefits of compliance between
the two regions discussed here under similar formal regulatory conditions.
These economic factors can be better understood by adopting the notion of
contextual embeddedness. I avoid the more commonly used term "structural", and instead
use "contextual" to clarify my point as distinguished from an oversocialized view 39 on
the one hand, and to emphasize the usefulness of the relational approach on the other. I
have no doubt that the economic actions of individuals at a micro level as well as macro
economic patterns are influenced by networks of social relationship. Beyond this point, it
should be emphasized that what we must look into are social relationships between
particular concrete actors rather than abstract actors encapsulated by stereotypical role
identification (Granovetter, quoted in Swedberg 1990). Examining social relationships in
the latter sense leads ultimately to a view that people in certain categories behave in the
same way (i.e., regulatory agencies behave this way and trade associations react that way,
etc.). As was already shown above, however, the variations in the drycleaners' perceived
costs and benefits of compliance resulted from different strategies performed by the same
39 This does not necessarily mean that all authors using the term "structural" embeddedness have an
oversocialized viewpoint. While using this phrase, for example, Grenovetter reminds us of
inappropriateness of oversocialization.
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categorical actors, that is, trade associations. Stereotypical categorizations of role
identification and social relationship are insufficient to capture the source of the
difference in our cases.
Contextual embeddedness departs from the assumption made in formal semantic
analysis where categories have clear, well-defined, closed, and monolexemic labels
(Feinberg 1979, Piore 199540). Thus, the concept overcomes the oversocialized view of
embeddedness by including cognitive embeddedness as its crucial subset ensuring
interpretation of the "subjective meaning-complex of action"41 in particular contexts. The
notion of cognitive embeddedness is useful in "calling attention to the limited ability of
human and corporate actors to employ the synoptic rationality required by neoclassical
(deterrence in the dissertation) approaches." (Zukin & DiMaggio 1990, parenthesis
added). However, this notion should not be confused with bounded rationality. Cognitive
embeddedness is not just about the limited mental capacity humans hold for exercising
rational reasoning. It is more like the ways in which actors, under the influence of
sociability, reinterpret the meanings of things taken for granted and, in turn, create new
meanings.42
If we are to explain social phenomena, then our explanation must address the very
subjective meaning the action implies for the actor (Schutz 1967). Recall the
Massachusetts case. While the reactions of southern California drycleaners to Rule 1421
did not quite deviate from a commonsense anticipation that industry would resist
regulations, their Massachusetts counterpart's reactions to the ERP was counterintuitive.
We found the rationale behind the Massachusetts group's behavior in different
perceptions of costs and benefits, which were initially forged by KDA and adopted as an
objective reality by individual drycleaners. This process was not totally a deceptive
40 To illuminate the limit of the classic analytical view of categorizations, Piore (1995) likened the concept
to a ripple: "categories are more like the patterns generated by a handful of rocks thrown into a still pond.
Each has a core that fades gradually as you move out from the center. At their edges, categories overlap and
are ambiguous." (p.122)
41 One of the most influential marching orders for sociology is given by Max Weber who tells, "the object
of cognitions is the subjective meaning-complex of action." (Weber 1947, p. 10 1)
42 Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) define cognitive embeddedness as the ways in which the structured
regularities of mental process limit the exercise of economic reasoning. For me, this definition is nothing
more than a slight twist of bounded rationality. Therefore, I provide an alternative definition for our
discussion's sake.
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manipulation of beliefs. As discussed at length in the previous section, KDA recognized
accessible potential benefits and tried to reap them in everyday business activities. In so
doing, individual drycleaners came to view the ERP in a new way. Mr. Jae Mun Nam in
Northborough said:
I am always willing to follow all the laws because I personally
believe that government regulations are necessary on behalf of the
public. But for me, to be totally candid with you, regulations
sometimes looked unfair because they could only benefit the
public at the expense of businesses. Now, I have a little bit
different perspective. It was not until the ERP that I came to think
that regulation could benefit all. It's as it should be.
He reinterpreted the conventional meaning of regulation (something burdensome) and
attached a new meaning (something potentially beneficial) to it.
Contextual embeddedness admits that actors can be either rational or normative or
in-between while rejecting any form of a priori rationality or normative values. What
determines the final direction of behavior depends on interpretations of contexts. This
means that both material facts and normative values themselves are indeterminate.
Specific socio-historical contexts give meanings to them, and actors interpret and react to
them. Regarding choices of action in relation to a particular set of preferences, an array of
choices is expanded or constrained by the webs of understanding of the ongoing
practices, identities, and interests of other actors that prevail in particular issue contexts.
As such, a key to understanding the choice making under relational approach is to
explicate the "intersubjectively constituted identities and the intersubjective meanings out
of which they are produced" (Lee, Y. 2003). In other words, the making of choices is
contingent upon actors' characterization of a particular situation in which they are
located, and this situational characterization is heavily affected by ongoing relations
between self and other actors in time. In this sense, knowledge embedded in individual's
cognition is not completely rational but reflexive; the greater part of knowledge is
socially derived and handed down to an individual by social networks. This is the essence
of the relational approach, embracing both rationality and normative values. Chapter 5
will offer, in greater detail, examples and theoretical accounts of the connections between
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networks of social relations, their influence on defining self-identities and compliance
choice making within the socio-historical context.
Do a Moral Obligation and the Perceived Legitimacy Make a Difference?
As a reactionary correction of the deterrence frame of reference, the theory of norms
replaces economic factors with social norms, which from a deterrence standpoint, are the
sources of "organized hypocrisy" 43 in the way of objectively seeing problems of rule
compliance. The inherent theoretical limits of the normative arguments have been
uncovered in Chapter 2 and the previous section of this chapter, in comparison with
deterrence theory and the relational approach. Therefore, this section will only examine
whether and to what extent a sense of moral obligation (to comply) and the perceived
legitimacy, two major explanatory variables of this theory, can account for the observed
difference between the two cases.
Impacts of a sense of moral obligation
Proponents of the theory of norms often present real world examples showing that there
are less violations than we would expect from the probability of detection and formal
punishment, and that even in the poorest regions, a complete breakdown of law does not
lead most people to engage in looting (Wilson 1993). They argue for the normative and
communal nature of rule compliance. That is, society provides its members with an
internal compass guiding them to act in prescribed ways that secure social order and
minimize deviations (Wilson 1993). We call this internal compass "a sense of moral
obligation" to obey laws. I am not under the illusion that I can provide an opposition to
the moral argument. What I aim to examine is if there was a significant difference
between the southern California community and its Massachusetts counterpart in terms of
the degree to which they engage in this moral sense. If a general moral sense, as the
theory of norms posits, is a decisive factor that should account for the observed
difference in compliance trends, Massachusetts drycleaners are anticipated to
demonstrate the higher degree of commitment to it, other things being equal. The
43 Krasner (1999), Quoted in Lee, Y. (2003)
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following questions were posed to roughly measure drycleaners' moral obligation to
comply. The survey results are summarized in Table 14.
QMJ: To what extent do you agree with the following statement?; "Regardless of
whether laws are legitimate, citizens must obey the laws." Please, indicate from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) certain.
QM2: To what extent do you agree with the following statement?; "Despite
decreases in profits, my business activities must not harm human health. Please,
indicate from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) certain.
Table 14. Degree of Moral Obligation to Comply
Southern Califomnia 6.57 (n= 107) 6.50 (n=107)
Massachusetts 6.50 (n=103) 6.59 (n=103)
* See Appendix for ANOVA results
The differences in the average scores between the two regions are statistically
insignificant. Drycleaners in both regions report a similar degree of duty to comply with
regulations. The results are not surprising because we know that ordinary people
recognize the importance of maintaining social order, and people know that the best way
to maintain social order is to obey the law.
Confusingly enough, however, drycleaners' responses to the following question
(QM3) were in stark contrast with those to the question of moral obligation (QM1).
QM3: To what extent do you agree with the following statement?; "If a
government regulation targeting the dry cleaning industry is unfair, it is hardfor
drycleaners to comply. An unfair regulation must be revoked." Please, indicate
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) certain.
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Table 15. Degree of Resistance to Unfair Regulation
* See Appendix for ANOVA results
Were respondents hypocrites? If so, why did they lie? If not, what are we missing? Here
our primary task must be to figure out whether a social norm of obedience really exists in
the dry cleaning communities and to examine whether it is internalized in a form of moral
obligation to comply at individual level. The task focuses special attention on the
southern California community because their collective response to QM1 is diametrically
opposed to the actual behavior, in comparison with the Massachusetts community's.
Based upon directly observable actions, proponents of the theory of norms would
argue that there is no such a thing as a norm of civil obedience in the southern California
community. They would say, "Social norms are abstracted from external manifestations
of some sort (Schneider 1968). If directly observable actions by more than 90% of
drycleaners fall into violation, it goes without saying that no social norm of obedience
exists. Their responses to QM1 must be lies." How faithful is this argument to empirical
reality?
The following hypothetical example might be useful in helping to point out the
fallacy in the above argument: Aliens secretly visited southern California in the late
1990s and observed drycleaners' business activities for years. They witnessed that most
Perc machines were leaking and that drycleaners were dumping Perc-containing waste in
a sewer system. Correspondingly, aliens inferred, "Judging from observable behavior,
there are no formal laws regulating drycleaners in this region of the Earth."
We know that this inference is wrong because we are already aware that there has
been Rule 1421 in southern California. The reality is that the Rule has been broken with
great frequency. The example implies that the rate at which southern California
drycleaners violate Rule 1421 has nothing to do with falsification of the Rule's existence.
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Likewise, even if every drycleaner were observed to behave differently, this would have
no bearing on the guiding norm's nonexistence.
It is possible that southern California drycleaners falsely answered the question.
People sometimes lie or speak with less than perfect understanding. Can this prove the
nonexistence of the norm of obedience in the southern California community? I think not.
Anthropologists have argued that even lies conform to standards and can tell us
something significant. If these drycleaners had lied, then they might have believed that
the lie conforms to a standard. Is it not primafacie evidence that the norm of obedience
or a moral obligation to comply exists? Indeed, there are some symbols and concepts
which are so general that virtually anyone who considers her/himself to be a member of
society will accept them (Feinberg 1979). It is tenable to argue that a norm of compliance
or obedience to laws is such a concept easily acceptable to ordinary people.
In addition, there is a good reason to believe that a sense of moral obligation
exists in the form of social norm in this community. At minimum, there is no difference
in socialization between the two dry cleaning communities highlighted by the theory of
norms. Most Korean drycleaners had been through primary and secondary socializations
that emphasized conformity to laws or state authorities. Primary socialization is the first
socialization an individual undergoes in childhood and it involves more than purely
cognitive learning. It occurs under circumstances that are highly charged emotionally.
This is so because a child's socialization is done by significant others such as parents.
S/he takes on these significant others' roles and attitudes and makes them her/his own.
Since the child has no choice in the selection of her/his significant others, s/he
internalizes their world as the only conceivable world. Therefore, primary socialization is
the most important one for an individual (Berger & Luckmann 1967) and likely to result
in entrenched beliefs.
By the time a Korean child enters an elementary school, s/he is told by parents,
"Behave yourself. Do not challenge your teachers. They are the same as us [parents]."
This stems from Confucianism that has provided Koreans with philosophies on everyday
life since the 15th century, and sets the stage on which children are divided into the good
and the bad. Confucianism likens the state to a parent and a teacher. Every interviewee,
like any other Korean, is familiar with a famous Confucian doctrine: "Emperor (the
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state), teacher, and parents are all identical." The state is to citizens what a parent is to
children. For most interviewees, it is always wrong for children to disobey a parent. It
follows that it is wrong to challenge the state.44
Secondary socialization is best illustrated by formal education (Berger &
Luckmann 1967). Institutions of formal education under the auspices of specialized
agencies contributed to strengthening the very belief in the importance of civil obedience.
Most interviewees had formal education some time between the mid 1960s and the mid
1980s when Korea had been under two consecutive military dictatorships. They had been
taught (or brainwashed) in schools that the greatest democratic value is obedience to the
state authority (which is essential to maintain unjust military regimes).45 Although blind
obedience has been replaced in Korea by the notion of democratic legitimacy since the
mid 1980s, those who immigrated to the U.S. seem to be bounded within their
socializations structured in minds.
One may argue that familiarity with social norms or the state ideology is one thing,
and their internalization is quite another. Unlike mere familiarity, internalization refers to
"the immediate apprehension or interpretation of an objective event as expressing
meanings, that is, as a manifestation of another's subjective process which thereby
becomes subjectively meaningful to myself' (Berger & Luckmann 1967. Italics added).
Therefore, one may ask how I am certain that a norm of obedience has been internalized
in drycleaners' minds. This is a legitimate interrogation, so I need to respond to this
question in detail.
Interviews frequently went beyond the issues of Rule 1421 and the ERP, and dealt
with Korea's politics, economy, national defense, education and other social issues. Most
interviewees had extremely negative views on any behavior that from their perspective
might disrupt the status quo. For example, these drycleaners unleashed strong
abomination of labor and student activists for their "irresponsible" activities: "The
government is doing its best.... Criticizing is easy, but presenting alternatives is quite
44 This paragraph discusses in no ways the extent to which this Confucian doctrine is valid in the 21"
century Korean society. For the moment, it must be restricted to the interviewees' experience prior to
immigration.
45 Militant anti-government movement during the 1970s and 1980s in Korea seems inconsistent with the
argument in this paragraph. Counterargument requires an understanding of conditions under which rival
theories emerge and are distributed. This does not concern us because it goes far beyond the scope of the
dissertation.
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difficult. Do they [activists] have a vision of our country's future? I think they don't.
They are making matters worse"; "Labor movement for justice? Bullshit. I think their
stomachs are too full. They need to know what hunger is like."; "Those assholes [student
activists] just don't want to study. That's why they protest. They don't even think about
their parents working hard to pay tuitions. Stupid half-brained jackass."
Some interviewees admitted the necessity of social movements. Even in such
cases, they mostly ended up saying, "An unjust law is also a law. Activists must not
attempt to overthrow it. Why don't they seek more peaceful ways within the permissible
limit set by the Constitution?" They were afraid that social movements challenging
existing laws and government would bring about turmoil.
Culmination of interviewees' tendency to obey the state authority was observed
during the period of the Korean Presidential impeachment in March, 2004. The
incumbent President used to be involved, though indirectly, in labor movement in the mid
1980s and is known for his sympathy for upsurging social movements in a variety of
arenas. Given that most interviewees' political opinion was diametrically opposed to the
Korean President's, they were anticipated to respect an impeachment holding. However,
drycleaners' reaction was quite the opposite of my presumption: "I don't like the
President Rho, but the impeachment is wrong. It is like kicking a father off the family
because he is not doing well." At first glance, drycleaners' hatred of social movements
and disagreement upon the impeachment seem to be incompatible. However, this attitude
clearly demonstrates internal consistency of moral reasoning on their part and shows the
extent to which interviewees adhere to the state authority. Young Bin Choi, a former
president of KDLA in Lawndale, California asserts:
Under any circumstances, people should obey the law for
harmonized society even if the obedience results in some
inconvenience and monetary loss on my part. In the long run,
that will benefit all of us including our children. How do you
think the United States keeps maintaining its power over
others? This country is ruled by laws. Most people obey the
laws.
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Interviewees viewed social order, laws and the state as coextensive. Allegedly, these
drycleaners had an internalized belief in a duty to obey the state that from their
perspective is the only accountable agent securing social order and laws by force.
Unlike the theory of norms' anticipation, the internalized social norm of obedience
does not provide plausible accounts of the difference observed in our cases. A sense of
moral obligation to obey the law may be necessary, but insufficient to ensure compliance
judging from the observed phenomenon in which southern California drycleaners showed
decreasing trends in compliance rates at a low level, despite their high degree of
attachment to a sense of abiding by formal rules.
Impacts of the perceived legitimacy
A second major component of the theory of norms is the perceived legitimacy, that is, a
specific evaluation of the appropriateness of a given regulation. It mainly comprises the
reasonableness of the rules (Winter & May 2001), the manner in which rules are enacted
(Bardach & Kagan 1982), and the fairness of regulators in enforcing the rules (Levy
1997), among other things. The following questions were posed to measure the
drycleaners' perceptions of legitimacy or fairness of regulation and regulatory agency in
each region. The questions were designed to contain similar contents in different formats
for the purpose of the response consistency check. The results are summarized in Table
16:
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Please, indicate from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) certain.
e QLJ: The current state regulation (Rule 1421 for southern California and the ERP
for Massachusetts) is fair
e QL2: The state agency is responsible and reliable
e QL3: Drycleaners' opinion is reflected in regulatory decision making
e QL4: When I have difficulty complying with the state regulation, the state agency
helps me solve the problem
e QL5: The state agency's way of enforcing rules is fair
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Table 16. Degree of Perceived Legitimacy: Average Scores of Responses to QL1 - QL5
Southern
California 1.54 1.88 1.76 1.75 2.10
(n=107)
Massachusetts 5.85 5.90 5.94 5.62 6.00(n=103)
* See Appendix for ANOVA results
Table 16 shows that in each dry cleaning community, responses are quite consistent
across the questions. Overall, the southern California community has strong negative
impressions on both Rule 1421 and the SCAQMD. Their stories are opposed to the
Massachusetts' where KDA did field (mouse) and thought (cockroach) experiments.
KDLA officers and several individual drycleaners argued, essentially:
Rule 1421 makes no sense. If Perc is really dangerous, then
government should've banned its production in the first
place. But the chemical industry is still producing it. Isn't this
evidence that Perc is much less dangerous than government
advertises?
Moreover, we are not the only Perc users. The
Hollywood, Navy, the aeronautic industry, metal finishers,
solvent degreasers.... they all consume tremendous amount
of Perc, but they are not regulated. Why us? It is because we
are non-white minority immigrants. One day, I asked an
inspector why the SCAQMD regulate us. He said, "I don't
know. I am just doing by what I heard from higher
authority." Even inspectors are unable to justify their action
(Personal Communication with Mr. Seojun Ma in Fullerton,
California)
In contrast to drycleaners' belief, in fact, other Perc users are also regulated (e.g., Solvent
degreasers are subject to Rule 1122; film cleaning and printing operations are regulated
under Rule 1425, etc.) However, most drycleaners did not know about regulations
targeting other Perc users. Even when I informed them that those industries were also
being regulated, many interviewees were skeptical of the information: "Are you sure?
The association never mentioned that."
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Massachusetts drycleaners were also unaware that other major Perc users are
regulated. Nevertheless, KDA's response was different from KDLA's:
It seems unfair that government touches only the dry cleaning
industry. Other industries using Perc should be regulated. But
they are who they are and we are who we are. Unlike those
industries, we do not harm the environment and human
health by following the ERP. We are proud of that. And it is
not difficult to fully comply.
- In response to the question of whether or not field inspectors abuse their
power over drycleaners, the interviewee said -
Do inspectors abuse their power? No. We [drycleaners] have
been doing well. Why would they harass us? (Personal
Communication with the president of KDA)
In general, the Massachusetts community views the ERP and the MADEP as legitimate
and fair, as opposed to the southern California community's views on Rule 1421 and the
SCAQMD. If we accept these findings as truthful, compliance must be strongly
correlated to how drycleaners view of the nature of current regulation and regulatory
agency, that is, the perceived legitimacy of rule and rule enforcement. This is not to say
that the perceived legitimacy is the sole factor motivating compliance behavior. As we
have seen, compliance is also connected to actors' material well-being to some degree.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say that the perceived legitimacy plays a crucial role of
behavioral guidance instructing one how to act. Proponents of the theory of norms posit
that this behavioral guidance emanates from social norms. It has nothing to do with
rational reasoning. One consigns the perceptions of legitimacy to the level of social
system, and concrete behavior stemming from this guidance constitutes social action
(Feinberg 1979).
While this position seems tenable from an empirical point of view, it presents a
further question with respect to the formulation of the perceived legitimacy. Why did the
two communities with identical cultural attributes and level of formal education come to
have different perceptions of legitimacy under similar regulatory conditions? If we are to
fully understand the role of the perceived legitimacy in making compliance choices, it is
essential to continue pushing the question of how community members formulate a sense
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of legitimacy. We will discuss the issue associated with the above question in detail in the
following chapter. For the moment, it would be useful to mention briefly the importance
of the trade associations and of regulators' strategies in formulating dominant perceptions
of legitimacy.
One of crucial points of the dissertation, following social constructivism, is that
reality is socially defined and interpreted through social interaction. Concrete individuals
and groups of individuals serve as definers and interpreters of reality. To understand
socially defined reality at any given time and its change over time, it is a prerequisite to
understand the role of the social organization (i.e., trade associations and formal
regulators in interactions in the dissertation) that influences actors by defining and
interpreting for them aspects of social reality (Berger & Luckmann 1967). This is a main
theme of Chapter 5.
The problem of variations in social norms
While having discussed the impacts of the two normative factors on compliance
behavior, three types of inconsistency have been recognized, which cannot be explained
by the theory of norms. The first type of inconsistency is one between norms and
drycleaners' actual behavior. A good illustration of this has been provided in the southern
California case (under the heading of 'impacts of a sense of moral obligations').
The second type involves norms that seem contradictory but are found in a single
community. These norms are held simultaneously by a single drycleaner. The theory of
norms contends that one's general sense of moral obligation to comply, resulting from a
life-long socialization process, is likely to affect the specific assessment of given
regulations (Winter & May 2001). Indeed, a theoretical understanding of norms of moral
obligation has been centered on legitimacy. However, our data are incompatible with this
traditional wisdom. Despite strong qualitative evidence of an internalized sense of duty to
obey the state and the laws, the majority of drycleaners in both regions indicate that it is
hard for them to comply unless a given regulation is fair. The southern California
drycleaners especially illustrate this seeming contradiction, as they confront an
inconsistency in the logic of their beliefs:
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" The state is a legitimate authority.
e Regulations are enacted by the state.
* Therefore, regulations are inherently legitimate.
" However, the regulation encountering drycleaners is illegitimate.
In this confrontation, these drycleaners' internal moral obligation to obey the law seems
to have been overridden by a more specific evaluation of the rule's appropriateness.
Nevertheless, they still believe that an unjust law is a law that must be followed.
The above two inconsistencies reveal that while general norms with respect to a
moral obligation are similar, perceptions of legitimacy are different between the cases.
This implies that an internalized moral obligation does not work under certain
circumstances. Just as a compass cannot indicate north in a magnetic field, so it appears
that an internal moral compass is incapable of guiding behavior within certain social
contexts.
A third inconsistency is found in variations in compliance within a single
community. A careful explanation of this type of inconsistency will be provided in
greater detail in the last section of Chapter 5. But before turning to that task, let us take a
look at Figure 11 to clarify the inquiry.





Compliance Threshold Level of Performance
46 This figure was originally suggested by Prof Archon Fung.
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The majority of the Massachusetts dry cleaning community fully complies with the ERP
while a small number of drycleaners violate it (area MV). Conversely, the majority of the
southern California community violates Rule 1421 while a handful of drycleaners comply
(area CC). Although the theory of norms is capable of explaining the between-group
variation, it rarely provides plausible accounts of variations within a group. In this sense,
the theory of norms is not so much incorrect as it is incomplete. How can we account for
the within-group variations? Can we simply attribute them to individual idiosyncrasies?
Otherwise, are there any other fundamental reasons for within-group variations?
These three internal inconsistencies observed in our cases cannot easily be
accommodated within the theory of norms.
Beyond Deterrence Theory and the Theory of Norms
This chapter has investigated two regulatory instances that were expected to yield similar
outcomes, according to predictions of dominant theories. Yet despite nearly identical
conditions, the two dry cleaning communities' regulatory outcomes with respect to
compliance trends were in stark contrast. We have found the reasons for the divergent
compliance decisions in the different perceptions of costs and benefits accruing with
compliance on the one hand, and the perceived legitimacy on the other (See Table 17).
Table 17. Analytic Outcomes of the Method of Difference
Dependent Independent Variables
Variable Economic in Nature Normative in Nature
Compliance Probability Probability Severity Compliance Compliance Moral Perceived
Trend Detection Imposition of Penalty Cost Benefit Obligation Legitimacy
Southern Declining
Equivalent Equivalent Equivalent Divergent Divergent Equivalent Divergent
MA Increasing
While the cost of compliance was identified by deterrence theory as a critical compliance
factor, the way it is formulated and the route through which it affects decision-making are
radically different from what the theory suggests. Most notable is a discovery of the
perceived benefit, which I call nurtured benefits. Deterrence theory does not recognize or
151
incorporate the role played by nurtured benefits in affecting compliance behavior.
Likewise, although the theory of norms has paid particular attention to the importance of
perceived legitimacy, the fundamental error of this theory lies in its failure to recognize
that an individual is by no means unconditionally subject to classificatory thought. This
theory appears incapable of disentangling the formulation of perceptions of legitimacy in
response to formal regulatory strategies and one's general sense of moral obligation at a
deeper level, a shortcoming since these views are sometimes independent of one another
as our cases suggest.
More critically, neither theory is able to answer the question of where these
influential factors affecting compliance choices come from. For deterrence theory, it does
not matter where they come from, if and only if the model can explain and predict
behavior. This position presupposes that economic factors are inherently disembedded
and rather externally given, viewing action as stemming from prior preferences. When
the factors are actually endogenous and socially constructed, however, the meaning of
rational action becomes unclear (March & Olsen 1989) and the manner in which they are
shaped is important.
In response to the question, the theory of norms would say that compliance factors
are socially and culturally developed. This assertion is much the same as saying that they
are externally given. In order to prune away this futile tautology, it is necessary to
identify the conditions of norms generation (Ullmann-Margalit 1977).
As this chapter has shown thus far, though in fragmented ways, all accounts are
funneled into the roles played by the trade associations in relation to regulatory agencies.
Both deterrence theory and the theory of norms miss this critical point. Even the
seemingly factual accounts of the observed phenomena told by the individual drycleaners
are little more than subjective interpretations of meanings affected by the dominant
narratives forged by the trade associations. Therefore, it is indispensable to examine why
and how the two trade associations contrived radically different ways of handling the
nearly identical situation. The examination will be focused on how individual drycleaners
are related to the associations and how their structured relations interact with the state
regulatory agencies in a broader social context. By adopting the relational approach, we
will capture how different patterns of interactions could bring about the different
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willingness, opportunities and capacities for individual drycleaners to respond to the
regulation.
In the following chapter, the relational approach provides a better understanding
of compliance behavior through in-depth descriptions which replace the vague, abstract
concepts of the existing views with more precise, concrete ones. This shift in emphasis in
interpreting rule compliance enables the important recognition that the contexts within
which diverse actors interact do matter.
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CHAPTER 5
MAKING SENSE OF COMPLIANCE AND NONCOMPLIANCE
In relation to regulators' enforcement strategies, this chapter tells a story of how and why
the two trade associations came up with radically different organizational strategies of
incentives and constraints for their members. The story is both explanatory and
exploratory: the sense of how is explained through specific situations in which the events
actually occurred; the sense of why is explored through identifying the essential
conditions in which similar situations could arise. The story is framed by the relational
approach's key phrases such as 'socio-historical context', 'relations among actors' and
'ongoing processes'.
To provide a clear picture of rule compliance behavior in a coherent narrative, the
separate stories of the events described in the previous chapter must be viewed in a web
of socio-historical contexts since their partiality exists in the matrix of a whole. The
importance of understanding context can be illuminated by a linguistic analogy. An event
is to a context what a word is to a whole sentence. For example, the English word "fine"
conveys a different meaning when used as either a noun or an adjective. Its true meaning
can only be grasped in a whole sentence, not in isolation from other words. Meaning is
always contextual. Recall the example of the Red Sox-Yankees relation. Why are the Red
Sox pitchers more inclined to commit to a norm of retaliation when they face the
Yankees? Without understanding a past series of events between the two teams in the
historical context, the present hostility may seem mysterious to people who are not
familiar with the rivalry.
Although actors are not always shackled by historical legacies, present events and
their relations are often built on past events. If they appear unrelated to past events, this
may not necessarily reflect the lack of connection to the past, but rather a deliberate
manipulation to serve some purpose (e.g., diplomatic relations between the U.S. and
Iraq). In other words, perceptions of the past and present are not fixed, but can constantly
be reinterpreted in an effort to serve particular ends. Accordingly, we must analyze
relations between actors and events through a process of moving back and forth along a
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historical horizon - in what I refer to as 'ongoing processes'. Analyzing specific relations
between events and actors reveals interesting variations in outcomes, depending on how
actors interpret or characterize their past and present in ways that inform their decisions
for the future (Piore et al. 1994). It is my hope that this in-depth storytelling will help us
understand why the actors behave in certain ways - why some actors comply with present
regulation and why others do not.
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section provides a brief historical
sketch of the two dry cleaning communities. After outlining the ways in which individual
drycleaners are linked to their respective trade associations, it then shows how different
forms of linkages create different channels of communication with and representation to
regulatory agencies. The third part of this section discusses the role of regulators and
their strategies affecting drycleaners' perceived legitimacy on a given regulation in
relation to the associations.
The second section examines how these different relations between drycleaners
represented by trade associations and regulatory agencies shape their identities, their
understanding of given regulations, and thus their strategic compliance choices. The
reason for focusing on trade associations is that as implicitly demonstrated in the
previous chapter, they tend to be viewed as significant others by individual drycleaners,
and thus exert steering influences on individual behavior. Finally, the last section
juxtaposes these case studies to experiences within other industries in order to explore the
essential conditions of compliance behavior in the context of small firms.
Structures of Networks
Linkages between Individual Drvcleaners and Trade Associations
The Southern California Case
Korean immigrants in southern California came to concentrate on the dry cleaning
industry in the late 1970s. As the number of dry cleaning facilities increased, competition
heated up and conflicts became intense. Viewing this tendency as self-destructive,
drycleaners strongly felt a need for a coordinating mechanism to resolve conflicts.
Having experience in organizing dairy farmers associations prior to immigration, Hee-
Kyu Park worked with several other drycleaners to organize sixty-two facilities in the
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region. In October of 1982, they founded the Korean Drycleaners-Laundry Association
(KDLA).
KDLA's activities covered extensive areas: from founding its own training school
whose primary mission was recruiting new drycleaners and providing its members with
technical assistance; to offering annual seminars on management and special dry cleaning
techniques; to creating a golf club and diverse cultural clubs, and hosting end-of-year
parties and picnics to promote intimacy among members; to establishing hotlines to
connect its members dispersed across four counties; to hiring a lawyer and developing
emergency service system to provide legal services; to granting scholarships to members'
children, to name a few. In the early 1990s, KDLA even raised a fund amounting to
$200,000 from which those who paid an annual membership fee could borrow up to
$5,000 at a zero interest rate. These practices were successful at expanding the
association's scale, and thus the membership reached over one thousand by the mid
1990s. However, tensions surrounding the effective use of the fund and other issues grew
over time, and subsequently exploded in 1997.
1997 was an extremely difficult year for KDLA. The hardship was generated by
the environmental regulation-related issue in the previous year. In 1996, the president of
an American drycleaners association4 7 was accused of contaminating a septic system.
Immediately after the accusation, the American association proposed a plan that
drycleaners in southern California co-establish a fund to clean up contaminated sites. In
response, two former KDLA presidents (in 1994 and in 1995, respectively) wrote letters
supporting the proposed plan under the name of KDLA. Their letters deviated from the
KDLA's official policy resisting all types of unfair (from the KDLA's perspective)
environmental regulations. KDLA argued that compared to the film industry and the
metal finishing industry, dry cleaning operations have negligible impact on the
environment. To overturn Rule 1421 or relax its requirements, KDLA had donated
considerable portions of the membership fees to California Fabricare Institute (CFI) that
47 Interviewees did not remember the official name of this association. It was simply known to Korean
drycleaners as the American Drycleaners Association. This association must be either the Greater Los
Angeles Dry Cleaners Association (GLADCA) or the Harbor/South Bay Dry Cleaners Association
(HSBDCA).
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had challenged the Perc-related regulations. Accepting the proposal could be viewed as
turning KDLA's position on its head.
Moreover, KDLA blamed these two former presidents for making fraudulent use
of the KDLA's name, and thus dismissed them from membership in fall 1996. The news
of the two men's ejection from the association appeared as a warning sign in Cleaners
News published in October 1996. It was a shocking scandal in the Korean dry cleaning
community and it did not take long time for the community's opinion to be divided into
two groups. A majority group argued that the two men deserved the ejection, while the
other group counter-argued that although it was wrong to use the KDLA's name without
permission, their ejection from membership was too harsh given that their act was not
personal embezzlement. This group claimed that at minimum, establishing a clean-up
fund through cooperation with American associations would not be a bad choice. In early
1997, this second group of drycleaners withdrew from KDLA and founded a new
association called Coalition for Korean Drycleaners (CKD).
At this critical moment, ten former KDLA presidents met together to resolve the
tension. This informal advisory group's most powerful persuasion among other things
was, "Wasn't it enough to experience the tragic division of our mother country? What
would Americans think? We are disgracing the entire Korean community in southern
California." The advisory group's emotional stimulus was quite persuasive. The two
associations agreed to reunite and reinstate those two former presidents. They officially
announced the agreements in October 1997.
The reconciliation between the two associations brought about self-contradicting
tendencies with respect to the degree of cohesion within KDLA. While a majority of
members contributed to increasing the level of group cohesion by following the
association's guidance, the small number of drycleaners began to challenge associational
decisions inside the governing board of KDLA.
In accordance with the first tendency, it was visible that the association's
resistance to Rule 1421 became intense with increased supports from more drycleaners.
Resistance to the Rule does not mean that KDLA openly advocated noncompliance. It
took a form of raising questions of the Rule's fairness. Rae Young Kim, a former KDLA
president in 1993, stated that, "Even if American associations hated the Rule, they
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seemed to give up opposition in despair due probably to pressure from government.
Unlike us, they didn't fiercely resist it. KDLA stood in the front line fighting against the
Rule." Encountering the amendment of the Rule proposed in 1998, KDLA conducted
systematic research on Perc's health effects and international cases. The association's
findings countering the SCAQMD's are summarized as follows:
e There is no scientific evidence confirming Perc's carcinogenic effects.
" In the same vein, there is no solid rationale for the SCAQMD's claim that Perc
contributes to air pollution in southern California.
e Canadian, British, Danish, and Swedish governments never reported Perc's
dangerous effects on human health.
To advertise unfairness of the Rule, KDLA recommended that its members contact
customers. KDLA launched a signature-collecting campaign and the individual members
appealed to customers for their sympathy. One of KDLA officials stated, "The campaign
was successful. Most customers understood the situation facing us. Some of them even
said that the Rule was ridiculous." The perceived public support made KDLA and its
members feel confident of the campaign, and thus the resistance to the Rule became
intense at both associational and individual level.
Here a critical question arises: why did KDLA begin to more actively commit to
resisting the Rule immediately after the reunification? The association declared to be
serving the members' collective interest, but this does not address the question of "why at
this moment, why not before." An alternative explanation is as follows.
As noted above, the breakup of the association in 1997 disappointed many
drycleaners in the region. This event was so embarrassing that the key constituents of
both KDLA and CKD wanted to let it go. As Sabel (1992) correctly pointed out,
however, simply forgetting cannot let bygones be bygones. More precisely, it was
impossible to erase what already took place in many drycleaners' minds. Letting bygones
be bygones required a convincing story that redefines the past event and "suggests a
future in which all subsequent conflicts will be limited in virtue of being defined in
advance as family fights" (Sabel 1992). In order to prevent or mitigate potential cynicism
toward the association, KDLA needed to convince its members that previous conflicts
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resulted simply from misunderstandings rather than irreconcilable differences. Resisting
the Rule in cooperation seemed to the association to be the best way to demonstrate that
KDLA and CKD had shared a common value and history, and that the prior conflict was
like a quarrel between husband and wife. A former KDLA president commented, "Soil
becomes firmer after rain. Since reunification, the association has been in perfect order
and the members have become more collaborative. So, we could concentrate on the
impending issue in more effective ways than before. A misfortune turned into a
blessing." Indeed, the campaign against the Rule was considered by drycleaners as a
symbol of esprit de corps within the community.
Meanwhile, a small number of drycleaners strongly felt that the association's
guidance was headed in the wrong direction. One drycleaner belonging to this group
stated, "I admit that Rule 1421 was unfair from the drycleaner's perspective, but
legitimate from the public perspective. Isn't it true that Perc pollutes the environment in
one way or another? And the Rule was not that difficult to comply with. The association
overreacted and made worse the relationship with the SCAQMD. Things could be better,
but KDLA never accepted that it made a mistake." Another drycleaner scornfully added,
"Why would they accept it?.... It [increased conflict with the SCAQMD] was not a
mistake. It was deliberate."
An opinion leader of the opposing party raised objections to the association's
guidance through the official channel of governing board meetings, only to be ignored.
Eventually, he was officially excluded from the board. A drycleaner in Cerritos
explained:
KDLA has had twelve branch offices in southern California since
1986. The governing board of the association used to consist of
representatives of each branch office. All of a sudden, however,
the association rejected our branch representative from the
governing board.
We demanded an explanation of that decision. KDLA
responded that the incumbent president exercised a veto and said
that they would accept anyone except for him. Why not him? He
had worked so hard for KDLA. And he has been a member of the
Minority Public Advisory Board of the AQMD since 1998. He is
familiar with diverse environmental regulations and maintains a
159
good relationship with the AQMD people. That was why we
recommended him as a board member.
We remonstrated given that the president did not have a
veto power according to the charter. Surprisingly, they already
amended the charter and granted a president veto power. We didn't
know that. How could that happen? As you may know, a charter is
to an association what Constitution is to a nation. Its amendment
must be approved by a general assembly which is held in
December every year. They did not even submit an amendment
proposal to the general assembly. What kind of organization is like
this?
KDLA and these drycleaners have since drifted apart. The tension between the two
parties intensely protruded in early 2004. The leader of the opposing drycleaners was in
charge of a golf club founded in 1991 as a KDLA's affiliated sports club. KDLA sent
official letters to its members and the golf club to show that their patience was getting
thin. Let us look at the main contents of those letters.
Document #: KDLA 2004-002
From: Korean Drycleaners-Laundry Association
To: Executive Secretary of the Golf Club
Subject: Notice to Prohibit the Use of the Term "KDLA"
February 6, 2004
.......... The golf club was founded as a branch of KDLA to promote friendship among
the members. Over the last few years, however, the club was led by non-members and
broke off the relation with KDLA. KDLA will no longer stand it....Based upon a
decision made by the governing board, the Association clarifies the followings:
1. Your club cannot use the term "KDLA" on February 1", 2004 and thereafter.
2. On February 1st, 2004, the association founded a new golf club whose official title is
"KDLA Golf Club."
3. The association will notify sponsors and drycleaners in the region that your club has
nothing to do with KDLA.
News Letter: Vol.1, No.1
From: Korean Drycleaners-Laundry Association
To: KDLA Members
Subject: New Golf Club
February 6, 2004
.......... In the last few years, the golf club has been drifted apart from KDLA. To address
the members' concerns, the KDLA governing board met with Mr. Doh [the executive
secretary of the golf club] on January 2 2 "d, 2004. He declared that the golf club would
withdraw from the association and act independently. The governing board accepted Mr.
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Doh's declaration. Therefore, KDLA created a new golf club this year. Bi-monthly golf
tournaments will be hosted by the new club from now on...... (Italics added).
Mr. Doh denied the statement italicized above: "I've never said that. On the contrary,
they asked me if the golf club were willing to be independent of KDLA...... The golf
club does not belong to the governing board. It belongs to the entire dry cleaning
community. So, I said 'I cannot decide it now. I must ask the club members.' That was all
I said."
KDLA sent a subsequent letter to Doh.
Document #: KDLA 2004-006
From: Korean Drycleaners-Laundry Association
To: Executive Secretary of the Golf Club
Subject: Confirmation Notice to Prohibit the Use of the Term "KDLA"
March 1, 2004
.......... Despite the previous warning letter issued on February 6th, you announced under
the name of KDLA that your club would host the 7 0th golf tournament. KDLA has no
choice but to interpret your announcement as spiting the association. KDLA warns you
that next time this happens again, appropriate actions will be followed.......
One retiree in Lawndale, who identified himself as neutral, stated, "The conflict within
the association was not serious, but it has rapidly grown because both parties hurt the
other's emotions. KDLA seemed to think that the leaders of the golf club undermined the
association's efforts to pursue collective interests of the community....... In the
meantime, the golf club members claimed that the association distorted their opinion to
dominate decision power by excluding them. These guys might be mistreated, but they
should consider why the governing board viewed them in that way."
Throughout the second half of the 1990s to now, the association has suffered from
factional infightings and from a minority group's exclusion from associational matters to
avoid undeserved blames. One drycleaner in this group stated, "People viewed me as a
splitter and I was really hurt. Why should I be treated in that way? I am not going to
contact KDLA again." This minority group of drycleaners formed its own small-scale
network apart from KDLA and shared information about regulations, cleaning techniques
and social life on their own.
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The Massachusetts Case
Massachusetts Korean Drycleaners Association (KDA) was founded in May 1982.
Starting with seven drycleaners in Boston area, KDA's membership reached
approximately fifty by 1989. KDA's main roles were helping new drycleaners open a
business and providing them with technical assistance. Throughout the 1980s, the
associational activities remained within the dry cleaning community, focusing solely on
developing and sharing special dry cleaning techniques. They made no effort to contact
outside actors such as suppliers or government agencies.
It was in 1990 that the association took first collective action to cope with a
cartel among suppliers. Drycleaners believed that the prices of commodities
indispensable for a dry cleaning business were set too high, but individual drycleaners did
not know what to do to solve the problem. After collecting extensive opinions from its
members, the association negotiated with suppliers to lower the prices. KDA seems to
have aimed for a co-op, but failed. A former chairman of the association's governing
board explained:
We got the prices right for a short period of time. Unfortunately,
some of us deviated from KDA's guidance. Suppliers strategically
selected a certain number of drycleaners and offered them
ridiculously low prices. They [the drycleaners] withdrew from the
purchasing association one by one. So, our effort to collectively
purchase cleaning commodities failed. Immediately after that,
suppliers set the prices above the previous levels....... We
could've done better if all of us had cooperated (Personal
Communication with Byoung-Joon Chang in Peabody).
This experience brought about two lessons for the community: First, individual
drycleaners began to learn the importance of organizing; second, KDA recognized how
difficult it is to organize collective actions.
In the early 1990s, there were approximately 270 Korean drycleaners in
Massachusetts. Of them, two hundred drycleaners joined the association and a surge in
membership generated a serious problem for KDA. Unexpectedly, nobody wanted to be
in charge of the association. That is, the association could not even find candidates for a
presidential position. The reason was twofold. First, since the members' expectations
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from the association were elevated as evidenced in abrupt increases in membership,
potential presidential candidates were afraid that they could not meet those expectations.
No one wanted to be remembered as an incompetent leader. Second, drycleaners already
knew that the position would require personal sacrifice in terms of time and money given
that former presidents used to devote their own resources to associational activities to
make things work.
Facing this problem, KDA searched a person who had a capacity to lead the
association. In November 1992, Ki-Seok Kim, the 3rd KDA president, contacted Harry
Cho to deliver the association's suggestion to set him up as the next president. Cho
declined the invitation. Nevertheless, Kim visited him three times to tell him that national
government recently passed the environmental law regulating the dry cleaning industry
and the current board members were not prepared to handle it. KDA kept appealing to
Cho's expertise in legal issues and sympathy for the association. Kim delivered the
association's subsequent message confirming that "First, the association will grant you
sufficient amount of discretion. You can do with it as you think best. Second, we know
that it is required for you to spend extra time doing the associational works. But you will
not spend your own money." To keep the second promise, fifteen board members
collected $3,000 to cover Cho's future associational activities (although Cho ended up
losing $2,000 out-of-pocket in each year of his presidency). Persuaded by the association,
Cho finally accepted an appointment.
On December 1 0 th, 1992, KDA convened a special session of the general
assembly in the Lexington Holiness church to announce an appointment of the new
president. Encountering a new OSHA regulation, Cho wanted to use this meeting as a
stage of an environmental seminar as well. Approximately 150 drycleaners attended the
meeting despite a snow storm warning on the date. Cho recalled this event in which he
was deeply involved for the first time:
The heavy turnout was a pleasant surprise to the association. At the
same time, it gave us [KDA] a difficult homework.......
They participated in the meeting not only to listen to a new
president but also to know about a new regulatory environment.
We presented how Perc could harm drycleaners and generate
ground-level ozone, but it was not enough. They asked essentially,
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"so, what exactly do we have to do?" Our answers were too
general to meet their inquiries. The board members felt a duty to
study to meet the members' demands. On the other hand, the
governing board members agreed that this could be a good
opportunity to increase the influence of the association within the
community.
A visible regulatory plan by the state government was not proposed until 1995.
Nevertheless, key board members began preparing for would-be regulations because they
anticipated that a new state regulation might be enacted in the future. At the same time,
the association made efforts to increase self-esteem of members and internal cohesion in
the community. These efforts were derived partly from members' personal hardships as
non-white immigrants and partly from the lessons of the 1990 experience.
In Massachusetts, there was a self-defeating atmosphere in which drycleaners felt
an inferiority complex with respect to their jobs. Job dissatisfaction was derived both
internally and externally. This was generally true in other regions in the United States.
They tended to think that dry cleaning was a low class job avoided by educated people. A
drycleaner in Newton confessed:
Every morning, I say hello to customers going to work in suits.
Many of them are professionals... .professors, doctors, lawyers,
businesspeople, accountants.... Honestly, I envied them.... I
graduated from the second best university in Korea. Many of my
college friends have respectable professional jobs. I frequently
asked myself, 'what am I doing here?'
Some drycleaners in Massachusetts (and in southern California, too) used to be employed
by large firms. At some point in their professional career, they encountered invisible
racial discrimination and recognized that they might be no longer promoted. For that
reason, they decided to retire before being laid off and moved on to start their own
businesses. These drycleaners commented, essentially, "When I first came to the United
States, I had a dream, but I couldn't get over a hurdle of reality. There was nothing I
could do in this country except for low class jobs".
Many interviewees believed that dry cleaning was despised by other Koreans. In
the early 1990s, KDA invited a Korean consul-general in Boston to its events, but he
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never showed up. KDA heard its members self-contemptuously say, "If we were a
Korean Doctors Association, he definitely would come."
Psychological disparity between a membership group and a reference group, and
its concomitant feeling of self-despise were major barriers to group integration because
drycleaners entrapped by this self-destructive consciousness tended to make themselves
hermits. From the association's viewpoint, there was a need for overcoming the sense of
defeatism permeating throughout the community. Cho stated:
One day, I watched then popular Korean soap opera depicting
immigrants' life. Some lines looked down on drycleaners. I was
angry. What's wrong with dry cleaning? We are not criminals, are
we? We work more than twelve hours per day, six days per week
to make money for our children's education. Why should our job
be looked down on? You know the old Korean proverb, "All
legitimate trades are equally honorable." No occupation in this
world deserves despise....... I strongly felt that the association
must do something to make things correct.
From 1993, KDA started offering periodic seminars dealing with two different but related
issues. Spring seminars dealt with advanced cleaning techniques and fall seminars
focused mainly on effective management skills (As noted in Chapter 3, KDA translates
the ERP recordkeeping requirements into a way of systematic management years later).
But these were not the whole contents of seminars. What KDA really aimed for at the
time was imbuing its members with self-respect. In spring seminars, KDA repeatedly
emphasized, "See, nobody can do this without being trained. Our job requires special
machines and techniques. We are professionals."
KDA's effort to enhance self-respect served as what Berger and Luckmann called
re-socialization in which the past is reinterpreted by retrojecting into the past self various
elements that were subjectively unavailable at the time. This reinterpretation of past
biography follows the re-socialization formula: "Then I thought.......now I know...."
(Berger & Luckmann 1967, p. 160). Several interviewees commented, essentially, "They
[KDA] were absolutely right. There is no reason to shame a dry cleaning job. Rather, it is
shameful to be shameful of my job." In a similar vein, a drycleaner in Northborough
stated:
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I don't remember when exactly it was... .but it was a weekend after
a management seminar in which Mr. Cho and Mr. Lowe kept
telling that we should escape a sense of inferiority.....
My daughter going to a college in New York State was
home. Her roommate's father was a plastic surgeon. I told her, "I
wish I could be a doctor or a professor, so that you can be proud of
me." She hugged me and said, "Dad. Whatever you do, I am
always proud of you"....... That my child took pride in me was a
great comfort....... Honestly, I am still not that proud of being a
drycleaner, but I am no longer shameful of my job.
As intended by the association, seminars were not simply about how to fix machines,
skills and primitive forms of management. They were also about how to fix the
permeating belief in the community.
Redefining self-identity through re-socialization seems to have contributed to
tightening internal cohesion to a considerable degree. KDA estimated that there were
approximately 150 attendants in each seminar. It is possible that the high attendance rates
throughout the 1990s resulted from reasons other than enhanced self-respect, such as the
association's extensive member outreach. Indeed, to bring as many drycleaners as
possible to associational events, KDA contacted all available drycleaners' networks such
as religious groups and rotating credit associations widely dispersed in the state.
However, the outreach effort was not new. It had been made long before 1993, but
drycleaners' participation rates at that time were not as high as those of the 1990s.
Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that those who previously disaffiliated themselves
from the community came to interact with others by way of redefined self attached to the
communal life.
It must be mentioned here that our emphasis on redefined identity does not lead
automatically to collective identity sometimes underestimating the uniqueness of
individuality. My aim is limited to show; that self-identification is a key element of the
individual's subjective reality; that different identities lead to different actions; and that
identity formation is a social process, that is, identities are (re)shaped by particular social
relations. Needless to say, these are also true in the southern California case. We will
discuss the above points in greater detail in the following section when illuminating the
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broader social context in each region in which identities are embedded. For the moment,
our focus sticks to examining how individual drycleaners are linked to KDA.
As we have seen, KDA played a role of a (re)socializing agent. It is likely that the
socializing agent takes on the feature of significant others vis-a-vis the individuals being
(re)socialized (Berger & Luckmann 1967). Although significant others are not the only
source serving to crystallize and sustain the individual's identity, they usually occupy an
influential position in processes of identity formation. Indeed, many interviewees stated
that KDA's encouragement played a decisive role in escaping a sense of job inferiority.
Not surprisingly, individual drycleaners came to discuss business details with KDA and
gave their support to the associational decisions. In turn, increased member support
contributed to successful fulfillment of associational goals.
This aspect is best illustrated in KDA's involvement in the Massachusetts
governor's election campaign in the mid 1990s. Led by Korean Society of New England
(KSNE) 48, opinion leaders of the entire Korean community gathered together to discuss
how Korean immigrants in the region could promote their social standing. From their
perspective, it was urgent to move beyond an ethnic enclave and interact with mainstream
society.49 A promising way to do this was raise the political voice by actively engaging in
election campaigns. They decided to donate campaign resources to a candidate who made
minority supports explicit in election pledges. While other business associations'
contributions were negligible, KDA was successful at raising a fund which amounted to
$12,000. KDA appealed to the members' emotions: "Changes can be so slow as to be
imperceptible during our life, but our children will benefit from our continuing action.
You don't want your children to be ignored and discriminated in this country as you
were." Myung-Sool Chang, the editor of New England Korean News, stated, "Since this
event, KDA's status in the entire Massachusetts Korean community has been elevated to
a considerable degree. Now, it is hard to imagine the Korean community's statewide
events without having recourse to KDA."
48 Korean Society of New England was founded in 1972. Despite its name, the Society represents the
Korean community in Massachusetts only.
49 The term "mainstream society" is frequently used by Korean immigrants to refer to the American
society. The term implies that these immigrants are not integrated into the new society.
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It was around this time that the Korean consul-general in Boston started appearing
KDA's events and KDA became a regular guest at events hosted by a consulate.
Moreover, drycleaners began to take on key positions within KSNE. Individual
drycleaners viewed the association's elevated social status as their own and gave more
credits to KDA.
This does not necessarily mean that the individual regarded oneself as an organic
element or a cell of the association. Nevertheless, it is no exaggeration to say that the
degree of integration within the dry cleaning community has increased and the
association has been more entrusted by its members. These trends are implicitly
evidenced in analyses of terms of reference used by interviewees when they call KDA.
Approximately one-third of Massachusetts interviewees used the first-person plural
possessive form to indicate KDA. That is, they called KDA "our" association. It was not
until the comparison of interview transcriptions for the two regions that I recognized the
significance of this type of a term of reference as a mode of indicating a high degree of
social intimacy, because using a plural possessive form rather than a singular form is a
deep-rooted manner for a Korean speaker to indicate one's possession (For example,
native speakers of Korean say "our school", "our house" and "our country" etc. to
actually indicate my school, my house, and my country in certain contexts). It was
evident that the frequency of saying "our association" was even higher in Massachusetts
than in southern California. Unlike their Massachusetts counterparts, the majority of
southern California interviewees simply called KDLA "the association" or "the cleaners
association."
It must be noted here that the possessive form "our" as in "our school", "our
house" and "our country" must be interpreted as the perceived closeness between a
speaker and her/his schoolmates, family and fellow countrymen, not between a speaker
and a listener. In the same vein, the term of reference "our association" can be considered
as indicating social proximity among the community members. At minimum, the
possessive form "our" cannot be used in a term of reference without a strong sense of
solidarity.
The degree the individual's reverence or dependence upon the association can be
measured by a personal pronoun used by interviewees in front of the outsider, that is, the
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interviewer. Each Korean personal pronoun has multiple modes of expressing degrees of
reverence. In other words, by either using honorifics or lowering oneself, a speaker
expresses her/his degree of respect. Besides a term of reference involving a word
"association", many interviewees in Massachusetts used the third-person plural pronoun
"Geu-Boon-Deul" to indicate KDA (more precisely, the KDA board members) while
southern California interviewees used "Geu-Saram-Deul" to refer to KDLA officials. The
two pronouns equally translate into the English pronoun "They". However, the semantic
zones associated with each Korean pronoun are quite distinct. Although the latter (Geu-
Saram-Deul) does not imply antipathy between KDLA and interviewees, it does not
contain a sense of reverence. In the meantime, it is no controversial to say that the former
(Geu-Boon-Deul) expressed by Massachusetts interviewees connotes the higher level of
reverence.
More explicit evidence that demonstrates a sense of solidarity or trust among
drycleaners is found in a recent event. In July 2004, two KDA board members and two
other drycleaners opened a company to supply trade commodities such as hangers,
shoulder guards, detergents, starch, and spotting chemicals. Establishing a supply
company seemed to be highly risky given that two other Korean-owned companies (Ace
Supply and Lee & Park Enterprise) could not survive even a year. Those two companies
went bankrupt because they failed to compete with big suppliers. Nevertheless, the
founders of the new company are confident:
Though Ace and Lee & Park were run by Koreans, they were
Connecticut-based and had no personal connections with
Massachusetts drycleaners. They were simply pursuing profits just
like others. But we are different. We personally know many
members and don't aim to make big money out of this business.
We already own dry cleaning shops and have ways to make living.
All we want is breaking the cartel of big suppliers to protect small
drycleaners. Hopefully, our members will understand it and switch
to us (Personal Communication with Byung Hyun Lee).
For the moment, there is no definite way to evaluate whether the four founders' belief in
the future cooperation of drycleaners is true or false. To confirm it, we need more time to
observe how this company is doing. At least, however, the event is enough to show that
some drycleaners, if not all, view themselves as linked to each other with a strong sense
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of solidarity. Otherwise, the new supplying company could not be established due to the
risky business environment.
Relations between Drv Cleaning Communities and Regulatory Agencies
We have thus far examined how the dry cleaning community in each region is structured
in terms of the relations between individual drycleaners and the association. The
examination reveals distinct patterns of interactions in southern California and in
Massachusetts. Mirroring Richard Locke's terms, I refer to these as polarized and
integrated types of network, respectively. In his study of the Italian economy, Locke
(1995) argues that different patterns of sociopolitical networks shape different economic
behaviors. From the array of distinct subnational arrangements, he identifies three ideal-
typical networks: hierarchical, polarized and polycentric networks.
Our discussion of two distinct networks benefits from his study. The dissertation
transfers the unit of analysis from associations and unions to individual firms. Now, let us
look at how two different types of network induced the communities into different
channels of communications with regulatory agencies (See Figure 12).
Figure 12. Network Structures between Regulators and Regulated Entities
in Southern California vs. Massachusetts
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In a polarized network of southern California, the SCAQMD encountered divergent
reactions to the formal regulation from the two opposing camps. This led eventually to a
triad of mutual distrust (See a dotted oval in Figure 12). Specifically, as noted in the
previous section, opinion leaders of the golf club admitted needs for regulation and
believed that KDA misled the community to unnecessary conflicts with the SCAQMD.
To erase a bad image of the community as a polluter, the golf club leaders became
relatively cooperative to the regulatory agency. They have established friendly relations
with the SCAQMD through ongoing participation in the Minority Public Advisory Board.
KDLA was suspicious of the benign relationship between the golf club leaders
and the SCAQMD. Because the executive secretary of the golf club was a state-certified
environmental educator, KDLA suspected that key golf club members attempted to
benefit from stringent regulations at the expense of other drycleaners. KDLA's
perception that they were mistreated strengthened a sense of being persecuted. "It is
KDLA that represents the entire Korean dry cleaning community in southern California.
Why does the AQMD keep contacting those guys [the leaders of the golf club] and
alienate a real industry representative? Something must have been going on between
them", a KDLA official vehemently complained.
The SCAQMD has not recognized factional infighting within the dry cleaning
communities until recently, so they were sometimes confused of the opposing responses
to identical regulatory signals. An SCAQMD staff member stated:
We meet with representatives of Korean drycleaners to discuss our
concerns and find common ground. Sometime later, other
drycleaners [presumably, KDLA] call and visit us, and present
different opinions. When we say, 'we already listened to
representatives of your association', they respond, 'They are not
the representatives. It is KDLA that represents Korean drycleaners,
and we are the executive officers of KDLA.'
For the SCAQMD, both groups of drycleaners were members of the identical community
under the similar conditions. Given its view of the industry, the SCAQMD cast a
suspicious glance at KDLA that kept challenging the Rule and the agency: "If some
drycleaners are capable of complying with Rule 1421, why not others?" (Personal
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Communication with a Field Inspector). From the SCAQMD's viewpoint, the majority of
drycleaners were unwilling to comply not because they did not have capacity but because
they did not want to. Correspondingly, the SCAQMD established harsher penalty policies
and deployed more regulatory resources to deal with recalcitrant polluters.
For KDLA, the SCAQMD's enforcement style as well as Rule 1421 per se was an
excessive oppression of small minority businesses. Mr. Ha, a former president of KDLA
stated:
We did our best to get things to work, but the AQMD didn't even
try to listen to drycleaners' concerns. They already decided what to
do before listening to our opinion..... Public hearing? Were they
really willing to listen to non-white small drycleaners? I don't
think so. It [public hearing] was a cheap and tawdry political
rhetoric.
Some KDLA members even brought Perc and hydrocarbon to public hearing held in the
SCAQMD headquarter in order to show that Perc is not dangerous. More precisely, it was
an attempt to demonstrate how angry drycleaners were. The SCAQMD was upset with
this "insane" attempt and became more skeptical of the KDLA's willingness to jointly
find reasonable solutions. Needless to say, antagonism between KDLA and the
SCAQMD grew rapidly and continuing antagonism seems to have foreclosed possibilities
of mutual understandings between the two.
In contrast to the southern California Case, the Massachusetts case demonstrates not only
direct contact between the MADEP and individual drycleaners but also a well-established
continuing channel of communication between the agency and KDA. If not frequent,
Massachusetts drycleaners enjoy open dialogue with the agency staff. During the ERP
seminars, they ask detailed questions stemming from everyday business contingency and
the staff provides customized solutions. In cases that the agency staff cannot answer
immediately, they keep inquirers' contact information and respond afterwards (normally
within a week). Drycleaners who experienced the MADEP's contact through phone calls
appreciated the agency's responsiveness (The MADEP's unique enforcement strategy
will be discussed in detail in the following section, in comparison with the SCAQMD's).
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In addition, diverse opinions of individual drycleaners are filtered through KDA
and, in turn, transmitted to the MADEP and the MADEP views KDA as a legitimate
representative of Korean drycleaners in the state. While the MADEP sends information
about the regulation to every single drycleaner through official letters, it always follows-
up actions to confirm that regulatory message was appropriately received by KDA and
individuals. Furthermore, the MADEP consults the association when they face difficulties
inducing violators into compliance. In sum, the relationship between the dry cleaning
community and the MADEP is cooperative in nature.
This cooperative regulatory relationship has been formulated through repeated,
multiple points of contact. Since the first year of the ERP, the MADEP has met annually
with the industry to communicate overall performance and to discuss how to further
improve it. This ongoing communication contributed to building trust between the
MADEP and the industry. The president of the Massachusetts association commented,
Our seminars have been held on Friday or Saturday evenings.
Although we invited them [the MADEP staff] to join the seminars,
we really did not expect that they would come because it was
weekend evenings. Who wants to spend time attending seminars
which they do not have to attend? Surprisingly, however, DEP
always sent their staff to listen to us. And they answered our
questions in great detail. We truly appreciated that.
A drycleaner from Framingham made a similar comment:
When I first came to the seminar, I was a little surprised because
our president introduced DEP staff to us. It was Friday evening.
They must have been off-duty. Honestly, I had thought that a new
rule had nothing to do with the environment and public health. But
their attendance changed my view on the ERP. I started thinking,
'They really want to help us and a new rule must be very important
to us. If not, why did they come in Friday evening?'
Another anecdotal story further reveals the relationship between KDA and the MADEP.
In a board members meeting, a drycleaner from Arlington said,
I have a good idea how to encourage people to pay annual
membership fee. Let's ask DEP to collect it along with annual ERP
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fee on behalf of us. If DEP were telling people to pay it, they will
accept the request without questioning.
Obviously, he was joking, but his joke clearly shows how the association views the
MADEP and how individual drycleaners have responded to regulators' requests.
In summary, there are similarities and notable differences between the two communities.
They are similar in that each region has a strong, influential trade association. Individual
drycleaners have recourse to their association in deciding how to respond to a given
regulation. They are different in that the linkages among drycleaners in southern
California are relatively polarized, compared to those in Massachusetts. Such polarization
of the community led eventually to a breakdown of communication between KDLA and
the SCAQMD while KDA and the MADEP held a cooperative relation through multiple
points of contact over time.
Impacts of Formal Regulatory Strategies on Perceived Legitimacy
Thus far, we have discussed differences in the two associations' attitudes toward
regulators and given regulations. Although the previous section explained how the
associations' perceptions of regulatory regime became divergent, it focused mainly on the
regulated entities' internal stories while remaining relatively silent on their reactions to
regulators' enforcement strategies. Recognizing that the account in the previous
discussion alone is insufficient to draw a clear picture of the generation of perceived
legitimacy, this section explicates how different enforcement strategies between the
SCAQMD and the MADEP contributed to drycleaners' divergent perceptions of fairness
and legitimacy.
Conclusively speaking, the SCAQMD's enforcement style takes on a typical
feature of traditional command-and-control, that is, deterrence strategy. On the contrary,
the MADEP's strategy can be characterized as "command-and-consult." Let us examine,
in detail, in what exactly they differ and how drycleaners react.
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The Southern California Case
Recall Figure 2 in Chapter 3. The SCAQMD's enforcement principle clarifies that a
primary goal of law enforcement is to create an adequate deterrent to illegal activities.
Correspondingly, the agency's enforcement system was oriented toward creation of an
expected penalty that outweighs the economic gain from violating regulations. To
investigate whether this principle was reflected in field inspectors' enforcement style, I
visited the SCAQMD Headquarter in Diamond Bar and met with a field inspector who
was in charge of inspecting sixty facilities in West Los Angeles. While showing and
explaining a compliance log form to me, an inspector said:
See... .there is nothing difficult to fill out this form. It takes only
three minutes a day. I don't understand why people don't do this.
(In response to the interviewer's question of 'why do you think
they do not comply with the regulatory requirements?', she said,)
Well....maybe, personality?, you know, some people are lazy....1
think it is a critical factor. The cost of compliance could be another
reason, but I think it's relatively moderate.
(In response to a subsequent question of 'What is the best strategy
to bring them into compliance?', she said,)
They are sort of a small, so they might need some sort of
assistance....maybe. But despite the agency's technical assistance
and a loan program, many people haven't changed their behavior.
So, I think regulatory stimulus is necessary. I mean.... I am trying
to let them know what went wrong.... Penalty imposition is
unavoidable in this process..... I just go by the book. That's what I
do. Without it, these people wouldn't change their behavior. That's
why we've done more inspections over the last four years.
(Personal Communication with J at the SCAQMD).
How did drycleaners view the SCAQMD's stringent deterrence strategy? Jong-
Moon Lee in Paramount told his experience:
One day, while I was removing lint from the machine, an inspector
came. He said I violated the rule because I didn't seal a lint
container. How absurd it was! I said, 'Don't you see I am cleaning
the machine? How can I put lint into a container while it is
sealed?' He suspiciously said, 'It seems that the container's
remained open for a while.' 'No. I was about to seal it, but you
rang the bell, so I came to the counter'. But he didn't trust me. I
50 Table 6 in Chapter 4 reveals that this effort has no significant effect on compliance.
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felt so bad not because he imposed fine but because he treated me
as a liar......It seems like they drive around just to collect money. I
think that's the whole point.
Presumably, the inspector thought that it is more objective and uncontroversial to base his
judgment on what he directly observed at the moment of inspection. Regardless of his
intention, however, his enforcement style led this drycleaner to feel that he was
mistreated and eventually to doubt the intention of inspection and the Rule itself. Indeed,
a view that the main goal of Rule 1421 is "collecting money" permeates in the Korean
dry cleaning community in southern California. Of twenty five interviewees, twenty one
people made the same point directly or indirectly.
In addition, Southern California drycleaners blamed the SCAQMD for its
irresponsiveness:
Last year, or two year ago, I got a Notice of Violation. I called
them [the SCAQMD] to ask what to do. They told me I could
either appeal or pay the fine until....1 don't remember. Anyway,
that's not what I wanted to hear about. I just wanted to know what
I should do to get things right, so I asked again. They connected
my call to another person. This guy said that he couldn't answer
right away, and if I left my phone number, someone would get
back to me. Alternatively, he said, I could find what I wanted to
know on their website. I really didn't want to look into the website
because I was not familiar with the Internet. So, I just left my
number, but they never contacted me..... I called again a couple of
weeks later, but they told me the same. If the Rule is really
important to protect the environment, as they claim, then why
don't they tell me what exactly to do? (Personal Communication
with C. Park in Pomona).
It was the year when the AQMD announced that they would
amend Rule 1421. They asked drycleaners to answer survey
questionnaires. I did it with hope that our opinion would be
reflected in an amendment. I faxed, but couldn't reach them. I
faxed them over and over again, but to fail. Finally, I called them
to ask how to send the survey form. They said that their fax
machine was broken, but would be fixed within hours. I faxed
them the next day. Still not working..... It took a week.... If I don't
repair my broken Perc machine right away, I know they will put
me in big trouble. But it took a week for them to fix a damn simple
fax machine. How can they tell us to do this and that? (Personal
Communication with K. Park in Diamond Bar)
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Inspectors visited me twice last year. When I asked them some
questions, they didn't answer me properly. They must have
sufficient knowledge of what they do. I think they simply ignored
me. They seemed to think I was bugging them with unnecessary
questions to distract their attention (Personal Communication with
C. Kim in Ontario).
The SCAQMD's deterrence principle is not just a theory in textbook but practical
enforcement guidance in actual use. Contrary to the agency's anticipation, this
enforcement strategy without a capacity of adequate responsiveness produced intense
backfire, and thus failed to yield changes in the regulated entities' behavior they sought.
From the perspective of drycleaners in southern California, inspection is simply a means
to increase the SCAQMD's revenue and rule 1421 was enacted to justify it. Drycleaners'
perceived illegitimacy on the Rule foreclosed their effort to be aware of the Rule's
requirements, let alone the impacts of their business activities on the environment and
human health.
The Massachusetts Case
Unlike the SCAQMD, the MADEP does not rely solely on a deterrence approach, and
instead takes on a different strategy, which I call command-and-consult. This does not
mean that the MADEP gave up a traditional penalty policy. Jeffrey Chormann who is in
charge of the ERP enforcement and compliance stated, "If we find somebody who's out
of compliance, the mindset is to take enforcement. When it [violation] is minor, we send
a notice of non-compliance [Lower Level Enforcement]. If it's something more egregious
or a repeated thing, it warrants a higher level of action [Higher Level Enforcement]. He
continued, "But......."
.... we don't necessarily go in there with the attitude 'we gotta find
something.' It's more of a..... I mean, we don't walk in with the
black hat and say 'we are looking to find as many problems as we
can.' We are also looking to help, you know, and provide
assistance, as well....... beyond sort of the regulatory aspects.....
During my fieldwork in southern California, I witnessed that some drycleaners brought their
grandchildren to a shop to take care of them for a day. It clearly shows that they never believe that Perc is
dangerous.
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This attitude stems from inspectors' field experience. Due to limited regulatory resources,
the same MADEP inspectors deal with both small and large firms. Having that kind of
experience, inspectors recognize that small business is a totally different kind of
operation, that violation is sometimes inadvertent rather than willful, and that small firms
needs more technical assistance. The comment of John Reinhardt, the ERP general
manager, is consistent with Jeffrey Chormann:
In the beginning, it was very difficult to work with even the
smallest sector such as the photo processors. They were not sure
about our intention..... But they recognized we didn't try to go in
and find things that were wrong.....
Of course, we do want people to comply. That's what our
job is. However, because they're small, we do.... try to help them
enhance compliance rather than just enforce..... They are small
business...... they wouldn't have a capacity of knowing all
technical stuff. That's the kind of thing we are more willing to
work with them on as opposed to taking sort of a hard line
attitude.....
For a while, part of our enforcement strategy was really to call
people, and talk to them, say, 'Are you still in business? Why
didn't we get a certification? Wondering if you're there and
you're not something else now and are still doing on-site dry
cleaning... .Get your certification in or you may get a letter of
enforcement from us.'..... There're more connections, either
through the notices in the mail or through our other outreach types
of things that we do, through the association..... We have a very
good relationship with the associations.
This attitude is substantially reflected in the MADEP's practice. The MADEP starts its
inspection with investigation of self-certifications which is due September 15th. Three
times per year the MADEP sends notices, clarifying what drycleaners need to do to
comply with the ERP. On July 1s, in addition, the agency mails out complete compliance
assistance package to everyone who needs to self-certify, giving her/him two months and
a half to prepare a compliance certificate. The agency's effort is highly appreciated by
drycleaners:
Every year, I have several notices from the DEP and our
association, and they remind me of what to do. When they ask
'why didn't you do this?', it's really hard for me to deny those
notices.....
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They're not like, 'Watch out. We're gonna come and close
you down.' It's more like, 'This is what you need to do. If you
have questions, give us a call.'.... (Personal Communication with
Gu-Ho Hong in Lowell).
We are not allowed to discharge laundry water into the septic
systems. If I were in violation, typical inspectors would say, 'You
are in violation. Stop, because the rules say you can't do that' and
that's it. I know about a typical enforcement style because I was a
groundwater inspector while in Korea. In fact, that's what I did.
But these guys [the MADEP staff] are different. Basically,
they say, 'Stop, but you can do this or that.' Actually, they offered
five options that can legally replace wastewater discharge into the
septic system. As a matter of fact, three of those options were
economically unfeasible, but there were options you might
entertain. More importantly, these guys are trying to go the extra
mile to tell, 'This is what you need to do, and this is what you are
allowed to do' (Personal Communication with Hyeon-Kweon
Yune in Townsend).
In other states, inspectors come to catch you. In Massachusetts,
they come to enlighten you (Personal Communication with Byung-
June Chang in Peabody).
In addition to the agency's proactive technical assistance, its responsiveness appears to
contribute to shaping a sense of legitimacy. In the 2004 ERP seminar on e-filing, two
drycleaners could not activate their accounts for unknown reasons. Paul Reilly from the
MADEP tried to solve the problem, but did not figure out what went wrong. He wrote
down these drycleaners' names, business identification numbers and contact information,
and promised to call them within two days to let them know what they should do. I asked
Lowe a month later if Reilly really contacted them. Lowe said, "Yes, he did."
I already asked Paul the same question. The problem was that they
didn't have a tax identification number because their shops were
newly opened. So, he gave them a temporary number to activate
their accounts.....
(In response to the interviewer's question of 'Is their prompt
response usual?', Lowe said).
They're quite reliable and very quick to respond to drycleaners'
inquiries. That's part of what makes us get along.......
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Drycleaners find the agency's responsiveness as important as the technical assistance.
The agency's efforts to satisfy the demands for increased responsiveness seem necessary
for the generation and maintenance of the drycleaners' perceived legitimacy. This we will
discuss in detail below.
Generation and Sustenance of Perceived Legitimacy
Comparison of drycleaners' reactions to different enforcement strategies provides
important lessons with regard to the generation and sustenance of perceived legitimacy
on the regulated entities' part. The interview data demonstrate that the way perceived
legitimacy is shaped and maintained differs from ones deterrence theory and the theory of
norms assume.
For deterrence theorists, legitimating mechanism is by no means of concern since
every law or regulation is automatically legitimate if and only if it has been enacted in
accordance with general formal principles (Offe 1984). That is, legitimacy is not about
content but about pre-established legal process. In deterrence framework, there is no need
for explicit legitimatization "as long as.... role acceptance is forced upon citizens.. .by
their own utilitarian/instrumental motives" (Offe 1984, p.145). Is this the only criterion
by which ordinary people judge whether or not a certain law is legitimate? In some cases,
yes, but in others, it is questionable. The example of the latter is a traffic law. We stop at
red lights and go on at green lights. We obey this rule not because it was made through
constitutional-legal process but because we assume that compliance with this formal rule
will increase our safety. Whether formal rules are accepted as legitimate depends not
upon what they are but "what likely results of their application are" (Offe 1984, p.135).
For proponents of the theory of norms, legitimacy is a critical factor that should
explain compliance behavior. On the one hand, the theory of norms assumes legal-
rational legitimacy when it discusses a sense of moral obligation to obey the laws. But it
goes further when the issue comes to perceived legitimacy. This theory views consent as
a precursor of legitimacy. That is, legitimacy is a matter of "whether or not a given
rulership is believed to be grounded on good title by most men subject to it" (Bozeman
1987). Without arguing against this notion of legitimacy, I would like to address its
weakness to suggest more relevant legitimatizing factors later.
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Consensual legitimacy cannot solve the problem of subjective differences in
perception of obligation. Drycleaners in southern California and Massachusetts equally
accept that the SCAQMD and the MADEP are legitimate governing entities. As
described in Chapter 3, in addition, the SCAQMD made as much effort as the MADEP
did in order to outreach target constituents and involve them in rule-making processes.
Nevertheless, the southern California community views a given regulation as illegitimate,
as opposed to their Massachusetts counterpart. Obviously, neither consent on legitimate
rulership nor expanded opportunity for participation is by itself a sufficient condition to
generate and sustain the perceived legitimacy, though necessary.
If this is true, then what are the additional conditions under which the regulated
accept given rules as legitimate, at least in a small firm context? As implied in the
preceding subsections, the crucial elements that gear into perceived legitimacy are
proactive technical assistance, responsiveness, and ongoing interface between the
regulated and regulators (See Figure 13). Let us examine the mechanism through which
these three components provoke the perceived legitimacy in the mind of the regulated.
Figure 13. Generation and Sustenance of Perceived Legitimacy
Regulators
Proactive Responsiveness Ongoing communication
Technical
Assistance
My voice is heard





Technical assistance obviously helps drycleaners expand their capacity to learn how to
comply, but that is only a part of contribution. Regarding the generation of perceived
legitimacy, more or equally important is that proactive assistance translates directly into
rules' reasonableness.
Common complaint most frequently raised by southern California interviewees is,
"This Rule is ridiculous. Make a compliable regulation." In general, small firms indicate
a great deal of uncertainty about what compliance means with respect to current
regulation (Patton & Warthington 2003). Nevertheless, the SCAQMD falsely assumed
that drycleaners were capable of complying with all requirements by themselves. At best,
the agency only expressed its willingness to provide reactive assistance. From the
perspective of southern California drycleaners, in contrast to the agency's assumption, it
is almost impossible to fully comply with rule 1421. They simply do not know what to
do. Conversely, provided with options to meet regulatory requirements, Massachusetts
interviewees view the ERP requirements as doable:
The DEP let us know what to do to fully comply. It's like
homework with solution templates. There is no difficulty meeting
the requirements (Personal Communication with an incumbent
president of KDA).
Provision of technical assistance in advance facilitated Massachusetts drycleaners'
positive reaction and led them to believe the regulatory requirements were reasonable.
Second, government responsiveness helps the regulated recognize that "our voice
is heard" and it subsequently leads to a sense of being respected on the part of the
regulated. In turn, respect by others provides and strengthens the social ground for self-
respect. We have already seen in the previous section what role a sense of self-respect
plays in promoting compliance in the Massachusetts case. As we will discuss in the
following section, enhanced self-respect and respect by others are crucial elements in
explaining compliance behavior in relation to shaping self-identity in a broad social
context.
By putting excessive emphasis on stringent deterrence efforts, the SCAQMD
inadvertently reduced its responsive capability vis-a-vis regulatory target constituents.
Correspondingly, it provoked a negative reaction from drycleaners who felt left out and
disbelieved the agency. When people feel left out and perceive that government does not
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care much what they think beyond the ballot box, they experience alienation. When this
feeling and perception persist over time, people experience their governments as
illegitimate (Cooper 1992) and resist in one way or another.
Here, it must be noted that if technical assistance and responsiveness were one-
point-in-time phenomenon, the regulated would feel deceived. A sense of deception
undercuts respect, attenuates trust, and breeds resentment (Campbell et al. 1970). If the
MADEP had provided assistance and been responsive only in the beginning of the ERP
implementation, drycleaners' perceived legitimacy, if any, could have evaporated.
Indeed, ongoing, if not frequent, contacts between the regulated and regulators provide a
critical background where legitimacy is sustained. That perceived legitimacy is
reinforced or weakened by the continuation of contacts suggests that regulators give more
recognition to consistency of rapport as well as its quality.
In sum, the notion of legitimacy helps to explain some of the differences in
regulatory outcomes. This perceived legitimacy is neither given by objective
constitutional-legality nor guaranteed by legitimate rule-making process. It is contingent
on agencies' specific enforcement strategies vis-a-vis individual target constituents. That
is, fundamental differences in the regulatory approach between the SCAQMD and the
MADEP brought about the different perceptions of legitimacy, and thus different
compliance outcome.
Regulatory Relations, Identities and Compliance Behavior
The previous section examined; 1) the nature of relationships between the trade
associations and the regulatory agencies; 2) the ways in which those relationships have
been established; and 3) the ways in which drycleaners' perception of enforcement
strategies shape and sustain perceived legitimacy. This examination paves road to the
relational approach's core argument: small firms' compliance with formal regulations
develops along with configuration of regulatory relationships. In other words, compliance
is a surface expression that results from the patterns of interactions between the
regulators and the regulated.
The regulatory relationship does not, however, translate directly into actual
behavior. How can different types of relations lead to different degrees of compliance
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behavior? To make a conceptual bridge, I turn to the notion of identity. The role of
identities in perceiving the external world has long been demonstrated in the literature of
experimental psychology. The literature posits that one's identity plays the role of an
"axis of interpretation implying that one will find in the external world what is relevant to
that identity." (Markus et al. 1985) It must be emphasized that my aim here is not to look
for a linear causality between social relations and identity. Although identity presupposes
particular social relations, it also affects patterns of those relations. Through dynamic
reactions of identity to social relations, the two reinforce one another. By showing the
interactive processes between identities and surrounding social relations, this section
aims to understand how regulatory relationship contributes to shaping identity and how
their interaction is important in determining compliance behavior.
Let us first look at how regulatory relations affect actors' self-identity formations
and their views of counterparts in interaction. This will provide the basis for
understanding why one identity becomes chosen over others.
The story of southern California is marked by divergent interpretations and
limited interactions between the SCAQMD and KDLA. In southern California,
drycleaners have a strong sense of discrimination with respect to their scale of business,
emerging from the existing interactions with the SCAQMD. This was directly addressed
in public hearings. The KDLA board members would make a strong protest to the
SCAQMD staff against Rule 1421: "If we were Ford, Toyota or Dow Chemical, would
you do the same?"
This remonstration was an insult on the regulators' part. The SCAQMD staff
responded that the agency never discriminated against small businesses and they were
just doing what they were supposed to do in order to protect public health. The
SCAQMD viewed KDLA's attack as stemming from a hackneyed excuse of recalcitrant
violators to justify their acts, and thus required more stringent enforcement. For KDLA,
on the other hand, the SCAQMD's response was a lie. No matter what the SCAQMD
said, drycleaners were extremely skeptical of the intention behind the statements. For
example, a board member of KDLA vehemently blames inspectors:
Whenever I demand an explanation of my status being in violation,
they [inspectors] say, "It could be legal in Korea, but you are in the
U.S. In the U.S., blah, blah, blah...."
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The fact that I am from Korea has nothing to do with the
issue. If I were from U.K or France, would they say that? And I
know I am in the U.S. I have been in the U.S for approximately
thirty five years. Those guys looked younger than thirty. What the
fxxx do they want to teach me?
The inspectors might want to simply show that they understood the violation was not
willful but accidental or caused by a misunderstanding due to cultural differences.
Regardless of inspectors' intention, however, their message is interpreted by receivers as
an insult. Not surprisingly, antagonism between the two continued and KDLA regarded
itself as "businesspeople discriminated against by government." KDLA believes that its
members are discriminated against because they are "non-white" immigrants and "small"
business owners with no power.
In Massachusetts, the cooperative relations that developed between the MADEP
and KDA led drycleaners to a different identity formation. As noted above, there was a
permeating tendency in which most drycleaners viewed themselves as nobody. They even
took it for granted that a Korean consul-general in Boston did not accept their invitation.
Though disappointed, KDA continued to enhance drycleaners' social status. In 1994,
KDA invited Mr. Angello, a member of the State House of Representatives, to a New
Year's party. Angello was selected as a main guest because he was the chairman of
Natural Resource Committee in the House. He accepted the invitation and delivered a
congratulatory address at the party. KDA knew that Angello was more likely than a
Korean consul-general to come because drycleaners meant votes to him. Whatever reason
was behind Angello's attendance, an elected official's appearance in a KDA-hosted event
was a pleasant shock to most drycleaners. Drycleaners came to feel that they were not
ignored. Furthermore, subsequent attendance of the MADEP staff in KDA seminars since
the ERP preparation stage has contributed to enhancing drycleaners' self-respect.
Massachusetts Korean drycleaners became viewing themselves as "citizens" just like
other Americans, not simply minority immigrants isolated from mainstream society.
Once shaped by existing social relations, identity functions as a lens through
which actors view the external world and provides the ways to interpret other actors'
nature, motives, probable actions, and attitudes in any given contexts, and, in turn, affects
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relations with others by either strengthening the existing patterns of interactions or
resisting them.
Recall our two cases. Antagonistic relations led southern California drycleaners to
identify themselves as "minority small business people discriminated against by
government." For KDLA and its members, the SCAQMD's motive to enact Rule 1421
was not to protect public health but to maintain its identity as a regulator. In other words,
KDLA believed that the SCAQMD created a new regulation to reinforce its raison d'etre
as regulators because it needed to keep demonstrating to the public that the agency
always does something for the public. From a KDLA's viewpoint, the dry cleaning
industry was targeted and victimized primarily because the industry comprised non-white
immigrants with no political power. A sense of discrimination made this group of
drycleaners get angry and urged them to fight against unfairness because obeying unfair
rules undermined their self-respect. It in turn exacerbated already persistent hostile
relations.
In the Massachusetts case, the MADEP emphasized formally and informally its
view of the industry. Drycleaners Environmental Certification Workbook articulates:
Professional drycleaners are an essential part of our communities.
Their services save us time and keep our clothing in the best
possible condition. Most drycleaners are family-owned businesses
which have been good neighbors for decades. Dry Cleaning has
become such a routine part of our lives that we rarely think about it
(Workbook, p.2)
Mr. Chang, a former chairman of KDA advisory board, commented, "It was not us but
the ERP staff that included this paragraph. I don't think it was a lip service. If it really
was a sugar-coated word, why did they [the MADEP] involve us in rule-making? They
treated us as citizens they are supposed to serve, not simply the target of regulation. Their
attitude made us feel good." Arguably, cooperative regulatory relations contributed to
forming a sense of being respected within the dry cleaning community and helped
drycleaners define themselves as "good citizens."
KDA wanted to retain enhanced self-respect and demonstrate to customers and
government "who we are." One of the demonstrations took the form of a clothes donation
campaign in 1997. Sponsored by Boston Ballet and Dunkin Doughnuts, KDA collected
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clothes from its members and customers, and donated them to poor neighborhoods
through Goodwill Industry Morgan Memorial. KDA selected the Goodwill as a channel
for donation in order to maximize the benefits on the beneficiary's part (The Red Cross
and other NGOs, KDA says, wanted to take 30 to 35% of profits accruing with the event
as a service fee while the Goodwill requested only 15%). KDA also offered free job
trainings to those who were willing to work at dry cleaning facilities. For these
community services, KDA won the Outstanding Community Award from the
Massachusetts Governor. Lowe commented that winning the governor's award prompted
the association to take on more social responsibility.
Annual seminars can also be understood as a way to demonstrate drycleaners'
commitment to public spiritedness. Needless to say, a primary purpose of the ERP
seminars was educating drycleaners, but it was not the whole story. KDA wanted to show
"we are doing our best" to the outsiders. That was why KDA invited the MADEP.
Indeed, the ERP seminars function as a ritual that increases internal cohesion for the
insiders on the one hand, and demonstrates drycleaners' goodness for the outsiders on the
other. Again, KDA won the Outstanding Environmental Performance Award from the
state government. It made them feel proud and willing to meet social expectations.
These experiences are particularly important for the ongoing confirmation of self-
identity. To maintain a sense of "I am truly who I think I am", I need not only the implicit
confirmation of identity on my part but also the explicit confirmation that others bestow
on me (Berger & Luckmann 1967). For example, to retain my identity as, say, a freelance
columnist, I need not only self-confidence but also requests of columns from newspapers
and magazines. Otherwise, I would gradually encounter an identity crisis and feel like a
jobless journalist. KDA's deliberate outreach to a mainstream society was successful at
inducing regulators to witness drycleaners' credible commitment to social responsibility.
In return, the MADEP gave more credits to KDA, and the relationship between KDA and
the MADEP became more benign.
Viewing identity as essentially social opens up room for the significance of the
relational sensitivities of actors in interaction. As we have seen, the trade associations'
differing self-identities led to differing perspectives of the regulatory agencies. Put
simply, the SCAQMD is viewed as an adversary by KDLA while the MADEP is
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considered to be a friend by KDA. Different identifications of counterparts in interaction
as an adversary versus a friend are likely to lead actors to interpret identical phenomena
differently because an adversary tends to harm while a friend does not. For example, the
U.S. missiles have a different meaning for Cuba from for Mexico due solely to different
diplomatic relations. Likewise, drycleaners in each region interpret identical regulatory
actions in question in radically different ways. The comparison of the following
interviews is quite illustrative:
Example 1. Different views on penalty exemptions
- Interview with Mr. Rae Young Kim in Westchester, California -
R. Kim: Last year, I was imposed $1,800 because of a Perc leak. They told
me to fix the machine by.... I think, the end of October. After repairing
the machine, I called them to notify it. Unexpectedly, they reduced the
fine down to $220.
Interviewer: Did that experience change your impression on SCAQMD?
R. Kim: What do you mean?
Interviewer: Since the beginning of the interview, you have complained
about them. Did the reduction of the fine make you think that they are
more generous than you thought?
R. Kim: (He raised his voice) No. Think about my case more carefully.
First, they never revisited to check out whether I really repaired the
machine. Second, I never begged them to reduce the fine. How did they
know that I fixed it? Why did they reduce the fine? Let me get this
straight. I believe that my violation has no significant impact on the
environment. If that really were serious, they should have imposed heavier
penalty on me, right? I am sure that SCAQMD knows that this law (Rule
1421) is problematic. Nevertheless, they insist that this law is important
for our health. It is ridiculous.
- Interview with Mr. Sung Bae Kim in Middleton, Massachusetts -
Interviewer: Have you ever received a notice of rule violation?
S. Kim: Yes, but it was a long time ago.
Interviewer: What was the reason?
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S. Kim: I did not have a computerized Perc detector. So, they [DEP]
imposed $200 on me.
Interviewer: Did you think that their decision was fair?
S. Kim: Well.... It was not unfair. I should've had it by then, but I just
forgot to purchase it.
Interviewer: What did you do after that?
S. Kim: I immediately purchased a detector and called them to notify it.
Interviewer: Did they revisit your facility?
S. Kim: No. They just believed that I had it. And I was exempted
from the fine. They were nice and understood that people could make a
mistake.
Example 2. Different views on compliance assistance
- Comments from Mr. Ha, a former president of KDLA, in West Hills, California
We know that they have official compliance assistance program. But it is a
lip service. How can they know what we need without listening to us?
Even though they have held public hearings several times, our opinions
were by no means reflected. We just wasted our time by attending the
hearing sessions.
- Comments from Mr. Choi, an incumbent president of KDA, in Reading,
Massachusetts.
A compliance guidebook helped us understand the purpose and meaning
of regulatory requirements ....... The guidebooks include the key concepts
we must know and standards that apply before, during and after our
primary business activities. It was quite helpful.
These diametrically opposite evaluations of the same events can be explained in two
different, but related ways. On the one hand, assistance programs were more
comprehensive and helpful in the Massachusetts case because of ongoing interactions
between KDA and the MADEP. The other conceivable explanation is that Massachusetts
drycleaners appreciated the MADEP's actions because they already had a good
impression of the MADEP, and not vice versa. Likewise, southern California drycleaners
were extremely suspicious of the SCAQMD's actions because they hated the SCAQMD,
and not vice versa. The above examples show that identities or images about formal
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regulators formulated through specific relations play a critical role in the trade
associations' evaluation of agencies' subsequent regulatory actions.
It is notable that the trade associations interpret the past relations with the state
regulatory agencies according to the present relations. In fact, KDLA and KDA had no
virtual contacts with the agencies before Rule 1421 and the ERP, respectively. Under this
same historical condition, the two associations characterize the agencies differently:
While KDLA says "AQMD was never helpful", KDA states "DEP never bothered us
(before the ERP)." Each association uses these reconstructed historical relations to justify
that its current characterization of the agency is "correct." It in turn reconfirms the
identity of the agency and the meaning of its actions associated with the assigned
identity. Now, the associations have a clear idea of "who they are" as well as "who we
are", and concomitantly, "what actions should be done" to best deal with their
requirements. Correspondingly, the two trade associations came up with radically
different behavioral guidance to respond to the given regulation. In the southern
California case, KDLA had no intention to cooperate with the SACQMD. Look at the
following instance:
One day, I was visiting the KDLA office located in Gardena. Mr. Han,
executive officer, was speaking to a drycleaner through a speaker phone.
A caller seemed to have opened recently a dry cleaning shop. He was
complaining about the complexity of Rule 1421 and asking what to do.
Han explained the major requirements in detail, but the caller was not sure
if he correctly understood Han's explanations. Another drycleaner [one of
KDA officials] in the office interrupted:
Drycleaner in the office: .... I recommend not wasting your time by trying
to fully comply. No matter how hard we try, we will fall into violation.
A caller: What do you mean? I don't understand.
Drycleaner: Let me give you an example. It is a commonsense that once
highway patrols decide to issue 100 tickets per day, they can do. What
about 200 or 300 tickets? Of course, they can do. My point is that the
purpose of Rule 1421 is to collect fines. So, once AQMD decides to
collect more money, we cannot be free from detection.
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The caller seemed confused. Han added, "Don't be stressed out. If you
want to meet every detailed requirement, you cannot run a business. Just
do what others do. If you have any problems or questions, call us again."
Where did this seemingly confusing recommendation come from? I asked
why he had this opinion. He told me what happened to him last year: "My
shop was inspected last year. When an inspector first checked if the Perc
machine was leaking, there was nothing wrong. A computerized detector
showed no sign of a Perc leak. I expected him to leave after reviewing the
records. But he checked the machine again. No leak. Then he started
sniffing garments, and looking around a boiler room, etc. Then, he
rechecked the machine. His detector finally made alarm sound. He
imposed $1,800 on me. Do you know how long he stayed in my shop? 4
hours. Can you believe that? I couldn't do anything that day because of
him. If you were I, would you spend your energy making efforts to
comply? It will make no difference." Han added, "Actually, he is not the
only one. Many drycleaners complained about similar experiences."
In contrast, KDA actively encouraged drycleaners to comply with the formal regulation.
The association kept saying, essentially:
You may know that the association was deeply involved in the ERP
creation. So, we have made great efforts to assist you to comply with ERP
and most drycleaners have fully complied. DEP believes that we are
making a credible commitment. You should know that we are one group.
When your violation is detected by DEP, it will undermine our collective
reputation. If you have any problems meeting the ERP requirements, let us
know and then we will do our best to help you. If you keep violating the
rules, we will have no choice but to notify DEP to protect others. In that
case, you should not expect us to help you and you will be in trouble
(Personal Communication with Dong-In Choi).
In addition to encouragement to share the fate of others, KDA created and dispersed the
potential benefits of the ERP to promote compliance rate as high as possible. Without
going into detail, since it is the same explanation as already presented in our discussion of
nurtured benefits in Chapter 3, we can note that emphasis on the benefit of compliance
could reconcile self-interest and collective behavioral guidance.
This effort was derived mainly from the 1990 experience of the failure to
establish a KDA-initiated purchase association. The experience taught the association
that however negligible it looks at the onset, the small number of deviations from
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guidance would eventually have a domino effect. That is, KDA learned that collective
actions could easily be shaken by chain reactions of egocentric behavior. To ensure
cooperation within the community, therefore, KDA needed to take advantage of the
conventional logic of business which should not be overlooked for businesspeople.
For the moment, it must be emphasized that the two associations' behavioral
instruction functions as norms-like guidance to which the majority of community
members have conformed. The messages from the associations alike dictate community
members to act in ways quite different from rational decision-making assumed in
deterrence theory. Within the deterrence framework, actors' choices of action follow the
rule of transitivity, telling "If I prefer A to B and B to C, then I will choose A." However,
drycleaners in both regions are prompted to follow a different mode of behavior: "Do A
if and only if others do A." In the Massachusetts case, it translates directly into "comply
because others comply." As evidenced in KDA's stories, this second guidance has little
to do with the probability of detection and the severity of formal sanctions. It is an
attempt to coordinate members' behavior to collectively demonstrate the community's
public spiritedness.
In the southern California case, KDLA's message conveys more complicated
connotation. The same type of guidance (Do A if and only if others do A) translates
implicitly into "Do it on your own as others do. None of us will blame you whatever you
do. Choice is up to you." KDLA does not offer what exactly to do, and thus its members
lack a guided interpretative framework. At a surface level, correspondingly, southern
California drycleaners choice making seems relatively atomized and rational. At a deeper
level, however, individuals are still influenced by the association's continuing message to
deal with the perceived threats: "Rule 1421 is not only costly to comply with but also
unfair. So, it is hard for most of us to fully comply. What are you going to do?" The
southern California case provides an interesting lesson with respect to individual choice
making: When ongoing interaction among actors is interrupted, actors are led to act
rationally (Heideger, Quoted in Piore 1995). However, the criteria to base actions in
rational ways are still socially provided.
The behavioral guidance offered by the two associations is also different from
social norms internalized through a life-long socialization assumed in the theory of
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norms. In general, this type of social norms is considered as solutions to past recurrent
problems implicitly formulated over a long period of time. However, trade associations'
behavioral guidance in question is a solution to new problems which from the onset are
enjoined as such. In the Massachusetts case, the behavioral guidance connotes, "comply
because you understand what it means, why it is important and what you need to do."
Obviously, this is not blind norm compliance.
Unlike the theory of norms' assumption that internalized social norms are difficult
to resist, the southern California case reveals that entrenched moral obligations to obey
the formal laws, a principal component determining compliance behavior within a
framework of the theory of norms, is easily overwhelmed by newly emerging behavioral
guidance.
In sum, the choice of drycleaner compliance is not simply determined by the
perceived probability of detection and the perceived severity of formal sanctions. More
important is the perceived cost and benefit of compliance, and as we have seen, these
material facts take on different meanings according to regulatory contexts. Nor is the
choice to comply dictated by abstract notions of moral obligations to obey the laws.
Though moral obligations certainly exist, they have little effect on the final choice of
action when the perceived cost of compliance is high and/or specific regulations facing
the regulated entity are perceived as unfair, as evidenced in the southern California case.
Compliance behavior is affected heavily by the recognition of 'who I am', 'who
they are', 'whether I am threatened or fairly treated by them', and 'how I might best deal
with those threats or respond to their actions in particular contexts.' Identity plays a
crucial role in characterizing the contexts. It guides actor's interpretation of the external
world and helps her/him understand (and misunderstand) the regulatory situation. As
such, an actor selects the most appropriate course of action on the basis of a specific
situation characterization. The most appropriate course of action may take a form of
either self-interest oriented or norms-guided behavior. This means that actors have a
wider array of potential choices of action than is assumed by deterrence theory and the
theory of norms. These choices are enabled or constrained by social structures that are
mutually created by actors through interactive practices in time. In other words, it is
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always conditioned by how the interpretive dimension of identity shapes the way an actor
defines a situation in which s/he is located.
Essential Conditions for Rule Compliance of Small Firms
The dissertation has reiterated that compliance behavior is a surface expression of
regulatory relationships that develop in particular socio-historical contexts. To support
the validity of this argument, my discussion delved into narrating what has been going on
under the surface over the last two decades in the two regions. By doing so, my
storytelling revealed 'justificatory (or surface)' reasons and 'real (or deep)' reasons for
compliance (and noncompliance) behavior.
Justificatory reasons on the part of the regulated are more or less economic in
nature. Those reasons ascribe to the perceived cost and benefit of compliance apart from
the perceived probability of detection and the severity of formal sanctions. The most
important finding in this regard is that the array of the economic facts are indeterminate,
and thus can be malleable according to interpretations of the ongoing practices, identities,
and intentions of other actors. As such, real reason for compliance is social. My
storytelling has shown how social reasons affect economic reasoning without overlooking
its significance and how they together govern the actual behavior.
This recognition is readily shared by organizational theorists and economic
sociologists who aware a flexibility in individual preferences (that neoclassical
economists assume away), but who nevertheless preserve the basic rationalist framework
(Piore 1992). Michael Piore epitomizes this point:
Neither the social nor the epistemological theory should in
principle conflict with individual welfare maximization.
Individuals in our theoretical universe are not irrational, but they
may be arational or prerational in the sense that the variables and
processes on which the social and epistemological focus are
generally .... prior to the calculations that rational actors in
economic theories .... are presumed to make (Piore 1992, p.4 3 1.
Italics original)
To avoid confusion, for the moment, I need to clarify what Piore means by the
epistemological and the social approach. The epistemological approach is quite similar to
the rationalist approach, focusing on the "presumed relationship between means and
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ends" or "models of reality in terms of which rational actors calculate gains and losses
and the way in which those models evolve over time." The social approach focuses its
attention on identity formation, that is, "how the individual defines her/himself' (Piore
1992. Italics original). He points out complex process of how an actor comes to
distinguish between means and ends, and urges to look into theoretical realm where the
distinction between means and ends does not arise.
Despite that Piore concerns the issue in the context of technological change and
organizational structure, his theoretical inquiry shed light on my discussion to explicate
the meanings of the research findings. It is an attempt to clarify a realm preceding both
rational calculation and identity formation. In an effort to build the empirical basis on
which the relational approach stands, my task in this final section focuses on identifying
the essential conditions that affect formation of social reasons underlying compliance
behavior. Although the relational approach puts a great emphasis on the importance of
particular contexts, the term "particular" does not mean that the same events cannot be
reproduced elsewhere due to unique local circumstances. Rather, it implies the rejection
of any form of determinism. In this vein, divergent compliance trends in the two regions
should not be explained by fatalism or relativism. They were the outcomes of deliberate
choices of action on the regulated entity's part. I find the essential conditions that
facilitate compliance choice in combination of; 1) the existence of influential trade
associations and 2) cooperative relationship between regulators and the regulated.
The Role of Trade Associations
Conventional wisdom states that small firms are less likely than large firms to obtain
information on regulatory requirements from trade associations. Although the dissertation
cannot tell the relative importance of trade associations to large vs. small firms, our
research showed that these associations play a decisive role in small firms' making
compliance choices.
Communities are by no means the arithmetic aggregation of individuals. They are
created and sustained through the interaction among individuals. The interaction is the
process through which individuals define themselves and create identities in the broader
social contexts (Piore 1995). It provides a clue for appropriate modes of actions
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associated with identities. Trade associations coordinate and direct the patterns of this
interaction among individuals, and simultaneously with the outsiders.
One of the significant roles of trade associations is one as a translator. Regulatory
agencies have traditionally been viewed as "neutral, fact-based implementers of the
legislative will and unmistakable transmitters of regulatory signals." (Fiorino 1995) Our
cases clearly demonstrate that this view is too often wrong. The real world is complex
and laden with political conflicts and value choices. Simply saying something or
providing information cannot ensure that regulatory message is transmitted as such.
However abundant it is, information cannot be used without being interpreted. It is
always communicated through interpretation of meanings. Without interpretation,
genuine choices of action would be impossible because actors must understand the
surroundings in order to act.
What we must recognize in this regard is that small firms are not self-reliant on
understanding regulatory requirements. All too often, they are reluctant to interpreting
regulatory messages by themselves, and thus require someone who can correctly interpret
and translate regulatory will, facilitate understanding of reality, and suggest the most
appropriate action on behalf of them. It is because small firms are afraid that they may
misunderstand complex regulatory signals and know that organizing and acting
collectively may be the only way to affect or to get attention of government (Tendler,
2002) when they attempt to correct the wrong. Necessary information and suggestions of
behavioral modes can be provided by third parties such as professional magazines and
university-based research institutes (like Occidental College-based Pollution Prevention
Education and Research Center [PPERC] in the southern California case). However,
small firms tend to give more credits to trade associations mainly because the
associations are viewed as a kind of "significant other." Although it is wrong to assume
that only significant others serve to understand reality by helping actors interpret the
external world, a central position of understanding, accepting and maintaining reality is
still occupied by significant others (Berger & Luckmann 1967). For individual small
firms, trade associations are the most reliable translator because the associations are
considered as sharing the same interest that minimizes the possibility of willfully
distorting the information.
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Beyond a role of a translator, the associations function as a narrator. They forge
narratives based on the interpretation of regulatory situations. The narrative is a method
by which actors organize and interpret the past and present events. It also serves as a
template for future actions (Piore 1995). Although no single person can control
narratives, a leader is likely to be a most prominent narrator. Trade associations as leaders
tell their stories first and most frequently, and their voices are heard more clearly than
others' (Piore 1995). When reality is presented to individuals mediated by a narrative, it
gives meanings of things and not just facts. This makes the associations' narratives a
powerful standardized guidance directing individual firms' interpretive processes. Unlike
a liberal notion of the reasoning ego, there are a number of ways in which understandings
of reality are passed on to each individual. Small firms require a comprehensive channel
of interpretation to economize their energy and act appropriately to deal with complex
reality. Trade associations are the most effective, reliable avenue to meet this demand on
the part of individual small firms.
The Role of Regulators and Importance of the Regulatory Relationship
Advocates of government regulation have traditionally argued that regulatory agencies
must be tough and maintain distance from the regulated entities to avoid agency capture.
As such, adversarial relations have been a default mode of formal regulations. This
adversarial institution seems much less effective in regulating small firms than traditional
wisdom suggests. Rather, cooperative regulatory institution based upon mutual trust
between the regulated and regulators seems to be more effective. In this vein, although
the existence of influential trade associations is necessary for increasing compliance of
small firms, it is by no means sufficient. Strong associations would be a major barrier to
promoting compliance if they lead communities to emotional withdrawal from a larger
society in general and to distrust toward regulators in particular. This is evident in the
southern California case.
Due to strong suspicions of regulatory intention, KDLA has doubted the veracity
of information from not only the SCAQMD but also other segments of the surrounding
society. The SCAQMD and PPERC have provided various compliance and beyond-
compliance options to help drycleaners in the District. For example, the SCAQMD
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announced that they had $2 million grants available for non-Perc cleaners. Drycleaners
switching from Perc to hydrocarbon could get $5,000 and to wet cleaning $10,000. The
SCAQMD did not require repaying the money. Surprisingly, no association members
applied for the grant. Instead, they requested that the SCAQMD use it to provide
undeniable scientific evidence confirming that Perc is dangerous. PPERC's effort to
technically assist drycleaners also failed. KDLA derisively states, "If Perc is bad, PPERC
is worse (this is a ridicule stemming from the center's name). They are wrong about
everything."
KDLA members do not even trust non-member drycleaners. Hans Kim in Rancho
Cucamonga, a former biochemist, used to attend KDLA technical seminars and explained
why and how Perc is dangerous. The only feedback he received from the attendees was,
"Since when have you worked for the AQMD? What do you want to get out of this?"
Because KDLA distrusts the SCAQMD, anyone who shares the same opinion as the
SCAQMD's is viewed as an enemy. Correspondingly, all communications were
interrupted by a breakdown of information flows and the association came to get more
and more insulated. A sense of "nobody is on my side" made the association get angrier
and prompted it to fight against enemies.
The Massachusetts case presents a diametrically opposite relation. KDA board
members state, "The ERP is legitimate. It was the product of collaboration between the
DEP and us", "They [The MADEP] treated us as innocent until proven guilty. It's as it
should be", "We are doing our best and they know it. In return, they trust us and we know
it." These attitudes led essentially to "We don't want to cheat on someone who trusts us.
We will live up to our promise." Furthermore, trust in the regulatory agency facilitates
forming trust in a third party. Unlike in the southern California case, KDA has
maintained a cooperative relationship with the Toxics Use Reduction Institute (TURI) at
the University of Massachusetts Lowell. TURI was established by the Toxics Use
Reduction Act in 1989. Since its inception, the institute has worked closely with the
MADEP. The MADEP's guarantee that TURI could be helpful for developing
educational programs assured KDA to accept assistance from the institute. Recently,
KDA and TURI began collaborating to develop a new program aiming for beyond-
compliance.
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The importance of regulatory relationship is evidenced in another two categories
of examples: First, in three Massachusetts industries consisting of small-sized firms; and
second, in good environmental performers of southern California and recalcitrant
violators of Massachusetts in the dry cleaning industry. They reinforce the relational
approach's implicit argument that the more collaborative the regulator-regulated
relationship, the higher compliance will be.
The first category involves the printing industry, the photo-processing industry
and gas stations. Together with the dry cleaning industry, the first two industries are
subject to the ERP. Because of the lack of in-depth interviews with the associations of
these industries, I was unable to confirm whether there exits trust between the MADEP
and these industries. Nevertheless, I could validate from the MADEP's statement that the
two trade associations have been very cooperative with the agency. The ERP general
manager states:
Partnership with industry groups helped get a lot of buy-in. Trade
associations helped us with compliance and enforcement. In one
year, we realized our response rate was low in the printing sector,
so we called the trade association and asked if they could help us
with the non-compliance rate. They were able to do a broadcast
fax to all their members, saying "you didn't get your certification
in." After that, more came in. There's an incentive to help us:
They can recruit new members and can serve as a liaison.. .with a
good view in their eyes and our eyes (Personal Communication
with Tara Velazquez).
As in the case of the dry cleaning industry, the MADEP could raise the percentage of
printers and photo-processors under their oversight with help from the trade associations
(See Table 18).
Table 18. Identified Number of Firms Pre- and Post-ERP
Industry Identified Number of firms before ERP Identified Number of firms after ERP
Photo Processing 100 500
Printing 250 1100
Total 350 1600
Source: April & Greiner 2000.
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Two years prior to the ERP, the Massachusetts printing industry established the
collaboration with the MADEP under the Massachusetts Printers Partnership (MP2)
focusing on increasing compliance. A 1997 contractor-evaluation of MP2 found dramatic
improvements in environmental performance by participating firms. Encouraged by the
members' environmental improvements without undermining competitiveness and due to
the awareness of the MADEP's reasonableness acquired from the past interaction, the
printers association readily accepted the ERP and responded to the MADEP's request for
further partnership. The MADEP estimated in 1998 that approximately 900 printers out
of 1,100 were in compliance (NAPA 2000).
The case of the photo-processing industry presents the significance of not only
regulatory relationship but also the nurtured benefit of regulation. When faced the ERP,
the trade association questioned the need for regulating the industry in the first place.
Photo-processors' major pollutant identified by the MADEP was silver-bearing
wastewater discharged to publicly owned treatment works (POTW). The association
claimed that the silver from photo-processing wastes has extremely low toxicity and that
there were no EPA regulations regarding silver levels in POTW sludge (April & Greiner
2000). Nevertheless, the benign relationship with the MADEP convinced the association
to believe that the ERP requirements were reasonable. Photo-processors were told by the
association that it is economically beneficial to recover silver even when including the
capital cost of recovery equipment (Personal Communication with Two Anonymous
Photo-Processors in CVSs).
Speculatively, individual photo-processors must have seriously taken into
consideration the potential benefit accruing with compliance in making choices. April
and Greiner's (2000) interviews with twenty photo-processors and Qualtex, a company
that manages photo-processing wastes for approximately 400 minilabs at locations such
as Walgreens, WalMart and CVS, revealed increases in compliance with the ERP
standard. Of twenty, fifteen firms were changing silver recovery canisters more
frequently than before. The other firms were monitoring canisters more carefully and
performing scheduled replacement as opposed to the traditionally haphazard method,
which resulted in excessive silver discharges. Qualtex stated that its system to manage
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canister replacement also improved. Those results were confirmed by independent
industry experts who stated that since the ERP, photo-processors in the state have paid
much closer attention to silver recovery systems.
Meanwhile, a group of gas stations hit road in the opposite direction. Gas stations
whose majority comprises Armenian immigrants were one of the major targets at the
ERP preparation stage. To convince gas station owners to accept the necessity of the
regulation, the MADEP presented a contaminated gas station as an example and notified
that it would cost at least $2 million to clean it up. The Armenian association was
skeptical of the accuracy of the cost estimation, so that it collected money from
approximately 300 members and cleaned up the site by itself. The actual site clean-up
required only $250,000. The association became extremely suspicious of the MADEP's
regulatory intention and strongly resisted the new regulation. Because mispresenting the
clean-up cost weakened its bargaining position to a significant degree, the MADEP could
not deal with the industry's challenge. After all, the ERP design team exempted gas
stations from the ERP because they were afraid that the failure in this industry could
cross out the success in the others. Alternatively, the MADEP launched a less stringent
regulation called Stage II targeting gasoline fuel dispensers.
It is difficult to directly compare the ERP firms with Stage II firms with respect to
compliance trends due to the lack of comparable data. The following is the only data that
can be used as a proxy (See Table 19). Although the data only cover environmental
justice areas, the wide differences in percentages of Higher Level Enforcement (HLE)
actions and lower enforcement actions tell that the Stage II firms' compliance rates must
have been lower than the ERP firms.
Table 19. Profile of Inspections and Enforcement in Environmental Justice Areas-FY 2004
ERP-All Sectors 32 10 (29%) 0% 14%
Stage i 28 28 (47%) 50% 46%
Source: The MADEP 2004
201
A second category of examples refers to both good environmental performers in southern
California and violators in Massachusetts in the dry cleaning industry. When illustrating
the importance of regulatory relationship, the examples concomitantly provide a
reasonable explanation of variations in compliance within each community. Recall Figure





Compliance Threshold Level of Performance
The majority of Massachusetts drycleaners fully complies with the ERP while a small
number of them violate it (area MV). Conversely, the majority of southern California
drycleaners violates Rule 1421 while a handful of drycleaners comply (area CC). Neither
deterrence theory nor the theory of norms explains why these within-group variations
take place. For the two theories, firms in areas CC and MV are simply statistical outliers.
Let us turn to the relational approach claiming that the more collaborative the
regulator-regulated relationship, the higher compliance will be. Our empirical data on
these statistical outliers unexplained by the existing theories are fairly consistent with the
relational approach's claim. In the southern California case, the interviews could confirm
that despite KDLA's strong hostility toward the SCAQMD, good environmental
performers (located in CC) maintain relatively positive impression of the regulatory
agency. Chong Kuk Kim in Ontario states,
I am pretty sure that the AQMD is doing well. Their active
enforcement has contributed to enhancing the air quality in
southern California..... There is nothing wrong with Rule 1421.
Above all, I appreciate the AQMD's effort to understand small
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drycleaners' business environment. One day, they called me and
asked if they could use my shop as a classroom to recruit new field
inspectors. They said that they needed real business environment to
get inspectors understand the difficulties of the dry cleaning
business. Isn't it nice of them? I had been running a dry cleaning
shop in Texas before I moved in to California. In Texas, I couldn't
even imagine this kind of regulators.
Paul Choi in Lancaster, who introduced me to the SCAQMD staff, made an almost
identical comment. Choi used to work at Boeing and retired due mainly to invisible racial
discrimination at workplace. He adds to Kim's comment:
Some requirements of Rule 1421 seem too strict, but I have no
intention to blame the AQMD for the Rule. They are public
officials and subject to higher authorities. I mean.... just as we are
required to comply with laws, so they are required to meet
demands of the CARB (California Air Resources Board) and EPA.
They are just doing what they are supposed to do................
KDLA blames that the AQMD are discriminating small businesses
and minorities, but I don't think so. I have known some staff for
several years because I was a member of the Minority Advisory
Board. Personally, I believe they are reasonable and willing to help
small businesspeople with compliance.
Other interviewees who were introduced in local newspapers as environmentally friendly
drycleaners (including wet cleaners) share the same view as Kim's and Choi's, and tend
to believe in what the SCAQMD says about Perc and Rule 1421. At minimum, unlike the
majority of KDL.A members, they do not doubt regulatory intention. This perception on
regulators affects directions of behavior. Although belief does not necessarily make
actors act, it, regardless of whether to be true or false, puts them into a condition under
which they will behave in certain ways when the occasion arises. Obviously, doubt or
distrust does not have such an active effect (Peirce 1877).
Behavior of recalcitrant violators in Massachusetts can also be explained in a
similar vein. But the reasons for their violations seem to result not so much from hostility
toward the MADEP as from the breakdown of interactions with the agency and the
association. However, they still illuminate the importance of regulatory relationship in
making choices of action.
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When the MADEP inspectors detected repeated violations, they always notified
KDA and asked if the association could help violators commit to compliance efforts
before imposing penalties. The MADEP staff said that it was because the purpose of
inspections was not to penalize violators but to bring them into compliance in the first
place. The MADEP's untraditional way of handling violators was appreciated by KDA
and most drycleaners. For KDA, it was a good way to increase the association's influence
on its members. For individual drycleaners, it was a way to avoid excessive HLE actions
accruing with accidental violations. As such, the MADEP's pre-notification was viewed
as a sign of the regulators' goodness of heart. However, some violators were upset with
the MADEP's method. An anonymous violator in Malden furiously complained:
When they [the MADEP] find violations, all they have to do is
giving fines. I am not going to complain about that. But because
they spoke to the association about me, people would think I have
violated the rule all the time. I swear that's not true. I was in
violation only once for a short time. But who is going to believe
me? They ruined my reputation..... What if my landlord knows
about it? He is not going to renew the lease and I will be pissed
off..... I don't understand why the DEP did that. Though I don't
have evidence, something must be going on between them [KDA
and the MADEP].
Interestingly, KDA defends the MADEP:
We know that those who were notified by the DEP made the same
violation more than twice. They are obstinate violators. If not, the
DEP won't call us. The DEP call for assistance only when they
think someone keeps violating because s/he does not understand
the inspector's instruction due to a language problem.... In those
cases, we called them [violators] to ask if they needed any help.
But some of them said, "You got the wrong person. I was never in
violation." We knew they lied, but what can we do if they respond
in that way?
If KDA tells the truth, then a crucial question arises: Why did those violators deny the
association's help? Although the sample size of the recalcitrant violators is too small to
draw on a definite answer, in-depth interviews revealed that the violators' comments
converge on a single point: They do not know what to do to meet all regulatory
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requirements because they have never engaged in associational activities, much less
contacts with the MADEP except for inspections.
It is usual in dry cleaning communities that when someone wants to newly run a
dry cleaning business or when a drycleaner wants to run an additional shop, s/he looks for
existing shops to take over them rather than opening a new facility. Taking over an
already-operating shop is preferable due to the potential to absorb the existing customers.
If a facility owner were known as a violator, nobody would give a look to her/his facility
for fear of the future clean-up liability. In this instance, the distinction between reputation
as a social factor and property value as an economic factor becomes blurry. Reputation in
the community translates directly into the monetary value of the property. For this reason,
the violators conceal their violation records and insulate themselves from others.
Another reason for this group of violators' reluctance to call for KDA's assistance
stems from a strong suspicion of the intention behind the MADEP's notice of violation to
KDA. These drycleaners suspect that KDA requested the MADEP to do it in order to
revenge them because they neither participated in the associational events nor paid
association fees. The MADEP is viewed as helping KDA for unknown reasons. In short,
they trust neither KDA nor the MADEP. From a compliance viewpoint, this aspect brings
about a vicious circle. Although the violators want to get things right, they simply do not
know what exactly to do and have nobody to ask. Therefore, their uncorrected violations
are detected in the follow-up inspections and, again, the violators try harder to hide
subsequent violations from other drycleaners.
One may recall that most Massachusetts interviewees said that compliance
assistance workbook was comprehensive, and thus ask why these violators do not use it.
A plausible answer can be found in Kim's response to my inquiry about why he attended
the ERP seminar:
You are a student, so let me ask you this question. Can you
understand all the contents of textbooks without your teachers'
help? (I said no). Right, few people can. That's why students take
classes. They need instructions. At least, they need to confirm
whether their understanding of something is correct by asking
teachers and other students. Things are the same for us. KDA and
the DEP are proud of their joint product [a compliance workbook].
They must be. It was easy for me to understand the workbook, but
only after I listened to the lectures. Someone may understand it
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without help by reading over and over again, but who is going to
do that? It's longer than fifty pages.
Indeed, the recalcitrant violators who never attended the ERP seminars stated that the
compliance assistance workbook was not so comprehensive. The story of the
Massachusetts violators by no means implies that all self-contained actors are necessarily
rule violators. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to infer that in the contexts similar to the
Massachusetts community, those actors are more likely to fall into violations. It is so
because the breakdown of social interactions deprives them of willingness and
opportunities to learn about ways of promoting their capacity to comply.
As we have seen, making choices of compliance never follows a straight line. Rather, it
results from complicated webs of ongoing social interactions. We traced the origin of
compliance behavior to the patterns of these interactions among actors that govern the
framing of the external world, contingencies and outcomes. Different patterns of social
interactions or relations lead actors to interpret the situations in which they exist in
different ways, and in turn shape different identities' of self and others. Differences in
identities lead to the corresponding differences in preferences, and thus probable choices.
In this way, social relations become the basis of interests, which are now endogenous
rather than exogenously given.
Again, the nature of the relationship between self and others determines identities
of self and others in interaction in a particular social context. Because identities are
developed through repeated interactive processes, they have a corresponding capacity to
judge and produce contextually meaningful behavior (Abrams 1997) that makes sense of
the situation in light of who did what and why. After all, social relations are at the heart




SUMMARY OF STUDY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION
Summary of the Dissertation
Environmental quality is not just a function of emissions from large smokestacks. Small
sources, regardless of whether they are manufacturing or service-oriented businesses,
collectively contribute significantly to environmental degradation. In 2001, small- and
medium-sized firms together accounted for over 90% of all businesses, and 50-60% of
employment, worldwide (UNIDO 2002). Consequently, even when small firms' share of
total pollution is low, their wide geographic dispersion amplifies adverse environmental
and health effects (Geiser & Crul 1996). Nonetheless, small businesses have long been
located at the margins of regulatory decision making.
Squeezed by their suppliers and fearful of regulation, small firms present a
difficult set of issues for regulators (Gottlieb 2001). Presumably, the most serious
problem regulators confront is compliance. Despite increased regulatory enforcement
efforts in recent years, small firms' rule compliance rates continue to be low, exposing
the limits of the current regulatory system.
The dry cleaning industry is a frequently cited example. As a neighborhood-
based, customer-service-oriented industry that currently generates more political conflict
than any other small firm sector, the dry cleaning industry has become symbol and
substance of the small business dilemma facing urban environmental policymakers
(Gottlieb 2001). This dissertation told the story of two dry cleaning communities to
uncover small firms' motivations for compliance with formal regulations.
Unlike scholarly works in traditions of deterrence theory and the theory of norms
which depicted compliance behavior as a function of either a strict cost-benefit
calculation or a sense of moral obligations to obey the laws, respectively, this dissertation
portrayed compliance as a configuration of regulatory relationships between regulated
entities and regulators, with trade associations playing a steering role. The argument was
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developed through in-depth storytelling in a somewhat untraditional manner. The story
started at the end (trends in rule compliance). It then went to the beginning, reached the
middle, and finally returned to the end. It continued moving back and forth through time,
even within each stage of the narrative. This storytelling method was intended to
elucidate the importance of ongoing systems of social relations. Rather than explain
compliance behavior by way of linear causalities (as pursued by a significant number of
existing studies), the dissertation told a nuanced story of how outcomes varied as actors
defined and interpreted their past and present, and extrapolated these into their future
differently (Piore 1995). This differentiated approach identified multiple layers of
motivations underlying compliance behavior.
The surface tier comprises economic factors quite distinct from those identified
by deterrence theory. In contrast to deterrence accounts that emphasize the perceived
probability of detection and the severity of formal sanctions, the dissertation revealed that
it is the perceived cost/benefit of compliance that explains outcomes. Critically, these
economic facts are themselves shown to be variable, demonstrating a wider array of
estimations than deterrence theory can provide.
Though useful, this finding alone did not provide satisfactory answers to the
primary research question. It naturally pushed the inquiry further: Given the almost
identical regulatory requirements, why did members of the two communities have wide
variations in perceptions of economic facts? Put another way, why are regulatory
requirements associated with costs and burdens in southern California and not in
Massachusetts? It became evident that economic facts cannot be assumed; compliance
costs/benefits must not be taken at face value. This realization prompted me to ascertain
what determines the meaning of economic facts to the regulated entities. In this
investigation I discovered the middle tier, comprising the perceived legitimacy of a rule
and its enforcement. In other words, the ways in which the regulated entities defined the
current regulations and regulators affected their perceptions of economic facts. As a
result, perceived legitimacy was a behavioral guide instructing one how to act.
While this claim was tenable from an empirical point of view, it posed additional
questions with respect to the formulation of perceived legitimacy: Why did two
communities with identical cultural attributes have different perceptions of legitimacy
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under similar regulatory conditions? How can we explain variations in compliance
behavior within a community?
These questions led to a search for the fundamental forces shaping perceived
legitimacy in particular socio-historical contexts in which actors are embedded. In
contrast to the orthodox theory of norms, the dissertation demonstrated that the perceived
legitimacy results neither from individuals' independent evaluation of regulatory
structures nor from life-long socialization. Instead, legitimacy is determined by ongoing
relations with regulators, with trade associations strategically coordinating and directing
members' behavior. The dissertation showed that different regulatory relationships
helped form different identities of the self and the other actors, with corresponding
changes in preferences, and thus probable choices of actions. In this way, regulatory
relations laid the basis of interests that are now endogenous. The dissertation
concomitantly revealed that the conceptual demarcation between economic and social
factors is, in fact, blurry, and thus suggested their integrated role in reality. The interplay
of these two seemingly contradictory groups of factors was explained by the notion of
contextual embeddedness in Chapter 4.
In summary, the traditional compliance theories view rule compliance as a
journey through a predetermined behavioral path. As we have seen, however, compliance
behavior does not follow such a course. The observed differences in rule compliance in
the two dry cleaning communities cannot be explained by economic factors or normative
factors alone. They are best explained through close examination of patterns of
associational activities and relations with formal regulators. These social factors affect
the way economic factors are perceived and, in turn, expand the array of the strategic
choices of behavior differently. This implies that the success in Massachusetts should not
be attributed to chance, but rather viewed as containing lessons applicable across other
small business sectors. The relational approach thus retains significant implications for
the principles underlying formal regulations that target small firms. We now turn to a
discussion of that theme.
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Implications for Regulation
Existing strategies for regulating industrial pollution are based on three components:
theories of firm decision-making, hypotheses regarding state capacities and well-defined
state roles.52 Traditional command-and-control (CAC) and market-based regulations,
although in conflict on a number of issues, share the same assumptions of the first two as
follows: Small firms, just like all other actors, act independently to maximize self-
interest; and state regulators perfectly understand this logic of decision-making and are
capable of collecting the information required for changing firms' behavior. CAC and
market-based regulations diverge in the roles they ascribe to the state. While CAC
presupposes paternalistic state intervention, market-based regulation argues against it.
The latter claims that state responsibility must be restricted to enforcing contracts critical
to a properly working market mechanism. Yet despite disagreement over the state's role,
the two regulatory frameworks agree that in order to change firm behavior, government is
responsible for implementing policies that change prices (only prices) associated with
behavior.
I will not reiterate the fundamental flaws in the claims mentioned above as both
the theoretical analysis and empirical evidence in preceding chapters provided the
rationales for refuting them. Instead, I will present the essence of the research findings
that counter the traditional theoretical assumptions point by point. First, small firms do
not decide independently how to act. Rather, their actions are coordinated and guided by
trade associations. Whether or not actors sense that they have a correct choice to make is
to a large extent socially determined in a particular context. Second, self-interest is in no
way the sole motivating factor. Overemphasis on disembedded self-interest dogma risks
missing the actuality of socio-historical contexts and thus, all important contextual
meanings evaporate. Third, without proper communication channels, regulators lack
knowledge of whether firms receive regulatory messages as such, and thus cannot
unambiguously interpret the latter's response. Consequently, regulators face tremendous
difficulty securing the behavior they seek.
If one accepts the validity of the research findings that emphasize the role of trade
associations and regulatory relationships (ignored by the existing theories), policy
52 I am indebted to Prof. Dara O'Rouke for this statement.
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implications become clear. To enhance mutual understandings and to facilitate
information flows, it is necessary to build institutional arrangements that generate and
sustain trust. This does not completely deny the influence of price change (i.e., change in
penalties) on firm behavior. However, what we are concerned about is not only the
direction of response but also its magnitude (Ehrlich 1972). Overdependence on
neoclassical logic stunts the possibility of helping small firms move toward socially
desirable behavior. For substantial increases in rule compliance, fundamental changes in
regulatory structure are needed. Such changes require a redefinition of government's role.
Stimulating Coordination of Collective Interests among Small Firms
Dominant environmental regulatory strategy targeting small firms has traditionally
focused on direct control vis-a-vis individual firms, with increased oversight and
sufficient sanctioning power, as is the case with southern California. This approach might
have significant effects in a highly concentrated industry (e.g., the oil industry) where a
few actors account for a large portion of total pollutants, and thus regulators need only
deal with a small number of firms (Wallace 1995). In the case of small firms, however,
operational realities differ significantly from idealized models. Much research has
revealed that this strategy failed due to technical problems (i.e., monitoring) and
regulators' cognitive limits derived from the system itself (i.e., difficulty in understanding
and collecting information relevant to shortcomings in existing strategy). Put simply,
government does not have capacity to continually monitor numerous small firms. The
system also lacks channels for translating useful field information into new forms of
regulatory structures that would facilitate improvements in compliance (Fiorino 2001).
Regulators must recognize that individual small firms are less likely than large
firms to be self-reliant when interpreting regulatory messages, defining images of
regulators, and making behavioral choices. Indeed, these semantic fields are frequently, if
not always, influenced by trade associations. The MADEP took advantage of this
influence. In May 1994, the MADEP invited industry actors from across the state to
discuss impending regulatory issues in Concord, Massachusetts. Approximately 7,500
people attended, most participating as individuals. The MADEP confessed outright that it
did not have the capacity to converse with all individual firms and instead, asked them to
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form coherent, collective opinions by particular industries. The agency stated that once
this prerequisite was met, fruitful regulatory discussions could take place. Participants
recognized the MADEP's inability to deal with all firms individually. Some industries
responded to the call for internal coordination of collective interests. This experience
appears to have contributed to successful regulatory negotiations in the MP2 and ERP
cases.
The Massachusetts case leads to a first general lesson: An enforcement strategy
that first encourages the coordination of collective interests, rather than direct control
over individual small firms, will yield higher compliance. Trade associations would
likely be receptive to this strategy because it increases associations' influence within their
communities. Consequently, they will be vigilant in monitoring members' performance to
ensure their authority over members and demonstrate their influence to the state. On the
regulatory side, the strategy would deploy limited regulatory resources more effectively.
With help from trade associations, regulators can obtain detailed information about
individual firms that was previously unattainable. For example, working closely with
associations would help distinguish between firms that have genuine difficulties and
those that are simply recalcitrant. The distinction would enhance the effectiveness of
strategic oversights.
Identifving Helpful Intermediaries (in the Absence of Trade Associations)
A second issue concerns circumstances under which the above guidance cannot be
materialized. The guidance is based theoretically on the relational approach, emphasizing
the combination of existing trade associations and cooperative regulatory relations. The
importance of trade associations stems from a tendency that the majority of the members
of social, political, economic systems discovers, develops, and expresses their feelings
and interests in the intimate groups of the broader community (Campbell et al. 1970).
Trade associations are themselves the "intimate groups" and play a role of significant
others to small firms. However, what if there is no pre-existing association? Without
them, can regulators stimulate industry-wide cooperation? If not, what should
government do?
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A plausible solution is to identify helpful intermediaries who can aid regulators in
outreach and communication with the regulated. We have already seen that the lack of
information (and its resulting uncertainty) is one of major barriers to small firms'
compliance. Even in situations where compliance is deemed desirable, we cannot ensure
that small firms have the capacity to undertake the task. For this reason, existing studies
unanimously suggest increasing the quality and sources of information as a solution.
Although there is nothing wrong with this suggestion, provision of information and
technical assistance alone is insufficient to resolve the problem. The plethora of
information sources and advice may result in greater uncertainty for small firms (Patton
& Worthington 2003).
As demonstrated throughout this dissertation, small firms' environmental
behavior is not tailored to a given regulation per se, but rather to an interpretation. In the
absence of reliable trade associations, therefore, there is a functional need for identifying
intermediaries who have the capacity to facilitate communication between the regulated
and regulators. Establishing this communication channel through which small firms wish
to address their concern will help government construct regulations and its enforcement
strategies that are perceived as fair and legitimate by the regulated.
Building Trust
A third general lesson concerns the importance of crafting trust between regulated entities
and regulators. In the U.S., the relationship between the two is characterized by "legal
formalization" (or rationalization) and "distrust" (Bardach & Kagan 1982b, Wallace
1995), making collected information suspect. Regulators have typically viewed firms
(regardless of size) as objects for regulatory coercion, as opposed to important
participants in policy making. This ethic was a response to agency capture evidenced in
economic regulations. To avoid capture, environmental policymakers deliberately built
regulatory systems based on adversarial legalism (Kagan 1995), under which prescriptive
legislation authorized agencies to issue rules backed by formal sanctions (Kagan &
Scholz 1984). These regulatory instruments, based on deterrence (or rationalist)
approach, were considered the primary drivers of compliance behavior (Fiorino 2001).
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Adversarial regulatory institutions were, to some degree, successful at regulating
large firms during the first stage of the development of environmental problem solving in
the 1970s. However, when an adversarial institution is combined with the rationalist
approach, it gives birth to problems that compromise or negate the effectiveness of
regulations in later stages. Specifically, this type of regulatory system is built on an
entrenched epistemological assumption that essential information and knowledge for
regulation come from external truth that can be discovered by regulators' expertise.
Under this positivist view, regulators are considered finder and transmitter of objective
truth, overlooking that new regulatory knowledge can be created and expanded through
continual interactions with the regulated. As a result, this system forecloses space for
collaborative problem solving, issuing imperatives without the possibility of industry
feedback. This is where collateral mistrust arises.
This tendency leads ultimately to the government as a controller and, in turn,
locks regulators and regulated entities into grossly asymmetrical power relationships.
Consequently, regulations become arbitrary, only reflecting the regulators' whims. Such
arbitrariness leads directly to the perceived illegitimacy of regulations on the part of the
regulated and generates resistance in one form or another. Here, regulators' possibilities
for winning societal agreements on regulations are lost.
In sum, given our core argument that cooperative regulatory relations facilitate
compliance behavior, the problems prevalent in an adversarial regulatory system preclude
the potential to encourage small firms' compliance by shutting out the new knowledge
and evaluative criteria needed to meet the challenges resulting from constantly evolving
environments.
It is empirically convincing that building trust is a prerequisite for increased
compliance. The issue is "whether" and "how" to build it. It must be noted that here,
"trust" does not mean blind trust, such as the unconditional belief in someone that
children may have for their parents. Nor do I mean the lexicographic definition of
"assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone" (Merriam-
Webster), that is essentially a personal attribute. Instead, our discussion of trust utilizes
Gambetta's notion defined as "the belief that when offered the chance, he/she is not
likely to behave in a way that damages us" (Gambetta 1988, quoted in Locke 2001). In
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this definition, trust is derived neither from affection nor from purposive-rational utility,
but rather from "grounding in open dialogue" among actors (Habermas 1990, quoted in
Adler 2001). Its nature is "situational and/or relational, something that develops between
two or more actors in a particular context or relationship" (Locke 2001). This alternative
notion of trust is well-suited to the relational approach.
Liberals are overly pessimistic about crafting trust. From a liberal viewpoint, trust
can be found, but never created in the short term (Sabel 1992). Conversely, recent studies
of economic development present evidence of trust creation even under adverse
conditions. This is demonstrated in Richard Locke's case study of the cheese industry in
the Italian South and the agricultural industry in Northeast Brazil. In the study, Locke
argues that trust can be built "through a sequential process that mixes together self-
interested action, government policy, and the development of self-governing mechanism"
(Locke 2001). Although the three sequential components are not perfectly matched with
our discussion-in the sense that Locke's main focus is on the construction of trust
within industries, rather than between government and industries-his argument still
provides an important insight into the trust-building process.
By combining Locke's argument with my research findings, I suggest practical
guidance to initiate and sustain trust in regulatory settings. It comprises: 1) identifying
collective interests, 2) maintaining consistency or predictability of behavior within a
mutually reasonable range, and 3) maintaining formal/informal communication channels.
These guide rules are not necessarily sequential, but must be followed throughout the
trust-building process.
First, interacting entities must clarify their collective wants in order to properly
understand the meanings of their own and the other's actions. Because to give meaning is
to make sense of the situation with respect to what "they" as well as "we" did and why,
this is a prerequisite for sowing seeds of trust on bare ground. At this stage, it does not
matter whether the pursued interests are economic or normative in nature, only that one
side perceives them as agreed-upon interests of the other.
At the outset of the interactions, both KDA and the ERP staff appeared to
cooperate in pursuit of their own interests, but not of the other's. KDA recognized the
need for cooperation to increase the association's influence over individual members. For
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their part, the ERP staff needed to cooperate to ensure maximal results of the new
regulation and to convince the opponents within the MADEP. Regardless of the nature of
their interests, both parties understood what "we" wanted and what "they" expected from
"us". In this way, the two groups of actors minimized the possibility of disagreements
over interpretations of future events. Obviously, the southern California dry cleaning
community failed to form and articulate coordinated interests, as did their counterpart in
Massachusetts. As the first lesson indicates, if the SCAQMD had helped them to identify
their collective interests, the relationship between regulators and the regulated would
have changed for the better.
Second, regulators need to recognize that unexpected or sudden changes in
requirements will almost certainly diminish trust on the part of the regulated, should any
trust exist. Because most small firms (and even associations) have no full-time
environmental staff and thus lack the capacity to prepare for unexpected regulatory
changes, they would be hard-pressed to comply should the situation arise. Small firms are
comfortable when regulations are stable and changes in requirements are known well in
advance through informed dialogue. Southern California drycleaners insist that the Rule
1421 amendments were so abrupt that they have no time to adapt. For example, the 2002
amendment mandated a total ban on Perc use, beginning in 2020. The rationale for this
amendment was based on concrete evidence of low compliance throughout the second
half of the 1990s. The SCAQMD believed that this shock therapy would change
drycleaners' compliance behavior and accelerate technology shifts. The agency also
believed that drycleaners had reasonable time to adapt.
At present, it is impossible to verify the SCAQMD's predictions. Nevertheless, it
is clear that the drycleaners' negative, angry reaction was entirely unanticipated by the
regulators. Many interviewees stated that they would shut down their dry cleaning
business after 2020 and open a restaurant, grocery or other business instead. Because they
felt threatened and furious at regulators and the unstable business environment, the
interviewees made no further efforts to change behavioral routines. One interviewee
commented, "Why should I maintain my Perc machine in good condition? I can't use it
after 2020 anyway." Drycleaners thought that the SCAQMD was moving too fast without
consulting with them. This perception led the community to view even minor changes as
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radical. For them, the actual time period for compliance preparation was immaterial
because the change was imposed abruptly and unilaterally.
Without a doubt, the shock therapy exacerbated drycleaners' prevailing hostility
toward the SCAQMD and foreclosed the possibility of the community's cooperation.
KDLA stopped conversing with compliance officials and appealed to Governing Board
members of SCAQMD, a majority of whom are elected officials representing the
District's four counties. From the perspective of the SCAQMD compliance officials, this
unexpected KDLA action was a typical industry lobbying tactic to avoid the reasonable
regulation. As a result, the agency's distrust toward the drycleaners also deepened.
In contrast, the MADEP discarded this traditional approach and instead sought
input from KDA before making a change. For example, the agency consulted with KDA
as long as a year before the implementation of e-filing. The purpose of the talks was not
to ask the association whether the new filing method was feasible but to obtain KDA's
help in persuading its members to accept changes in requirements. As we have seen in
detail in Chapter 4, KDA responded positively to the agency's request and consequently,
the MADEP successfully implemented e-filing and began seeing substantial
administrative savings.
It should be noted that stable regulation does not imply immutability. Rather, it
connotes a predictable business environment in which small firms enjoy open, informed
communication. It is understood that change is a feature of social interactions. Fossilized
policies cannot meet the regulatory demands emerging from complicated and shifting
webs of interactions. To be effective, regulatory policy must be capable of evolving in
pace with a continuously changing context. However, I have observed that at the trust-
building stage, regulatory changes must be perceived as reasonable by regulated entities.
Once this seemingly incremental methodology builds trust, it will aid the implementation
of more drastic future changes, often deemed necessary in the environmental arena.
Finally, ongoing communication between regulators and regulated entities is
essential. Prior to enacting a new regulation, regulators are generally open to dialogue
with industries in order to legitimize their planned action. After enactment, regulators all
too often stop conversing with the regulated and communication channels break down.
This terminates any seeds of trust that may have begun germinating. Therefore,
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institutionalizing communication channels is a crucial element for creating and sustaining
trust, whether such channels are formal or informal.
The Massachusetts case is illustrative. In addition to establishing a hotline, Paul
Reilly, the ERP dry cleaning sector manager, has attended KDA's ERP seminars and
New Year's parties. KDA officials thought that Reilly's attendance would be short-lived,
but it has continued to the present. In the 2004 ERP seminar, I asked the manager why he
attended. He responded, "We never expected the ERP seminars would last this long, but
now we see how sincere KDA is. I feel an obligation to come to see if there is anything I
can do for them." Furthermore, along with some KDA board members, he was always
among the last people to leave the event. He remained even after the seminars ended in
order to respond to additional questions. When I told him it was 10:00 p.m. and time to
leave, he said, "There are still one or two people here with questions that I might help
answer." KDA officials and most members interviewed stated that Reilly's consistent
attendance led them to view the agency as responsible and reliable. It appears that this
small gesture contributed greatly to advancing simple cooperation into so-called
"reflexive trust" (Adler 2001) or "studied trust" (Sabel 1992).
This section has offered guidance for regulators to create trust within formal regulatory
settings in order to secure large gains in small firm compliance. The main theme is
consistent with what Glasbergen (1996) termed social learning, focusing on interactions
and communications among actors. With a redefinition of the role of government, it
argued for institutional arrangements that expand the array of possible strategies
regulated entities may pursue. Of course, even within such a rearranged institution, actors
still retain a range of options. Thus, the application of this general guidance must be
tailored to the particular socio-historical context associated with each industry/locale.
Future Research and Concluding Remarks
I am certain of the relative advantages of cooperative institutions for small firm
regulation, but there still remain three crucial issues to be addressed. Although not
directly related to the dissertation's central research question, they need to be mentioned
to further future research on small firm regulation.
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First, what concerns advocates of adversarial institutions is agency capture, which
is a fair misgiving. Although an individual small firm does not have the capacity to
capture an agency, small firms' collective efforts can lead to this result. How can we
ensure that government maintains pressure on industries while fostering cooperative
relations?
One promising method is "outsourcing" regulation (O'Rourke 2003), which refers
to third party involvement in policymaking and monitoring processes. This does not
imply a discarding of government accountability to the public or a weakening of its
authority. Rather, it must be understood as taking advantage of external resources and
utilizing government capacity more effectively.
Recent regulation studies provide strong support for this approach. In their game
theoretic model, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) showed that public interest group
involvement in regulation helps prevent agency capture by increasing industry's lobbying
costs with no change in benefits. O'Rourke (2003) introduces the notion of "social
regulation" that focuses on the role of independent third party monitoring to improve the
effectiveness of labor practice governance, particularly in sweatshops. Esbenshade (2000)
documents that non-governmental monitoring raises compliance with labor standards in
the apparel industry.
The central feature of third party involvement is an emphasis on transparency to
catalyze public scrutiny, accountability, and competition among firms, while maintaining
a system of sanctions. This strategy offers the encouraging alternative regulatory model,
by moving beyond conventional CAC regulation based solely on deterrence theory and
overcoming the limits of voluntary regulation implicit in the theory of norms.
In this scenario, identifying which third party is most likely to affect small firms'
polluting behavior, and considering what information will best generate motivating
pressure are among regulators' principal tasks. For example, small firms, not being well
known to the public in terms of their brand names or the goods and services they
produce, may be immune to the pressure national media attention or international
environmental groups may exert. In our dry cleaning cases, it is difficult to evaluate
whether public pressure affected the drycleaners' compliance behavior, as they have not
been confronted with direct pressure from third parties. Nevertheless, some interviewees
219
stated that they were concerned about complaints from the landlord and neighboring
stores, rather than the general public. Therefore, the success of a third party involvement
strategy largely depends on selecting the right source of pressure according to the
characteristics of each particular industry and its locale.
A second issue concerns the impacts of the number of actors or community size
on sources of respect and coordinating common interests, which was not addressed in the
dissertation. How important of a variable is community size?
One of the key explanations of Massachusetts drycleaners' compliance behavior
lay in KDA's effort to overcome a job inferiority complex. They viewed environmental
compliance as a promising way to overcome the inferiority complex by gaining respect
from others. How does this compare to the southern California community? Although
systematic data are unavailable on this question, both the census data and short comments
revealed in interviews with Massachusetts drycleaners help us infer the reason for the
divergence.
As of 2000, there were 17,369 Koreans in Massachusetts. This number is far
smaller than those of other minority groups in the state. Also, Koreans' distributional
pattern differs from other Massachusetts ethnic groups. Chinese, Haitian, Vietnamese and
other immigrants are highly concentrated in a small number of cities and publicly
demonstrate their cultural heritage. This residential concentration contributes to securing
political influence with local politicians. In contrast, Koreans are widely spread across the
state. "Together with the absolute small number of population, our residential distribution
made us culturally and politically vulnerable. Politicians tended to ignore the Korean
community's opinion," Lowe asserted, "This recognition prompted us to outreach to
mainstream society.... To raise our voice, we needed to demonstrate that we fulfilled our
duties."
Koreans in southern California are located in a different socio-political and
cultural environment. Since the mid 1970s, more than 600,000 Koreans have resided in
southern California and they established a large "Korean colony" in Los Angeles (Light
5 Of 17,369, approximately 5,900 (34%) were Korean students whose visa status is F1 (international
student) or J1 (visiting scholar) - Source: The Boston Korean (03/10/05).
5 The 2000 census data reveals that 84,392 Chinese, 43,801 Indians, 33,692 Vietnamese, and 19,696
Cambodians settled down in Massachusetts.
220
& Bonacich 1988). Koreans in this region enjoy diverse ethnic resources and benefits
resulting from a large and rapidly growing population. For example, most private
companies as well as public agencies provide Korean language service. The Korean
community bore a mayor (City of Diamond Bar) and a member of the Federal House of
Representatives in the 1990s. There was therefore no urgent need for them to extensively
engage in the mainstream society. This enabled them to reside in an ethnic enclave that
was large enough to provide all the commonly expected conveniences of life. In this
social environment, drycleaners might not need to seek respect from non-Korean ethnic
groups. For them, compliance and cooperation with the SCAQMD might not be
considered a viable strategy for gaining respect. Currently, however, the explanation
above remains speculative, since it is inferred from insufficient data.
With regard to coordinating common interests, the issue shares the similar
concern with collective action problem, though not exactly the same. In his classic work,
The Logic of Collective Action, Olsen (1965) argued that "unless the number of
individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special devices to
make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will
not act to achieve their common or group interests." In a similar vein, Axelrod and Dion
(1988) assert that increasing the number of actors who simultaneously interact tends to
make coordinating behavior more difficult. Obviously, southern California has far more
drycleaners than Massachusetts (There are approximately 2,000 Korean drycleaners in
southern California and 400 in Massachusetts). Does the relatively large number of
drycleaners in southern California inhibit shaping collective behavioral guidance? While
this idea seems convincing, it cracks when we note that the Massachusetts community
outnumbers the one in Connecticut, yet the latter nevertheless exhibits no coordinated
behavior. As Ostrom (1990) pointed out, group facilitation of collective interests does not
seem to depend on the absolute number of actors, but rather on how noticeable each
actor's actions are within the group. This is an open question that requires further
scrutiny.
A final issue concerns a paradoxical phenomenon observed in the final stage of
the dissertation research. From a societal viewpoint, high compliance is not only a
blessing but also a curse in certain industries consisting of numerous small firms. This
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situation arises because although high compliance reduces toxic waste, it simultaneously
locks regulators and industries into existing technologies. In other words, as a result of
high compliance, regulators and industries are satisfied with the status quo and make little
effort to further technological innovation. For example, in 2003, the Massachusetts House
of Representatives attempted to outlaw Perc, but the MADEP objected in hearing
sessions. The MADEP's objection does not seem to be derived from agency capture.
Rather, the agency was afraid that the new regulation would destroy drycleaners' trust in
the agency, which had been built up over the preceding few years. Regardless of the
reason, high compliance sustained technological lock-in by providing a strong rationale
for continuing Perc use. To accelerate regulatory shift from reactive pollution control to
proactive pollution prevention, studies on how to stimulate innovation and diffusion of
advanced technologies are necessary.
The three issues addressed in this section require careful study to advance more effective
environmental policies. Nevertheless, they do not detract from the unique contributions
of the relational approach in explaining small firms' compliance behavior. This approach
offers a new understanding of small firms' behavioral logic of compliance and an
alternative system for creating and managing regulatory relations. The research findings
should be carefully considered when designing future environmental governance
structures.
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APPENDIX: ANOVA RESULTS OF SUERVEY RESPONSES
(SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES TO)
Table 9-1. Perceived Certainty of Monetary Penalty Imposition (Response to QS1)
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between 473.186 1 473.186 259.397 .000
Groups
Within Groups 379.428 208 1.824
Total 852.614 209
ANOVA results show that there is a difference in average scores of total responses on perceived
certainty of monetary penalty imposition between southern California and Massachusetts, and the
difference is statistically significant at the level of 0.05.
Table 9-2. Perceived Certainty of License Withdrawal: Response to QS2
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between
.028 1 .028 .035 .853
Groups
Within Groups 169.953 208 .817
Total 169.981 209
Though there is a small difference in average scores of total responses on perceived certainty of
license withdrawal between southern California and Massachusetts, ANOVA results indicate that
it is not statistically significant at the level of 0.05.
Table 11-1. Perceived Probability of Detection: Responses to QD1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between
66.898 1 66.898 42.896 .000Groups
Within Groups 324.383 208 1.560
Total 391.281 209
ANOVA results show that there is a difference in perceived probability of detection of total
responses between southern California and Massachusetts and the difference is statistically
significant at the level of 0.05.
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Table 11-2. Perceived Probability of Detection: Responses to QD2
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between
23788.524 1 23788.524 82.058 .000Groups
Within Groups 60299.099 208 289.900
Total 84087.624 209
ANOVA results show that there is a difference in perceived probability of detection of total
responses between southern California and Massachusetts and the difference is statistically
significant at the level of 0.05.
Table 14. Degree of Moral Obligation to Comply: Responses to QM1 and QM2
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between
.295 1 .295 .538 .464Groups
Within Groups 113.972 208 .548
Total 114.267 209
Though there is a difference in average scores of responses to QM1 between southern California
and Massachusetts, ANOVA results indicate that it is not statistically significant at the level of
0.05.
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between
.402 1 .402 .840 .360Groups
Within Groups 99.621 208 .479
Total 100.024 209
Though there is a difference in average scores of responses to QM2 between southern California
and Massachusetts, ANOVA results show that it is not statistically significant at the level of 0.05.
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Table 15. Degree of Resistance to Unfair Regulation: Responses to QM3
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 2.114 1 2.114 2.606 .108
Within Groups 167.924 207 .811
Total 170.038 208 _
Though there is a difference on average scores of responses to QM3 between southern
California and Massachusetts, ANOVA results indicate that it is not statistically significant at the
level of 0.05.
Table 16. Degree of Perceived Legitimacy: Average Scores of Responses to QLI - QL5
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between 975.938 1 975.938 1545.143 .000Groups
Within Groups 131.376 208 .632
Total 1107.314 209
ANOVA results show that there is a difference in average scores of responses to QL1 between
southern California and Massachusetts and it is statistically significant at the level of 0.05.
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between
849.974 1 849.974 1334.806 .000Groups
Within Groups 132.450 208 .637
Total 982.424 209
ANOVA results show that there is a difference on average scores of responses to QL2 between
southern California and Massachusetts and it is statistically significant at the level of 0.05.
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between
919.048 1 919.048 1230.662 .000Groups
Within Groups 155.333 208 .747
Total 1074.381 209
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ANOVA results show that there is a difference in average scores of responses to QL3 between
southern California and Massachusetts and it is statistically significant at the level of 0.05.
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between
787.504 1 787.504 1457.044 .000Groups
Within Groups 112.420 208 .540
Total 899.924 209
ANOVA results show that there is a difference in average scores of responses to QL4 between
southern California and Massachusetts and it is statistically significant at the level of 0.05.
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between
797.088 1 797.088 1220.250 .000Groups
Within Groups 135.869 208 .653
Total 932.957 209
ANOVA results show that there is a difference in average scores of responses to QL5 between
southern California and Massachusetts and it is statistically significant at the level of 0.05.
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